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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND ITS RELATION TO
A DECLARED PURPOSE OR POLICY
OF A STATUTE
THEODORE S. Cox*

The most distinctive and significant American contribution to
juridical theory is the doctrine of judicial review. Presidents and legislators, from the time of Mr. Jefferson to the present, have criticized it
severely. With some justice they have pointed to the fact that in the
Constitutional Convention the proposal to grant to the Supreme Court
the equivalent of the executive veto power was rejected.' Hence, successive critics have raised the cry of judicial usurpation. This criticism,
however, ignores three important facts. First, the Constitution itself in
declaring that the Constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof,
should be the supreme law of the land, states: "and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 2 Certainly, so far
as state action is concerned, this is a dear recognition of the authority
vested in the courts to examine the provisions of state constitutions orstate statutes in order to determine whether or not they conform to theFederal Constitution. This, of course, is judicial review. Secondly,.
statutory interpretation is an inherent judicial function. Where thereis a document embodying the fundamental law which has been promulgated by the power in which resides the ultimate sovereignty, there is
always a potential conflict between such document and statutes enacted in the ordinary process of legislation. The determination of this.
*Dean and Professor of Jurisprudence, College of William and Mary, Department of Jurisprudence.
1
~fany of the members of the Convention, however, were of the opinion that
the Supreme Court would exercise judicial review regardless of the absence of a
specific provision authorizing it. This view that such power would be exercised is
strengthened by the provisions of Article III, Section 2, giving the judicial power of
the United States jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and.
treaties.
2

U.S. Const. Art. VI.
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conflict obviously is within this inherent judical power. Thirdly, and
fundamentally, the doctrine of judicial review is the normal result of
the existence of a written constitution, the embodiment of the supreme
law of the land. This supreme law ipso facto must be superior to ordinary enactments by transient legislatures.
The origin of judicial review in America was not sudden; it was
the result of a slow historical development covering more than a hundred years. So far as the colonies were concerned, the basic fundamental law of each colony was its charter. A royal grant, the charter
-contained the powers, duties, obligations, and privileges conferred on
the colony. The enactments of the colonial assemblies were subject to
review by the crown and its agencies. With this colonial experience it is
not surprising, therefore, to find the principle (that legislation was
subject to review) continued after independence. Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, there had been pronouncements to this effect by courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
North Carolina, and elsewhere. But the most complete formulation of
the doctrine of judical review was enunciated in Virginia in 1782. By
the constitution of Virginia a pardon for treason could be granted only
by the action of both branches of the Virginia assembly. A person
convicted of treason was granted what he alleged to be a pardon, although it had been enacted by one house only. This alleged pardon being pleaded in a judicial proceeding, George Wythe,8 Chancellor of
Virginia, held that no pardon had been granted, since the court was of
the opinion that the purported grant of the pardon by a single house
was intended by that house to remain inoperative unless concurred in
by the other house. But Chancellor Wythe went on to state: "Nay,
more, if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by the people, I, in
administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united
powers at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the Constitution,
will say to them, 'here is the limit of your authority; and hither shall
you go but not further.' "4 This was five years before the meeting of
the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. While there is no evidence that John Marshall, during his very brief study of law under
Chancellor Wythe at the College of William and Mary, was consciously
'George Wythe, signer of the Declaration of Independence and a member of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was Professor of Law and Police at the
College of William and Mary from 1779 to 179o when he was succeeded by St.
George Tucker.
'Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5, 7 (Va. 1782).
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aware of the great Chancellor's attitude toward judicial review, it is
none the less interesting to speculate whether or not, perhaps, unconsciously, Marshall absorbed this legal philosophy from his instructor,
since it was Marshall who established the doctrine in American Constitutional Law, that the Supreme Court of the United States is supreme, necessarily possessing the power to review legislation.
Under the American theory of government, of course, there arethree separate departments. These three departments of government,.
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial are separate and distinct and are.
invested with separate grants of power. The character of these grants.
in the Federal Constitution is general and undefined, for example, in
the several articles it is successively stated: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress... The executive Power shall
be vested in a President ... the judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . "5 In all these grants the
terms were not defined but they were, none the less, well known and
well recognized things; so well known and understood as to be unnecessary of further definition. It should not be overlooked that the
term judicial power as then used and understood included, of course,
the power of interpreting the law.
But, each of the three branches of the government were presumably
of equal dignity, and the members of the other departments were as
much bound to support and defend the Constitution as was the judiciary. It is obvious, therefore, that the powers of the judiciary to declare
executive acts beyond the constitutional grant or to declare certain
legislative enactments not to be law, because they were not passed in
pursuance of the Constitution, were subject to certain restrictive principles. It is a matter of tremendous concern for one co-ordinate department of the government to declare that one of the other departments has acted beyond the constitutional power given it or has erroneously exerted its authority. It is a much graver charge for the court
to impugn the good faith of either of the other two departments. It
is fundamental, therefore, in determining the constitutionality of a
statute that the court proceed with the strongest kind of presumption
that the legislation is constitutional, that it will not be overturned
without dear evidence of its being beyond the limits granted to the
legislature by the Constitution, and that the court wherever possible
will so interpret the statute as to bring it within the constitutional
limitations.
5

U. S. Const. Art. I, II, and III.
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There has been a tendency for the states to provide in their constitutions that the title of a statute shall cover its scope and that if mat-terbe included in the statute which is not embraced by the title, such
-unincluded provisions must fail. For example, the Virginia constitution provides, "no law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in its title... "6 The Federal Constitution, however,
is silent on this point, and this silence, unfortunately, has encouraged
,the undesirable practice of attaching riders to bills. But in any case
-when a statute, federal or state, is before a court for interpretation,
,the purpose of the statute as indicated in its title and the policy of the
statute (if the legislature has seen fit to include a declaration of policy)
become highly pertinent facts. Care should be taken, however, to distinguish between purpose or policy and the motive which prompted
the legislature to enact the statute. In determining the constitutionality of statutes, courts are concerned only with the question of constitutional power and the constitutional exercise of it. In such cases the
important questions before the court regarding its constitutionality
are, first, did the legislature possess the power to enact the statute, and
secondly, was this power exercised constitutionally? In other words,
a court in reviewing a tax statute, for example, of necessity, would
inquire two things: did the legislature have the power to tax the thing
taxed; is the purpose of the particular statute the raising of revenue?
If the legislature possessed the power to levy the tax and the statute is
for the purpose of raising revenue, the court cannot concern itself
with the wisdom, the expediency, or the motive of such statute. But,
if the statute obviously is for the purpose of regulation and not for the
purpose of raising revenue, it must fail unless the legislature possessed
the constitutional power to regulate. This would be true regardless of
a legislative declaration of purpose or policy.
In applying the general principles of statutory interpretation, the
court is entitled to believe that the legislature does not intend to exceed its powers and that the true purpose of the statute has been
stated in the title and the declaration of policy unless the contrary
is obvious.
Let us consider some of the leading cases involving the question of
the effect of a legislative declaration of purpose or policy on the question of the constitutionality of a statute. In the case of Minnesota v.
Barber,7 decided in 189o, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
WVa. Const. § 52.
7136

U. S. 313, IO S. Ct. 862, 34 L. ed. 455 (1890).
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question of determining the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute
which required meat offered for sale for human consumption in Minnesota to be inspected by Minnesota inspectors within twenty-four
hours of slaughtering. Its purpose was described thus: "An act for the
protection of the public health by providing for inspection, before
slaughtering, of cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for
human food." In holding the statute to be unconstitutional, as placing
an improper burden on interstate commerce, the court stated: "The
presumption that this statute was enacted in good faith, for the purpose
expressed in the title, namely to protect the health of the people of
Minnesota, cannot control the final determination of the question
whether it is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
There may be no purpose upon the part of a legislature to violate the
provisions of that instrument, and yet a statute enacted by it, under
forms of law, may, by its necessary operation, be destructive of rights
granted or secured by the Constitution. In such cases, the courts must
sustain the supreme law of the land by declaring the statute unconstitutional and void."8
In 1928 the principle enunciated in Minnesota v. Barber was applied in the Louisiana Shrimp Case.9 The act under consideration dedared that all shrimp and parts thereof in Louisiana waters were property of the state. It was made unlawful to ship any shrimp from Louisiana without removing the heads and hulls, while it also was made unlawful to export any raw shells, heads, and hulls since they were "required to be manufactured into fertilizer or to be used as an element in
chicken-feed." The facts showed that 95%of the Louisiana shrimp was
intended for out of state consumption; that some shrimp bran was
made in Louisiana from heads and hulls, all of which was shipped out
of the state for use in making fertilizer; that no more than 50%/ of the
hulls and heads removed in Louisiana was used for any purpose; and
that the heads and hulls had no market value and frequently became
a nuisance. The court held the statute to be unconstitutional as
amounting to a burdensome regulation of interstate commerce, stating:
"The facts alleged in the complaint, the details set forth on the plain6136 U. S. 313, 319, lo S. Ct. 862, 863, 34 L. ed. 455 (189o).

The court cited a long line of cases in support of this doctrine, quoting from
Henderson v. Mayor of the city of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268, 23 L. ed. 543 (1875),
as follows: "in whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect."
OFoster-Fountain Packing Co. et al. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 1. 73 L. ed.
147 (1928).
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tiffs' affidavits and the provisions of the Act to be restrained show that
the conservation of hulls and heads is a feigned and not a real purpose.
They support the plaintiffs' contention that the purpose of the enactment is to prevent the interstate movement of raw shrimp from the
Louisiana Marshes to the plants of Biloxi [Mississippi] in order through
commercial necessity to bring about the removal of the packing and
canning industries from Mississippi to Louisiana. The conditions imposed by the Act upon the interstate movement of the meat and other
products of shrimp are not intended, and do not operate, to conserve
them for the use of the people of the State."1 0 The court said further:
"One challenging the validity of a state enactment on the ground that
it is repugnant to the commerce clause is not necessarily bound by the
legislative declaration of purpose. It is open to him to show that in
their practical operation its provisions directly burden or destroy interstate commerce ... In determining what is interstate commerce, courts
look to practical considerations and the established course of business...""
In 1904 in McCray v. United States12 with three justices dissenting,
the Supreme Court held constitutional a federal statute levying a tax
on colored oleomargarine at much greater rate than was levied on uncolored oleomargarine. The statute declared as its purpose the raising of revenue although neither the court nor the general public was
so naive as to believe that the declaration of purpose disclosed the real
legislative intent. But, the court, recognizing the deference due to an
enactment by a coordinate branch of the government, chose to treat
it as a valid exercise of the taxing power on the ground that the statute
on its face was intended to raise revenue rather than to regulate. Since
a statute which on its face is intended to produce revenue is none the
less a taxing statute even though little or no revenue is produced and
even though regulation results, the court refused to look behind the
purpose as manifested by the legislative declaration and by the statute as a whole. This probably was correct since the judicial power cannot extend to a consideration of the soundness of constitutional theory,
the wisdom of political action, or an undisclosed motive.
Fifteen years later the Supreme Court decided another important
case quite analogous to the McCray case. In United States v. Dore"278 U. S. 1, 10, 49'S. Ct. 1. 3,3 L ed. 147 (1928).
2"278 U. S. 1, 10, 49 S. Ct. 1, 3, 73 L. ed. 147 (1928), citing cases, among them Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 S. Ct. 862, 34 L. ed. 455 (189o); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, i1 S. Ct. 213, 34 L. ed. 862 (1891).
2195
U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78 (1904).
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mus,13 the court held valid a federal statute placing a tax on the sale
of narcotics and establishing considerable control over such sales. Although the statute in its terms declared that it was a revenue measure,
its constitutionality was questioned on the ground that it was not an exercise of the taxing power but was an attempt to regulate a matter beyond federal control. By a five to four decision the court viewed the
statute as a valid exercise of the taxing power since on its face it was a
revenue producing measure which was not refuted by the statute as a
whole, and beyond this point the court had no authority to inquire.
Ironically, the future justified the position of the majority of the court
14
in that the narcotic law has become a source of considerable revenue.
In the case of Hill v. Wallace,15 decided in 1922, the Supreme Court
held invalid a federal statute which was declared to be "An Act taxing
contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery, and options for such
contracts, and providing for the regulation of boards of trade, and for
other purposes."'(' Mr. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the court
stated: "It is impossible to escape the conviction from a full reading of
this law, that it was enacted for the purpose of regulating the conduct
of boards of trade through the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture and the use of an administrative tribunal consisting of that
Secretary, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General. Indeed, the title of the act recites that one of its provisions is the regulation of the boards of trade."' 7 Since the act sought to regulate a matter
not shown to be subject to federal regulation, namely, intrastate commerce, the court held the statute beyond the federal authority. The
court held that the Child Labor Tax'8 case completely covered the case
1249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919).
"/Other pertinent decisions are Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5, 45 S. Ct.
446 (1925), where it was held that the practice of a profession could not be regulated

by the United States under pretext of raising revenue; United States v. Constantine,
296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223, 8o L. ed. 233 (1935) where it was held that "Congress in the guise of a taxing statute could not impose sanctions for violation of
state law respecting the local sale of liquor;" and the Child Labor Tax case, 259 U.
S.

20,

42

S. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817

(1922),

in which a statute entitled "An Act to pro-

vide revenue and for other purposes" imposing a "tax" on persons knowingly employing children below certain ages in certain industries while those unknowingly doing the same thing were not subjected to the "tax" was held to be unconstitutional, the court taking the position that this alleged "tax" was in effect a penalty
and was intended to regulate and not to raise revenue and stating, "scienter is associated with penalties not with taxes."
2259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
2Italics, the Court's.
"7259

U. S. 44, 66,

"s259

U. S.

20, 42

42 S. Ct. 453, 457, 66 L. ed. 822
S. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817 (1922).

(1922).
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in hand and quoted from the former as follows: "Out of a proper respect for the acts of a coordinate branch of the Government, the court
has gone far to sustain taxing acts as such, even though there has been
ground for suspecting from the weight of the tax it was intended to
destroy its subject. But in the act before us, the presumption of validity
cannot prevail, because the proof of the contrary is found on the very
face of its provisions. Grant the validity of this law and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control
any one of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction
of which the states have never parted with, and which are reserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure
of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax
upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word 'tax' would
be to break down all constitutional limitations to the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States."19
A study of these cases suggests the quandary in which the courts are
placed: either they must accept the declared purpose and policy of the
legislature as controlling, even though the whole statute indicates
something entirely different, or else they must declare that the legislature has committed an error or has been guilty of bad faith. There
seems to be but one course for the courts to follow and that is for them,
as they have done in the past, to view the statute as a whole and determine whether or not by any possibility it can be interpreted in accordance with the declared legislative purpose or policy. If this can be done,
of course, in light of general principles of statutory construction, the
statute will be held to be constitutional, but if the declared purpose
and policy are at complete variance with the actual character of the
statute and its operation, the court would be derelict if it relied solely
on such declaration of purpose and policy. In fact such a view would
be stultifying. To impugn the motives and good faith of a coordinate
branch of the government, surely is a very serious matter, but to permit unconstitutional legislation to hide behind the cloak of a title or
a declaration of policy is reprehensible.
The problem is aggravated when in addition to a declaration of
purpose or policy the legislature includes a finding of fact. For example,
after the Futures Trading Act was declared unconstitutional, 20 Congress enacted another statute, the Grain Futures Act in which were recited congressional findings of fact that: transactions known as "fu"259 U. S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 449, 450, 66 L. ed. 817 (1922).
"Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
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tures" were affected with the public interest; they were susceptible to
speculation, manipulation, and control; sudden and unreasonable
fluctuations in price frequently resulted; such fluctuations in price
were an obstruction to and a burden on interstate commerce; and that
regulation was imperative to protect such commerce and the national
public interest therein. The statute came before the court in the case
of Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, et al. v. Olsen, et al., 21 decided in 1923. Mr. Chief Justice Taft again speaking for the court compared the instant case with Hill v. Wallace and quoting from the latter said: "It follows that sales for future delivery on the Board of Trade
are not in and of themselves interstate commerce. They cannot come
within the regulatory power of Congress as such, unless they are regarded by Congress, from the evidence before it, as directly interfering
with interstate commerce so as to be an obstruction or burden thereon."22 The court held that the Grain Futures Act differed from the
Futures Trading Act "in having the very features the absence of which"
prevented the court from sustaining the earlier legislation.
Continuing its opinion, the court quoted from Stafford v. Wallace23 as follows: "Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice,
and threatens to obstruct or unduly burden the freedom of interstate
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide
the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are
dearly non-existent." Then said the court, "in the act we are considering, Congress has expressly declared that transactions and prices of
grain in dealing in futures are susceptible to speculations, manipulations and control which are detrimental to the producer and consumer
and persons handling grain in interstate commerce and render regulation imperative for the production of such commerce and the national public interest therein." "It is clear" continued the court, "from
the citations in the statement of the case, of evidence before committees of investigation as to manipulations of the futures market and
their effect, that we would be unwarranted in rejecting the finding of
Congress as unreasonable, and that in our inquiry as to the validity of
this legislation we must accept the view that such manipulation does
2262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).
o
2262 U. S. 1, 32, 43 S. Ct. 47 , 476, 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).

"258 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735 (1922).
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work to the detriment of producers, consumers, shippers, and legitimate dealers in interstate commerce in grain and that it is a real
abuse."2 4 Two justices dissented from this opinion. The conclusion
seems inescapable that a legislative finding of fact declared in a statute
unless obviously false may result in the statute's being held constitutional when without such declaration the statute might be held void.
Somewhat similar to the two cases of Hill v. Wallace and Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. Olsen are the cases dealing with the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The former was considered in 1935 in the case of United
States v. Butler.25 The Agricultural Adjustment Act declared that an
economic emergency existed "due to the disparity of farm prices and
those of other commodities, reducing farmers' purchasing power thus
affecting transactions in farm commodities, burdening and obstructing interstate commerce." The act further declared that it was the
policy of Congress to establish and maintain such balance between the
production and consumption of agricultural commodities and such
marketing conditions therefor as well as reestablish prices to farmers
at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power
with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing
power of agricultural commodities in the past period. The technique
employed was the levying of an alleged processing tax. Interestingly
enough the government did not seek to have this statute upheld on the
ground of regulating interstate commerce (despite the mention of it
in the act) but sought to have it upheld as a valid tax. The court, with
three justices dissenting, held that as a matter of fact the statute sought
to regulate agricultural production and that the alleged tax was a mere
incident, a means to that end. Since the majority of the court was of
the opinion that regulation of agricultural production was beyond the
power of the Federal Government to regulate, the statute was held un26
constitutional.
Undaunted, Congress in 1937 enacted the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act and declared that "the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities in interstate commerce impairs the purchasing
34262 U. S. 1, 37, 43 S. Ct. 470, 477, 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).
252 9 7 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 8o L. ed. 477 (1936).
26Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent which was joined in by Mr. Justice Brendeis
and Mr. Justice Cardozo, stated: "While unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of the Government is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."
297 U. S. 1, 78, 56 S. Ct. 312, 325, 8o L. ed. 477 (1936).
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power of the farmers." Such interference was declared in the statute to
"burden and obstruct the normal channels of interstate commerce."
And it was stated that it was the congressional policy, by the use of
power delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture "to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities
in interstate commerce as will establish prices to farmers at a level
that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power
of agricultural commodities in the base period . .-. 27 The Supreme
Court, by a five to four decision, upheld the constitutionality of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act in the case of United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., et al.,2 8 which concerned marketing agree29
ments affecting the production and distribution of milk.
The constitutionality of the Agricultural Marketing Agreements
Act was again upheld in the case of H. P. Hood and Sons v. United
States,30 decided at the same time. Mr. Justice Roberts dissented on the
ground that there had been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture. He maintained that there
was no standard by which such administrative action was confined or
executed, and that the only guide in respect to the choice of method
which the Secretary of Agriculture might select for raising the price
of milk was the declaration of policy embodied in the statute.31 Here
2rWith certain exceptions, as in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the base
period was fixed at August, 1909, to July. 1914, or if it was impossible to determine
such period then the period 1919 to 1929.
2'307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. ed. 1446 (939).
21Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented, stating: "First,
Congress possesses the powers delegated by the Constitution-no others. The opinion
of this court in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (935), 295 U. S.
495, 79 L. ed. 1507, 55 S. Ct. 837, 97 A. L. R. 947, noteworthy because of modernity
and reaffirmation of ancient doctrine-sufficiently demonstrates the absence of congressional authority to manage private business affairs under the transparent guise
of regulating interstate commerce. True, production and distribution of milk are
most important enterprises, not easy of wise execution; but so is breeding the cows,
authors of the commodity, also sowing and reaping the fodder which inspires them."
307 U. S. 533, 582, 59 S. Ct. 993, 1017, 83 L. ed. 1446 (1939).
The dissenting justices stated further that even if this power were possessed by
Congress it could not be delegated to another. Such delegation of power 'to the
Secretary of Agriculture allowing him to "prescribe according to his own errant will
and then to execute" was "not government by law but by caprice." Mr. Justice
Roberts, dissenting, maintained that the act was so administered, contrary to the
terms of the statute, that all producers did not receive uniform prices for milk, thus
the small handlers, placed at the mercy of the large ones, were destroyed and denied
due process of law.
3'307 U. S. 588, 59 S. Ct. ioig, 83 L. ed. 1478 (1939).
"Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler joined in this dissent. 307 U. S.
588, 603, 59 S. Ct. 1019, 1027, 83 L. ed. 1478 (1939).
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there is injected a new suggestion as to the effect of a legislative declaration of policy on the question of administrative action. It seems
highly doubtful that this case was intended as authority for any such
principle that a declaration of policy might replace a standard for administrative action.
In the field of public utilities we also are confronted with the effect
of a legislative finding of fact on the constitutionality of legislative enactments. It is a truism that a business which is not by nature and
character a public utility cannot be converted into one by legislative
fiat. There have been instances in which legislatures have declared
certain businesses to be public utilities which, by the nature and
character of their holding out, were not, as a matter of fact, public
utilities. Despite such legislative pronouncements, the courts have declared such statutes unconstitutional. But when a business once not
considered one affected with a public interest becomes generally so
considered, it would seem that a legislative finding of fact to that effect
becomes of tremendous significance in a question of the constitutionality of the statute. Perhaps one should mention in passing a comparison of a legislative conclusion of law, for example, that a particular
business is a public utility, with a legislative finding of fact which will
support such conclusion of law.
The courts seem to have been impartial in holding unconstitutional
legislation which, as a matter of fact, denies the declared constitutional
purpose and policy since both federal and state statutes of this type
have been declared invalid. There seems not to have been any greater
tendency to declare state legislation unconstitutional because of an
attempt by state legislatures to enact unconstitutional legislation behind the cloak of a declared purpose or policy than there has been in
federal legislation, although probably there may have been in the mind
of the court a belief that congressional legislation, since enacted by a
coordinate branch of the government, is entitled to greater deference
and consideration where declarations of purpose or policy and findings of fact have been included in such legislation. The Supreme Court
seems to have been reasonably consistent, for in all the cases it has not
been the declaration of purpose or policy alone that has been the determining factor, but such declaration coupled with the nature, character, operation and effect of the entire statute. In those cases dealing
with the declaration of the finding of fact by Congress, such declaration seems to have been given greater weight in that the court has been
unwilling to presume to doubt the correctness of this finding of fact
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unless there is no evidence to support it. It seems as if the court has
applied here, the principle which is applied to administrative findings
of fact, that such finding of fact will be accepted by the court unless
from the evidence before it, such administrative body could not have
arrived at the decision which it reached.
Let us consider by way of summary three types of statutes, one without a declaration of policy, another with such declaration, and still
another with a legislative finding of fact added. In all three, of course,
the presumption is in favor of their constitutionality, but in the second
case a declared policy may result in a statute's being held constitutional
when without it the opposite conclusion might be reached, since such
declaration clarifies the legislative intent. And in the third case the
likelihood of the statute's being held valid is enhanced, since the
legislative finding of fact (unless arbitrary and without evidence)
showing that the matter falls within the legislative power, supports
the legislature's assumption of authority over it.
The position, therefore, of the court seems generally sound. It is
inconceivable that a statute which actually, by nature and by operation, was intended to do one thing and attempts to do that thing should
be held constitutional, if as a matter of fact it is unconstitutional,
merely because the legislature has declared substantially that black is
white. It is something like "a rose by any other name." Perhaps this
attempt by a legislature to do something it feels would not receive
sanction when reviewed by the courts, by including a declaration of
purpose or policy quite different, would not exist were it not for judicial review. It is, perhaps, not too unreasonable to assume that did the
responsibility for the constitutionality of legislation not rest ultimately
on the courts the legislators might assume greater responsibility, to the
end that legislation of doubtful constitutionality be not enacted. Unfortunately, even in the recent past, there have been instances where
the executive and legislative branches both have presumed to secure
enactment of legislation, regardless of any doubts of constitutionality,
no matter how reasonable such doubts may have been. Such an attempt
scarcely is calculated to impress the citizen with either the legal wisdom
or good faith of such reckless proponents of doubtful legislation.
It is certainly true that a great deal of legislation inconsistent with
the Constitution would have been allowed to stand had the courts been
willing to accept as conclusive the legislative declarations of purpose
and policy. If the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, as by
its own terms it is declared to be, and if statutes enacted by transient
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legislatures must conform to the fundamental law in order to be valid,
and if the interpretation of such fundamental law and the statutes purportedly passed in pursuance thereof is a function of the judiciary, the
courts must continue to hold unconstitutional legislative enactments
which transcend the Constitution, even to the extent of looking behind
the declaration of legislative purpose or policy when such declarations
and the statutes themselves are irreconcilable. This they must do even
though in the doing they question legislative good faith.
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INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS AS A MEANS OF
EFFECTUATING GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES
ROBERT

H. GRAY*

As a means of social control, income tax deductions obviously represent but a small segment of a much larger problem which permeates not
only the entire field of taxation, but also the entire field of law, of
politics, and of economics as well. The regulation of individual conduct has been a necessary by-product of all organized society. The
planning and supervision of activity and the adjustment of differences
have always been important parts of community life. Compliance has
been secured by the use of self-restraint, coercion and hope for reward;
the extent and the complexity of the machinery required for this purpose has varied with the economic and political development of the
state and with the objectives desired and the means used to obtain

them.
Contemporary industrial civilization, with its division of labor, its
intricate financial system, and its large-scale production and distribution of goods, has demanded careful planning and coordination. Although opinions differ as to the proper place which government should
occupy in this vast organization, few fail to appreciate the growing importance of political regulation and control. The Laissez-faire philosophy of the nineteenth century is being rapidly replaced by a less individualistic attitude. Administrative tribunals and state ownership

and operation of property reflect this fundamental change. The close
interrelationship between "governmenf" and "business" makes it inevitable that the policies and actions of each depend upon and tremendously affect those of the other.
In addition to the direct control exercised by the federal, state, and
local governments over public and private industry, the power to tax
and the power to spend are being used to an increasing extent to supplement the more direct forms of regulation. In many types of situations the taxing power is a peculiarly effective method of effectuating
"non-fiscal" policies. 1 For many years it has been recognized that the
*Assistant Professor of Economics and Law, Washington and Lee University.
et seq.
"Taxation for non-fiscal purposes is taxation not to produce revenue to carry
on a given program of public expenditures but to produce directly certain eco1 See Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 129
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2
collection of any tax necessarily affects social and economic institutions.

Even when laid solely for the purpose of raising revenue, a tax may influence the buying habits of the public and consequently change the
nature and location of industry; it may have a direct effect upon savings and upon the accumulation and distribution of wealth. In short,
the government cannot collect revenue without "inevitably affecting
social relations." It is because of this inevitable effect that taxation
assumes such great importance as a means of social control. "The only
real issue," it has been said, "is whether this powerful instrument shall
be wielded blindly or whether it shall be intelligently directed toward
4
the attainment of consciously sought social objectives."
Greater recognition is being given to the fact that all governmental activities interact upon one another and unless there is a careful analysis of the purposes to be achieved by 'each there is great
danger that they will nullify rather than support the general policies
of the governing authority.5 The taxing and spending powers are thus
being used with increasing effectiveness in the redistribution of income
and wealth, to subsidize industry through tax exemptions and direct
payments, and to encourage or prohibit certain types of conduct
through special forms of taxation. 6 Inheritance taxes, processing taxes
and farmer benefit payments, protective tariffs, special taxes on oleomargarine and state bank notes, exemptions from taxation, excess and
undistributed profits taxes, taxes on liquor-these illustrate but a few
ways in which the taxing and spending powers have been used to
regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services.
However, in spite of the fact that federal, state, and local taxes
nomic or social effects irrespective of whether revenue is actually raised or not."
Peck, The Use of the Taxing Power for Non-Fiscal Purposes (1936) i85 Annals of
The American Academy of Political and Social Science 57.
2"Taxation ... is the most pervasive and privileged exercise of the police power;
with the enormous increase in taxes resulting from the war, along with its large
effect on the margins for profit, it is becoming the most effective exercise of the
police power. Even when not consciously intended to be regulative, taxes nevertheless regulate." Commons, Instrumental Economics (1934) 820.
'Seligman, Essays in Taxation (1oth ed., 1925) 316; Preliminary Report of the
Committee of the National Tax Association on Federal Taxation of Corporations
(1938) 23, 24.

'Heer. Taxation as an Instrument of Social Control (1937) 42 AM. J. of Sociology 484.
'Shoup, op. cit. supra, note i at 129.
OSee Bingham, Economic Effects of the New Deal Tax Policy (1937) 3 So. Econ.
J. 270, 275, 276.
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7
absorb more than one-fifth of the national income the wisdom of using the taxing power for non-fiscal purposes is still a subject of serious
controversy. 8Although there has been no disagreement concerning the
proposition that the collection of any tax necessarily affects business,
there has been a sharp difference of opinion as to the proper method of
treating this inevitable consequence of taxation. Many believe that the
effect of taxation should be minimized as much as possible-that the
principle of "neutrality" should be a fundamental tenet of public finance; if there must be social control, the control should be achieved by
direct legislation enacted for that particular purpose. They emphasize
the difficulty of constructing an equitable tax system under the most
favorable circumstances and insist that, because of the scope and complexity of the revenue problem, any attempt to incorporate regulatory
provisions into tax legislation makes it virtually impossible to secure
a satisfactory answer to two questions which are said to be separate and
distinct. The result of this failure to segregate taxation from regulation,
it is argued, is inadequate revenue, ineffective control, or both.
This over-simplification of the problem, however, fails to take into
consideration the fact that since all taxes affect the production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services, any attempt to "neutralize" this phenomenon is itself a method of social control. An insistence upon the maintenance of the status quo requires a careful consideration of the effects of taxation and involves exactly the same typeof "non-fiscal" judgment that is required when a tax is imposed for
the purpose of raising revenue in a manner which will also lead tochanged conditions of a kind thought desirable by the taxing authority. If the "leave-them-as-you-find-them" 9 principle of taxation does not
involve the exercise of control, then its proponents are reduced to theabsurd position of advocating the collection of a tax regardless of its.
effect. This, of course, is never done. Whether "consciously, unconsciously, blindly, ignorantly, by greed and camouflage, by demagogic
plutocracy or demagogic democracy,"' 0 the effect of a tax plays an important part in the legislative process. It is much better to accept the7

See Moulton and others, Capital, Expense, Employment, and Economic Stability

(1940) 271-

"For example, see Lutz, Public Finance (1936) 371 et seq.; Tuller, The Taxing
Power (1937) 13 et seq.; Todd, Taxation and the Redistribution of Wealth (1937) 22
Bulletin of the National Tax Association 269. Cf. Johnson, Vested Interests in Government Spending (1938) 17 Proceedings Academy of Political Science 7& , 79
Buehler, Public Finance (2d ed., 194o) 658.
"Commons, Instrumental Economics (1934) 821.
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fact that legislators do consider expected effects and openly and intelligently to adapt them so that they will implement the policies of
the government, than to permit a secret opposition to a changing
-order impair the very real value of an important instrument of control
under the guise of economic doctrine.
Whatever may be the merits of the opposition to the use of taxation as a means of regulation, it is clear that so far as the income tax
is concerned, taxation is being used for non-fiscal purposes. Although
the need for revenue played an important part in the enactment of in,come tax legislation, the post-Civil War acts grew out of the Populist
movement. 1' The unrest and demand for social reform during the
latter part of the nineteenth century contributed largely to the enactment of the tax declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co.12 While the bitter denunciation of the Court which follow,ed this decision gradually subsided,'3 the movement for tax reform
-continued and resulted in the Corporation Franchise Act of 19o914 and
and the Sixteenth Amendment..
While the policy underlying the use of the graduated income tax
has long been the subject of dispute, 15 it is clear that regardless of
whether its justification is found in the fact that it is the best measure
of the taxpayer's "ability to pay" or that it is the most efficient means
of "redistributing" income, the deduction provisions of the present
federal statute are a necessary part of the successful operation of either
policy. Since the taxpayer's gross income16 is brought within the scope
,of the statute and since two persons with the same gross income may
have entirely different net incomes, neither the "ability" theory nor
ithe "redistribution" theory will be followed unless the deduction section permits an accurate reflection of the prevailing concept of income.
In addition to the major function of determining income, the de,duction section has been used for the purpose of effectuating other
"See Blakey, the Federal Income Tax (1940) Ch. i.
"157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895); 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 S. Ct.
Buehler, Regulatory Taxation (1939) 17 Harv. Bus. Rev. 138.

912

(1895). See

"For a reprint of editorials see Department of Justice, Taxation of Government

Bondholders and Employees (1938) Appendix Vol. i, No. 1o.
U36 Stat. 11, 112.
"With Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice (1894), Part II,
,compare Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938) 18 et seq.; Messages of President
Roosevelt of June ig, 1935, March 3, 1936 and November 16, 1937; Hale, Economic
Theory and the Statesman, in Tugwell, the Trend of Economics (1924) 189, 217
,et seq.
"See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 22.
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policies of the national government. The most obvious example is, of
course, the deduction for charitable contributions. 17 Largely in an
effort to encourage private charitable institutions which perform a
part of the activities of government, Congress has provided for a
limited reduction in taxes for those who donate to such institutions.' 8
However, the deduction is not limited to charities. Contributions to
federal, state, and local governments, and to war veteran and fraternal
organizations are also encouraged. In an effort to "stimulate prospecting and exploration"'19 special deduction provisions have been includedh
in various revenue measures. 20 Deductions based on "discovery value"
rather than cost and percentage depletion based on gross income havebeen used to encourage the development of the mining and oil and.
gas industries. Although the deduction of interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry tax exempt securities is not permitted, an
exception is made in the case of original subscribers who purchaseUnited States obligations. 21 Since banks and other financial institutions pay interest on much of their funds used for investment, this ex-22 "
ception was made in order to protect the market for federal bonds.
Finally, the deduction of travelling expense while away from homeincurred in the pursuit of a trade or business, "including the entireamount expended for meals and lodging" 23 and the deduction of pay-ments made to irrevocable employees' pension trusts24 were includedl
for the respective purposes of encouraging persons to enter business forthemselves (1) 25 and to prevent employees from being deprived of
expected benefits which would result from a termination of revocable
trusts. 26 Thus Congress has intentionally employed income tax deductions. as a means of securing desired courses of conduct and in a very
real sense much of this effort has been successful.27
1

"lnternal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (o), (q).
'BE. g., see Committee Reports to this effect reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C. B_
741, 742, 789, 795.
"1939-i (Part 2) C. B. 121.
1'For the modified provisions see Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §§ 2a (M), 114.
(b), (2), (s), (4)'1 lnternal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (b).
22939-1 (Part 2) C. B. 604.
=Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (a) (I).
"Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (p).
261 Cong. Rec. 5201.
"1939-1 (Part a) C. B. 761.
2'For a discussion of the extent to which the combined income tax and estate
tax deductions encourage gifts to charity see Harriss, Taxes and Philanthropy
(1940) 32 Columbia Univ. Q. 112. See also Magill, Federal Regulation of Family
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However, as is usually the case with taxation, income tax deductions
have produced consequences of both a favorable and unfavorable na-ture. For example, the deduction for interest is allowed even though
-not incurred in the production of income. 28 Since the rental value of
his residence is not taxed to the home-owner, this deduction, coupled
-with a similar one for taxes, 29 encourages home ownership. In view of
the exemption of building and loan associations from taxation a0 this
result appears to be consistent with congressional policy. But since the
,deduction is also allowed to corporations and since there is a policy to
;tax corporate income both to the corporation and later to the taxpayer
when received in the form of dividends, the interest deduction offers an
-opportunity to avoid the tax to the corporation; by issuing bonds in.stead of stock to its shareholders, it is thus possible for many corporations greatly to reduce their taxable profit by the simple expedient of
paying dividends in the form of interest. 81
Because of the deliberate use which Congress has made of income
tax deductions in the past and because of the inevitable effect such de82
ductions have on corporate policies and individual conduct, it is to

be expected that this practice will become of increasing importance
in the future. By adjusting deductions particularly important to selected types of income, by classifying and giving varying effect to certain
expenditures, by'providing for new and eliminating old deductions, it
is possible to penalize or subsidize industries, occupations and trades,
and to regulate through coercion and reward.3 3 Unless the Constitution stands in the way, an absolute control over deductions offers another powerful weapon of social control.
Settlements (1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 265, 278. See also Harriss, Philanthropy and
Federal Tax Exemptions (1939) 47 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 541.
'Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (b).
'Id. § 23 (c).
3MId. § 1oi (4).
"Conrad, Some Suggestions for Changes in the Federal Income Tax (1939) 17
Taxes 713, 717, 718; Magill, Effects of Taxation on Corporate Policies (1938) 72
U. S. L. Rev. 637, 644.
'Lay, Some Public and Business Policies Embodied in the Federal Income Tax
(1938) 18 Southwestern Soc. Sci. Q. 322.
3"The whole theory of 'incentive taxation' can by a simple twist of the tongue
be transformed into 'penalty taxation,' if one wills to do so. The taxpayer who is
allowed to deduct from his taxable income the amount of his charitable contributions during the year is favored over the taxpayer who, having made no such con-tributions, is 'penalized' for his failure to do so. The matter is one of draftsmanship.
Since the two forms of statutes do not have different effects, it is submitted that
they should not have different constitutional consequences." Gellhorn, Administra.tive Law (1940) 444, 445-
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The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly expressed
the view that federal income tax deductions are exclusively a matter of
legislative concern; that they involve statutory and not constitutional
problems. 34 Typical of the many statements found in the Board of Tax
Appeals, lower federal court, and Supreme Court opinions is the one
appearing in Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Company: "Unquestionably Congress has power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to
85
tax."
While the cases fully support the statement that Congress has the
power to deny all deductions from gross income,3 6 there is considerable
doubt as to the power of Congress to condition such deductions. Taken
literally it would, of course, give the national government tremendous
power over matters heretofore considered to be exclusively within the
control of the states. Because of the steeply graduated personal income
tax rates3 7 and because of the magnitude of corporate deductions when
compared with net income,38 the economic coercion resulting from a
threat of disallowance would compel prompt compliance with many
forms of regulation.
However, the broad generalizations of the type quoted above appear in cases dealing with interpretations of the Fifth and Sixteenth
Amendments. The questions under discussion related solely to the
constitutional rights of private persons and did not involve alleged encroachments by the national government upon the reserved powers of
the states. Actually, the Supreme Court has not permitted Congress to
exercise uncontrolled discretion over deductions. In 1921, Congress revised the income tax sections relating to life insurance companies for
the purpose of providing a more equitable method of taxing their
3

'See White v. United States, 3o5 U. S. 281, 292, 59 S. Ct. 179, 184 (1938); Deputy
v. DuPont, 3o8 U. S. 488, 6o S. Ct. 363, 366 (1940); and Helvering v. Winmill, 3o 5
U. S. 79, 84, 59 S. Ct. 45, 47 (1938).
'292 U. S. 37t, 381, 54 S. Ct. 758, 76o (1934).

"More than a hundred cases have been found which support those cited in note
34 supra.
3TThe refusal of a deduction to a taxpayer in the highest income bracket would
result in an increase in the surtax of 75 per-cent of the deduction disallowed. See
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 12.
"Aggregate federal eorporate tax returns for 1936 reported total receipts of
$132,722,6o2,ooo. Total deductions amounted to $124,951,715,ooo.

Although $78,023,-

o7,ooo of this latter sum represented cost of goods sold, nevertheless even the balance amounted to almost six times the net corporate income. U. S. Treasury Department, Statistics of Income for 1936, Patt 2, p. 24.
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earnings. Of the various deductions permitted there was one for tax exempt interest and another for 4% of certain reserves less the
amount of the aforementioned interest which had been previously
deducted. 9 In National Life Insurance Co. v. United States40 the Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional. "Congress had no
power purposely and directly to tax state obligations by refusing to
41
their owners deductions allowed to others."
In view of these conflicting statements, the extent to which Congress
may use deductions from gross income as a means of attaining objdctives which could not be reached by direct action is by no means dear.
As Congress has made no attempt to use the deduction section to secure
such objectives since the decision in National Life Insurance Co. v.
United States, there are no additional Supreme Court cases directly in
point. However, a number of important cases growing out of similar
federal tax legislation and a rapidly changing political and economic
panorama suggest a probable solution to the problem.
The growing importance of government in business, the immediate
sensitiveness of a competitive economy to a relative change in prices and
purchasing power, the impossibility of insulating the effects of direct
regulation, taxation, and public expenditures-all obviously require
coordinated and cooperative action on the part of private enterprise
and the national, state, and local governments. Seriously divergent
policies must inevitably result in chaos. In a sense it is thus unfortunate
that the uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the powers of Congress and of the several state legislatures has often led to an artificial
selection of the instruments of social control. Instead of selecting the
most effective means of reaching a desired result it has often been necessary to select a cumbersome and even an unsatisfactory method of attaining a legislative objective.
Since the power of Congress to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" 42 is said to embrace "every conceivable power of
taxation, '4 and since taxation inevitably affects economic and social
relations, it is not surprising that this fortuitous conjunction of political and economic power should be exercised with increasing frequency.
s9Revenue Act of 1921, § 245.
4*277 U. S. 508, 48 S. Ct. 591 (1928).
41277 U. S. 508, 522, 48 S. Ct. 591, 594. Cf. Revenue Act of 1928, § 117.
"U. S. Const. Art I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
"Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 12, 36 S. Ct. 236, 239 (1916).
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Aside from its superior effectiveness for many purposes, it has the ob44
vious advantage of constitutional validity in many types of situations,
a validity which makes its use advisable from a political point of view
even though the exercise of some other, but less extensive, grant of
authority would be more advantageous from an economic standpoint.
Thus constitutional considerations compel congressional use and misuse of the taxing power. Constitutional considerations likewise form
the basis of attack upon the exercise of this power. Undoubtedly a large
part of the opposition to the use of the national taxing power for nonfiscal purposes is based upon either an objection to an extension of the
activities of Congress in general or an objection to specific regulations
in particular rather than because of any fundamental disapproval of
regulation by taxation. By insisting upon a different and, allegedly,
more direct method of social control, it has been frequently possible to
raise serious constitutional doubts as to its validity and thus discourage
its enactment, or, if this fails, to argue that the legislation is not in substance a tax even though it is in form. Since every tax statute represents
at least an ostensible attempt to raise revenue and necessarily operates
as a method of control,45 the Supreme Court has frequently been
called upon to determine the permissible limits of this inherent powerto-regulate-through-taxation. Unless it is to be supposed that the taxing power of Congress is the Achilles heel of our dual system of government, some line must be drawn between permissible revenue measures
and unconstitutional interference. 46 Yet the drawing of this line is extremely difficult. Running counter to the concept of states' rights is the
powerful force of economic necessity. The development of transportation and communication has obliterated state boundaries for many
practical purposes. 47 It has long been recognized that in many situations regulation must be nation-wide if it is to be effective. The internal
affairs of the states are becoming increasingly subject to federal control.
"See Hall, Government and Business (1939) 311-314.
""In the levying of every tax Congress must inevitably have a purpose other
than the raising of revenue since it cannot escape the responsibility of controlling
in the national interest the non-fiscal regulatory effects of the distribution of tax
burdens. There can, in short, be no such thing as taxation for revenue only." Cushman, Social and Economic Control through Taxation (1934) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 757,
764.
""Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the
exclusive province of the states." Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. x,
gg (U. S. 1824). See also, Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution
(1922) 1 N. C. L. Rev. 61, 69; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 175 et seq.
'7E. g., the Shreveport case, Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States,
234 U. S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833 (1914).
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In addition to the current trend toward greater centralization,
those who oppose the use of the taxing power for non-fiscal purposes
have been faced with a long-continued course of legislative conduct to
the contrary, conduct which has been sustained, moreover, by numerour Supreme Court decisions.
The framers of the Constitution were well aware of the regulatory
aspects of taxationA8 Colonial tariffs and the interstate barriers under
the Articles of Confederation supplied ample training in the use of
tax legislation for non-fiscal purposes.49 This recognition was voiced
from the floor of the Convention and is contained in the Constitution
itself. 50 The requirement that direct taxes be apportioned is a lasting
memorial to a keen appreciation of the possible effect of a national
capitation tax upon the existence of slavery in the South. 51
The second act of the new Congress, 2 a tariff on imports "for the
support of government... and the encouragement and protection of
manufactures," eloquently describes the prevailing legislative opinion
in 1789. Furthermore, this use of the taxing power to secure collateral
results was not confined to import duties. In 1791 a tax was laid on
domestic liquor;53 although enacted primarily for the purpose of raising revenue, one of the reasons given for this particular exaction was
that it would tend to discourage the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Thus, the virtually contemporaneous action of members of Con"Brant, Regulation by Taxation (19s5) 85 New Republic 98. Cf. Cushman,
The National Police Power under the Taxing Clause of the Constitution (1920) 4
Minn. L. Rev. 247, 296 n. 34; Stocking, The Development of American Institutions, in
Spahr and Others, Economic Principles and Problems (1940) 41, 49.

"For numerous illustrations see Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 6o3, 85 N. E.
545,

908).

'For

example, see Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787

(1920) 412.

"Paterson, J., a member of the Consitution Convention, said that "The provision was made in favor of the southern states. They possessed a large number of
slaves; and had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive.
A majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them a limited territory,
well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision
had been introduced into the Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of
the other states. Congress, in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily,
and land in every part of the Union at the same rate or measure: so much a head in
the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the clause in the Constitution, which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the states, according to their respective numbers." Hylton v. United States,
3 Dall. 171, 177 (U. S. 1796).
01 Stat. 24 (1789)1 Stat. 199 (179 0 .
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gress, many of whom were members of the Constitutional Convention,
indicates that the latter body saw no objection to taxation for regulatory purposes54-at least so long as the statute was in the form of a revenue measure habitually employed for fiscal purpose. Congress was
deliberately given very broad taxing powers; there was no intention to
perpetuate the fundamental weaknesses of the Confederation. These
powers were known to have regulatory consequences, yet there was no
attempt to confine such consequences within the limits of the other
delegated powers.
In view of the scope of the federal taxing power and the historical
basis. 5 for its use for non-fiscal purposes, it was to be expected that attempts to use it to burden and to prohibit would be sustained by the
Supreme Court. And such has been the case. As long as the statute has
been in the form of an ordinary revenue measure it has been invariably
upheld. There has been no constitutional objection to a tax which
"merely" handicaps or discourages a given course of conduct. Thus in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno56 the "tax" on state bank notes was sustained
even though it was dear that the statute would not produce revenue.
Although the Court did mention the fact that Congress had the power
to regulate currency, the decision was based squarely upon the proposition that Congress had the power to tax such notes and having this
power, the Court would not inquire into the amount of the tax or the
purpose for which it was enacted.
The doctrine of the Veazie Bank case was reaffirmed in McCray v.
United States.57 Although it was argued that the federal tax on colored
oleomargarine was so high that it would destroy the industry, the Court
refused to inquire into the reason for its enactment. There being a
power to tax, the rate was not a matter of judicial concern. Furthermore, even if there had been an abuse of power by Congress, the
Court would not abuse its own power by disciplining another branch
of the national government. 58 Other but less extreme cases indicated
the same judicial attitude. An inheritance tax was sustained in Knowl"'See J. w. Hampton, Jr., &Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 412, 48 S. Ct. 348,

353 (1928).

1z"Since 1789 the Federal Government has used the taxing power to encourage
or discourage, or even destroy, certain businesses, regulate others, and prevent still
others from entering the field." Anderson, Taxation, Recovery, and Defense (1940)

68.

.8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769 (1904).
W195 U. S. 27 at 54, 24 S. Ct. 769 at 776 (19o4).
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ton v. Moore59 and a tax on foreign-built yachts in Billings v. United
States;60 the former tax received strong congressional support because
it was admittedly a method of reducing large family fortunes while the
latter tax was enacted as a measure to protect domestic ship-building.
An attempt to regulate corporations 6' and at the same time to avoid, in
part, the decision in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. 02 was successful when the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 was upheld in
Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co.63 The objection that a tax on corporations
chartered by the states would enable Congress to destroy such institutions was said not to be a matter for the Court to decide. "The remedy
for such wrongs, if such in fact exist, is in the ability of the people to
choose their own representatives, and not in the exertion of unwarranted powers by courts of justice."64
In addition to sustaining prohibitive sanctions in the bare form of
tax legislation, the Supreme Court for a number of years indicated a
willingness to sustain regulations which were incorporated in the
statute for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the tax.
In Nicol v. Ames65 a federal "statute of frauds" for boards of trade was
sustained as a legitimate part of a tax statute. While the act prescribed
in detail the information to be contained in the memorandum of sale,
it was justified on the ground that the provisions were simply "means of
identifying the sale, and for collecting the tax by means of the required
stamp." Again, in Felsenheld v. United States," the Court upheld a
section of the statute laying an excise tax on tobacco which prohibited
the inclusion of "any article or thing whatsoever" on, in, or with the
package containing the tobacco other than specified stamps and labels;
even though the coupon in question was of inappreciable weight and
in no way interfered with the collection of the tax, Congress could
provide that the package bearing the revenue stamps "shall contain
only the article which is subject to the tax."
A much more ambitious scheme to use the ancillary powers of taxation was sustained in United States v. Doremus.67 In declaring the HarED178

U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900).
6'232 U. S. 261, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914).

""The first and only step thus far taken to place corporations, aside from railroads, under some form of government control." Bruce, Taxation of Manufacturing and Mercantile Corporations (1910) 3 State and Local Taxation 304.
"157 U. S.
"220 U. S.
9"220
U. S.
"173 U. S.
"s86 U. S.
67249 U. S.

429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895); 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895).
107, 31 S. Ct. 342 (1911).
107, 169, 31 S. Ct. 342, 366 (1911).
509, 19 S. Ct. 522 (1899).
126, 22 S. Ct. 740 (1902).
86, 39 S. Ct. 214 (1919).
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rison Narcotic Drug Act constitutional, the Court said that Congress
was clearly authorized to select as a subject of taxation dispensers of
narcotics; since the detailed provisions relating to their registration
had the tendency to diminish the clandestine sale of narcotics without
paying the tax, 68 "the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation
to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution,
it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induc'
ed it." 69
Thus, for the first one hundred and thirty years under the Constitution, the Court refused to make a distinction between taxes for fiscal
and for non-fiscal purposes. Although federal taxes had been declared
unconstitutional because they were said to violate the requirement of
apportionment, 70 or were on exports,7 1 or were contrary to the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity,72 no tax statute had been held invalid because of its regulatory effect. The national government had a
broad taxing power, and in the exercise of this power its discretion as
to the amount to be exacted was not subject to judicial review. Taxation often acted as a deterrent and occasionally as a prohibition; the
motive for such action was immaterial. The selection of the object of
the tax always involved non-fiscal considerations.73 Consequently when
President Taft, in order to eradicate an occupational disease resulting
from the handling of white phosphorus, recommended,7 4 and Congress
6"The tax was "$i. per annum."
"249 U. S. 86, 93, 39 S. Ct. 214, 216 (1919).
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895);
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
"Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 21 S. Ct. 648 (19o); United States v.
Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 459 (1915); Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United
States, 237 U. S. 19, 35 S.Ct. 496 (s915).
='Collector v. Day, ii Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871); United States v. Railroad Co., 17

Wall. 322 (U. S.1873).
-'"It is a common but, as we think, erroneous opinion in some quarters that the

legislative body enacting a taxing statute cannot with propriety take into consideration any other matters but the revenue sought to be obtained, and that if it has other
purposes besides raising revenue in imposing the tax, or in prescribing a particular
manner in which it shall be levied, the tax is invalid. When enacting a statute, it is
not only the right but the duty of a legislative body in such cases to take into con-

sideration the effect of the tax in an economic way on the people as a whole, and
the beneficial or injurious effects as the case may be which will result from the man-

ner in which the tax is levied. If this were not done, the result might be highly injurious to the public generally, and result in a condition of affairs which would

arouse so much protest and objection that our institutions would be endangered."
Green, J., in F. Couthoui, Inc. v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 158, 162, 163 (Ct. Cl., 1931).
'Message of December 6,
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enacted, 75 a prohibitive tax on the manufacture of white phosphorus
matches, the constitutional power of the national government was not
76
seriously questioned.
Because of the unbroken line of authority sustaining the taxing
power it was only reasonable that, when an attempt to regulate child
labor through the exercise of its power over commerce failed in Hammer v. Dagenhart,77 Congress should immediately thereafter seek to
reach the same result through taxation. However, in Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co. 78 the Court refused to follow its earlier practice and declared invalid the tax on the net profits of a business knowingly employing child labor. While indicating a willingness to concede that the
question of intent would not be considered when dealing with a prohibitory excise on "a commodity or other thing of value," Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, speaking for the majority, insisted that a detailed course
of conduct prescribed by the act presented a different problem; it was
an attempt to regulate subjects not entrusted to Congress. Although the
Court said that the provisions appearing on the face of the statute were
not "naturally and reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax," 79
and thus sought to distinguish it from the narcotics tax, it should be
noted that the detailed specifications in the child labor statute, unlike
those of the earlier legislation, were not enacted as an ostensible aid to
collection. Instead, they were merely descriptive of the industries subject to the tax-just as "notes used for circulation," "oleomargarine
which is yellow in color," and "white phosphorus matches" described,
in part, the businesses subject to other federal excise taxes. It is difficult to see how an excise tax on a business employing child labor discloses a clearer intention to regulate matters within the control of
the states than does an excise on matches containing white phosphorus;
yet to Taft the President and Taft the Chief Justice (in both offices
under oath to support the Constitution of the United States) the two
were entirely different. If the classification was valid under the Fifth
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment should not have stood in the
way. As was illustrated by the state bank note, olemargarine, narcotics,
inheritance, and corporation tax cases, the power to tax necessarily carried with it the power to interfere with local affairs. Yet in Hill v. Wal"'37Stat. 8 (1912).
"The Act was not litigated. Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 192.
'247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
7"259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449 (1922).
'259 U. S. 20, 43, 42 S. Ct. 449, 453 (1922).
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lace,s0 decided the same day, the Court again held a business tax invalid. A "tax" on the sale of grain at boards of trade other than those
boards of trade which complied with the requirements of the statute
was also said to be an attempt to regulate rather than to tax.
Beginning with the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court for more
than a decade thereafter displayed a vacillating attitude with regard
to the power of Congress to tax for non-fiscal purposes. For example,
it refused to grant certiorari in two cases 8 ' where lower federal courts
sustained the federal tax on the sale of tickets away from the box office.
Although the rate was so graduated that "the ticket speculator has no
motive to sell for a premium of between 50 cents and $1,"82 the lower
courts did not consider this a direct interference with state activity.
Perhaps the fact that the Supreme Court had previously held that the
states themselves could not regulate the price of theatre tickets83 justified the belief that this was not an "unauthorized exercise by Congress
of police power."8 4 Any doubt as to the availability of the taxing power
for regulatory measures was put to rest by the Supreme Court in J. W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.8 5 "So long as the motive of Congress and the effects of its legislative action are to secure revenue for
the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives
in the selection of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional
action."8 6 Yet in spite of this the Court in United States v. Constantine8 7 declared invalid a special excise tax on persons carrying on a
liquor business in violation of state law. Since the exaction in question
was in addition to the regular tax, since it was highly exorbitant, and
since the condition of its imposition was the commission of a crime, the
9'259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453 (1922). See also Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 46
S. Ct.
8 165 (1926).
sMcKenna v. Anderson, 31 F. (2d) ioi6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied, 279
U. S. 869,49 S. Ct. 482 (1929); Couthoui v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 158 (Ct. Ci., 1931)
cert. denied, 285 U. S. 548, 52 S. Ct. 396 (1932). Accord: Alexander Theatre Ticket
Office, Inc. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Apollo Operating Corp.
v. Anderson, 55 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
'2Alexander Theatre Ticket Office, Inc. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44, 48 (C.C.
A. 2d, 1927).
wrTyson & Bro. United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U. S.418, 47 S. Ct.
426 (1927).
8'23 F. (2d) 44, 47 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
6276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928). Tariff Act of 1922, § 315, authorizing the

President to regulate customs duties in order to equalize the costs of production in
the United States and competing foreign countries held valid.
U 2 7 6 U. S. 394, 412, 48 S. Ct. 348, 353 (1928).

8296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223 (1935).
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Court declared it to be a penalty, and being a penalty, it was an attempt to "usurp the police powers of the state." Mr. Justice Cardozo in
his dissenting opinion pointed out, however, that the classification ivas
a reasonable one, that the large profits of an illegal business, the expense and difficulty of tax collection, and the propriety of a higher tax
on illegality all led to the conclusion that the statute was an appropriate means of raising revenue.
In United States v. Butler88 the A. A. A. processing tax was held invalid since it was part of a scheme to regulate farm production. Since
the statute under consideration contained detailed regulatory provisions relating neither to the description of the persons subject to the
tax nor to the means of collecting it, it represented a departure from
the earlier tax legislation. It was largely because of this departure that
the act was declared unconstitutional. If the expenditure section of
the statute had been carefully insulated from the tax section, under
prior decisions8 9 the taxpayer would have been in no position to object to the manner in which the proceeds were used. Standing alone,
the processing tax was clearly a valid exercise of the federal taxing
power. 90 Except as a lesson of doubtful value in the drafting of statutes,
the Butler case has little bearing upon the question of regulatory taxation; and even the uncertainty created by the Constantine case has
been largely dispelled.
The National Firearms Act 91 providing for the registration and taxation of dealers, a tax of $200 on each transfer of certain types of firearms, and for the identification of transferees was sustained in Sonzinsky
v. United States.92 Even though it was argued that the statute was enacted for the purpose of regulating and suppressing traffic in firearms,
the Court refused to limit the federal taxing power. It said:
"Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it
interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed....
But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory
effect ....and it has long been established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing
power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome or
tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed .... Inquiry into the
'8297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936). Also Rickert Rice Mills v. Fortenot, 297 U. S.
110, 56 S. Ct. 374 (1936).

'*Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923).
mCincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 3oi U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 764 (1936).
"148 Stat. 1236 (1934).
'300 U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554 (1937).
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hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power
constitutionally
conferred upon it is beyond the competency of
93
courts."

Thus the Court reaffirmed the traditional view that a statute appearing on its face to be a revenue measure will be treated as an exercise of
the taxing power. The fact that Congress intends to achieve some result in addition to an avowed purpose of seeking funds for public ex94
penditure will not defeat the legislation; "objective constitutionality"
and not "the process of psychoanalysis" 95 determines its validity.
However, if the statute contains detailed regulations which do not
facilitate the collection of revenue a much more serious question is
raised. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.9 6 a tax of 15% on the sale
price of bituminous coal with a 13V% drawback for those operators
who complied with the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was declared to be a penalty and not a tax. But in Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins 97 the 19/2% tax imposed by the Bituminous Coal Act
of 1937 upon non-code members engaged in interstate commerce was
sustained, the regulatory provisions being "clearly within the power of
Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution."98 Since the
tax question was not seriously argued in the Cartercase it is difficult to
evaluate this method of regulation when the federal taxing power alone
is the basis for the local interference. A conditional tax or a conditional drawback may be declared invalid even though a classified tax
which gives something of the same result may be valid. That is, a "tax"
may be used to discourage or prohibit a certain course of conduct even
though it may not be possible to secure affirmative action through a
coercive exaction; situations requiring administrative flexibility may
be beyond federal control even though the static aspect of the same
problem may be effectively regulated.
However, any implied limitations upon the federal taxing power
must be carefully examined. The relatively few cases declaring federal
tax statutes unconstitutional are being carefully reconsidered by the
Supreme Court. The restriction against the taxation of the salaries of
03oo U. S. 506, 513-514, 57 S. Ct. 554, 555, 556 (1937).
'Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation (1934) 18
Minn. L. Rev. 757, 774 et seq.
"From the opinion of Cardozo, J., dissenting in United States v. Constantine,
296 U. S. 287, 299, 56 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1935).
10298 U. S.238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1956).
'31o U. S. 381, 6o S. Ct. 907 (1940).
Ws31o U. S. 381, 393, 60 S.Ct. 907, 912 (1940).
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federal judges has disappeared.9 9 There is increasing reluctance to
strike down retroactive taxes' 00 and there is a tendency to narrow the
direct tax concept so that it includes only capitation taxes and assessments upon real property. 1° 1 The doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity is rapidly disappearing,10 2 and it is even possible that the
Court will revert to the view advanced by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland'0 3 that state institutions are protected from
the national taxing power only by the uniformity and apportionment
clauses of the Constitution and by the locally elected members of Congress. In fact, the Court has sustained the use of "economic coercion"
on the states in order to compel them to enact legislation thought desirable by Congress. The 80% credit against the federal estate tax
for amounts paid to state governments under similar statutes was sustained over the objection of the State of Florida.' °4 And in Chas. C.
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis10 5 a federal tax on employers with a
90% credit for contributions made by such employers to state unemployment funds established in compliance with federal regulations was held valid. Compared with the possible implications of the
Davis and state employee tax case,' 06 the interference with local affairs
objected to in United States v. Constantine appears mild indeed; and
even if the Constantine decision has not been immunized by Sonzinsky
v. United States, 0 7 the strong dissent in the earlier case and the present
attitude of the Court give it very doubtful authority.
The other cases holding federal tax statutes invalid because of their
non-fiscal character are of small solace to opponents of federal regulation. United States v. Butler never amounted to more than a "lesson
in legislative draftsmanship,"' 108 and the rapidly expanding power over
commerce has largely nullified the effects of the remaining cases. Four
months after Hill v. Wallace Congress enacted a similar statute which
"See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277, 59 S. Ct. 838 (1939). Public Salary
Tax Act of 1939, § 3.
"'E. g., see United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498, 57 S. Ct. 309 (1937).
mSee New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 466 (1937).
'Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S.466, 480, 59 S.Ct. 595, 598 (1939).
u34 Wheat. 316, 435, 436 (U. S. 1819).
'"Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265 (1927).
'03o1 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883 (1937). See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619,
57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).

"'Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969 (1938).
"3oo

U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554 (1937).

208Powell, The Processing Tax and the Social Security Act (1936) 5 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 125, 130.
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was sustained in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen.109 The regulation
of the bituminous coal industry which was declared invalid in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co. was redrafted and upheld in Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins. Even Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. has been effectively circumscribed by the implications of National Labor Rela11 0
by the specific
tions Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporaton,
by United
and
Act
of
1938,111
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
112
Co.
Lumber
Darby
W.
F.
v.
States
The refurbishing of the taxing power, the broadening of the concept of interstate commerce and of the doctrine which permits national
regulation of matters which "directly affect" such commerce, the control over foreign trade and banking and currency, the exclusive management of the postal service, and the power to enact bankruptcy
measures-all combine to give tremendous power to the national government. In view of the multiple powers which may be exercised by
Congress and the unsympathetic manner in which the Supreme Court
has recently cited those tax decisions which overrode important national legislation, it may be reasonably supposed that future attempts to
use the taxing power either as an independent source of authority for
regulation or as an aid to some other delegated power will meet with
little constitutional restraint.

2'262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923).

U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
Stat. io6o (1938) §§ i (1), 12.
n261 S. Ct. 451 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 39 S. Ct.
529 (1918).
11301
152
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THE ENFORCEMENT OF ORAL PROMISES
TO GIVE REAL ESTATE SECURITY
THEODORE A. SMEDLEYO

Whenever a series of cases involves the use of a discretionary power
by a court of conscience, the results of such cases and the reasoning advanced to support such results are certain to lack the quality of uniformity. As the discretion and the conscience of individual human beings differ, so differ the decisions in these cases. Nor can it ever be expected, even hoped, to be otherwise, because each slight variance in facts
and circumstances of one case from another may and often should tip
the balance of justice on one side or the other. The necessity of adhering to a uniform system could readily become an intolerable restraint
on the efforts of the courts to obtain the proper solution to the problems raised in the litigation. However, freedom from the necessity of
following a set standard of decision may also lead to interminable confusion. If no precedent is to be observed as binding, or even strongly
persuasive, individuals have no means of ascertaining their rights and
liabilities, attorneys have no bases for arguing their clients' claims in
the courts, and the courts themselves have no guides to direct the
course of their decisions. Non-uniformity becomes chaos, and litigation becomes pure gambling, turning on the flip of a court's conscience.
A better demonstration of the above truths could hardly be found
than in the attempts of American courts to determine what effect
should be given to oral promises to give real estate security for a loan
or some similar obligation. The one point of general agreement in
this question is that the giving of a legal mortgage on real estate involves such a transfer of an interest in land as to come within the scope
of the Statute of Frauds.' Thus, a purely oral promise to give a security
interest in realty does not constitute a mortgage nor give any lien in the
eyes of a court of law, no matter how solemn nor well-evidenced the
oral promise may be. Since equity is known to be able in many circum*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
'Brown v. Stapleton, 24 N. E. (2d) o9 (Ind. 194o) ; Washington Brewery Co. v
Carry, 24 Ad. 151 (Md. 1892); Brown v. Drew, 67 N. H. 569, 42 At. 177 (1894);
Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938); Rutherford National
Bank v. Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. 18o (1933); Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y.
69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923); Newman v. Newman, 1o3 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921);
"Meachv. Stone and Perry, 1 D. Chip. 182 (Vt. 18x4); Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346,
128 S. E. 139 (1925); Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) § 75, 27 C. J. 218, Statute of
-Frauds § 198.
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stances to remedy the shortcomings of legal relief, and since equity
courts can be especially adept at side-stepping the obstacles of a statuteprescribing formalities, 2 it is natural that the courts of equity are frequently asked to decree the enforcement of oral security promises. The
number and variety of different views which have been expressed in
answer to requests for such equitable relief are amazing.
Take as an example the cases arising with these somewhat oversimplified facts as a nucleus. Landowner makes an oral agreement with
lender that if the latter will lend a stated sum of money on stated terms,
landowner will give a mortgage on his property to secure the repayment of the loan. The money is advanced and accepted, but for some
reason a formal mortgage is never executed. Landowner failing to repay the loan, lender seeks the aid of equity to declare and enforce hissecurity in the land.3 Perhaps the leading case in the field is Sleeth v.
Sampson, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1923, ruling
that the lender is not entitled to the lien sought.4 However, two earlier
2Consider, for instance, the power of equity to grant specific performance of
oral contracts to convey land absolutely, Clark, Principles of Equity (igig) § 13o;
McClintock, Equity (1936) § 55; and to declare a deed absolute in form to be ai
mortgage, Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) § 34o; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 7; Oral-.
Understandings At Variance With Absolute Deeds, (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 189.
8In asking equity to give him the benefit of the promised security, the bor-rower may present his request in various forms. The bill may be for specific performance of an oral contract to give a mortgage; it may ask for the declaration and/
foreclosure of an equitable lien; or it may seek to impress a lien on land; or some
other variation of one of these phrases may be employed.
It is to be understood that in case the rights of any bona fide purchaser of a
legal interest from the landowner intervene, such rights will be superior to the
claims of the borrower, who has merely an equitable interest. This discussion is
intended to consider only the situation in which no such third parties are involved,
so that the issue is simply as to the rights between lender and borrower. The authorities cited will go to this issue only, unless the contrary is expressly stated.
However, this is not to say that persons in addition to the lender and borrower
may not sometimes be involved. Creditors of the borrower are certainly interested,
as are purchasers or incumbrancers who for some reason may not be classed as bona
fide purchasers. No attempt will be made here to designate precisely what persons.
would stand prior to the lender in claiming an interest in the land. A few cases.
bearing on this point are: Farmers' State Bank v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66, 242 Pac.
466 (1926) ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408, 155 Pac. 791 (9 16); Lane v. Lloyd,
33 Ky. L. 570, 11O S.W. 401 (19o8); Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kimble, 132 Neb.
408, 272 N. W. 231 (1937); Herring v. Whitford, i 9 Neb. 725, 232 N. W. 581 (1930);
Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 55 Neb. 243, 75 N. W. 569(1898); West v. First
Baptist Church of Taft, 123 Tex. Civ. App. 388, 71 S.W. (2d) iogo (1934).
'237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). It has been said that this case was properly
decided because the loan was not actually made, and therefore no basis for an equitable mortgage was present. Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8, p. 48. However, Mr. Justice
Cardozo, writing the opinion for the New York Court of Appeals said: "Some money
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New York cases are the authorities most often cited for the proposition
that the lender should be given the benefit of the security orally
promised to him.5 In New Jersey, cases are on record from 18io to 1937
upholding the propriety of equity's affording relief to the lender, 6 but
in 1938 the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, in a 9-6 decision,7
reversed a lower court decision which had granted specific performance of the oral promise,8 apparently believing that the established
rule of New Jersey was being invoked. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1925 decreed specific performance of the oral
promise, even though counsel for the plaintiff did not think to argue
his case on this theory.9 Yet eight years later the same court, with three
of the same judges still on the bench, held that no such relief could be
given, 10 the court seemingly not remembering the existence of the
earlier decision. In an old Maryland case,21 the court went out of its
way to rule that the Statute of Frauds did not apply in such a case (the
defendant had not contended that it didl), but within two decades the
12
same court, reaching the opposite result in the same kind of a suit,
took occasion to flay the former opinion unmercifully. In their "extreme generality" the earlier statements of the court would, "if adopted
:as rules of decision ... operate as a judicial repeal of the statute of
frauds."' 8
The central bone of contention in most of these cases was whether
,r not the effect of the Statute of Frauds could be obviated by finding
sufficient part performance by the lender-promisee to enable equity to
decree that the landowner-promisor must specifically perform his part
was then handed to the borrower, though exactly how much the witness who overheard the conversation was unable to state." 237 N. Y. 69, 71-2, 142 N. E. 355, 356
(1923).

5Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. ooo (1894) ; Smith v. Smith, 125
N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (1891). In Sleeth v. Sampson, the New York Court of Appeals
declared that the above cases were not authority contrary to the decision reached
in Sleeth v. Sampson, and that only the dicta in those cases suggested a disagreement. 237 N. Y. 69 at 73, 142 N. E. 355 at 357 (1923).

'Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (181o) (not reported until 1881); Clark v.
Van Cleef, 75 N. J. Eq. 152, 71 Atl. 26o, 262 (19o8); Rutherford National Bank v.
Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. i8o (933); Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J.
6
Eq. 59 , 196 At. 205(1937).

'Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938).
'Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 Ad. 205 (1937).
'Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
"Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E. 179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (1933).
"Cole v. Cole, 41 Md. 301 (1875).
"Washington Brewery Co. v. Carry, 24 Ad. 151 (Md. 1892).
"Washington Brewery Co. v. Carry, 24 At. 151, 152 (Md. 1892).
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of the oral agreement. Here, as in cases involving oral land sale contracts, a difference of opinion exists as to what constitutes sufficient
14
part performance to take the case out of the operation of the Statute. It
is to be noted in passing, that this disagreement in turn springs from
a lack of consensus as to the basis and origin of the part performance
doctrine itself.' 5 While these arguments rage, other authority contends
that the issue is irrelevant entirely because the part performance doctrine of land sale cases is not applicable to oral security promise cases
in any event, 16 and some go so far as to cut the ground from under
the whole basic issue of how equity can avoid the Statute of Frauds
by declaring that the Statute was never intended to extend to cases
calling for such special functions of equity powers. 17 On the other extreme, there is an occasional refusal to recognize that equity courts
even have jurisdiction in the cases under consideration, because the
lender's remedy at law is adequate.' 8
Cases holding for or against the lender's prayer for relief are frequently based on inadequate authority,19 and when confronted with
"'Compare the two opinions in the Feldman case, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 Ad.
205 (1937) and 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938). Also compare Sleeth v. Sampson,
237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923) and Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E.
179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (1933) with Rutherford National Bank v. Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq.
571, 169 At. 18o (1933) and Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
15See Meach v. Stone and Perry, 1 D. Chip. 182 (Vt. 1814); Clark, Principles of

Equity (1919) §§ 131-135; McClintock, Equity (1936) §§ 55-56; Walsh, Equity (193o)
§§ 78-79.
1'Walsh, Equity (1930) §§ 62 and 85; Walsh Mortgages (1934) § 8.
"Schram v. Burt, 111 F. (2d) 557 at 562 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) ; Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 1o4 at 113, 38 N. E. ooo at 1002 (1894). See Costigan, Interpretation
of the Statute of Frauds (1919) 14 Ill. L. Rev. i. The last reference makes an argument that the original framers of the English Statute of Frauds specifically intended that it should apply only to law courts. The cases cited apparently derive their
authority from the clause found in some modern Statutes of Frauds, to the effect
that interests in land raised by operation of law are not within the mandate of the
Statute. See note 42, infra.

"Compare Newman v. Newman, 1o Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 at 75 (1921) and
Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687 at 688, 170 S. E. 179 at i8o, 89 A. L. . 1451 at
1453 (1933) with Hughes v. Mullaney, 92 Minn. 485, ioo N. W. 217 at 218 (19o4) and
Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346 at 350, 128 S. E. 139 at 141 (1925). Also Hicks v. Turck,
72 Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339 (1888) and Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 216, 17 N. W.
343 (1883) (written promise).
19Brown v. Stapleton, 24 N. E. (2d) gog at 91(Ind. 1940) (ruling that oral
promise is within Statute and therefore unenforceable is made in a subdordinate
clause, no authority cited); Brown v. Drew, 67 N. H. 569, 42 Atl. 177 (1894) (one
paragraph opinion); Aaron Frank Clothing Co. v. Deegan, 204 S. W. 471 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918) (rules on Statute of Frauds issue in two sentences; one of two cases
cited is a trust case, and several Texas cases to contrary are ignored) ; Williams v.
Rice, 6o Mich. 102, 26 N. W. 846 (1886) (decision to enforce lien made in two
sentences, no authority cited).
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a precedent contrary to the result desired to be reached, courts have
been known to distinguish the troublesome precedent with little more
20
than a hollow oratorical flourish.
In this mass of irreconcilables, generalizations must be somewhat
tenuous. Probably the numerical weight of authority is represented
by cases enforcing the lender's lien on the land in one manner or an-

other.21 But the opinion is here ventured that there has been at least
a noticeable trend since about 1920 toward the decision that the lender
can be given nothing on the basis of the oral promise of his debtor
to give security. Thus, since the case of Sleeth v. Sampson in 1923,22
New York has held to the rule that the oral promise will not be enforced, though the earlier decisions in that state were thought to hold
to the contrary. 23 As already stated, New Jersey reversed its field in
1938, in a positive, if not well-considered, decision in Feldman v. Warshawsky. 24 In 192 1, Ohio joined the jurisdictions denying relief.25 Also
already referred to is West Virginia's turn about between 1925 and
1933.26 Kansas, after having pursued an unusually intelligent course
"OFor instance, Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84, 85 (1938).
The chancery court had relied upon Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1810)
which had been widely cited as authority in other cases. In reversing the chancery
court decision, the Court of Errors and Appeals disposed of this old and venerable
precedent with this observation: "In Dean v. Anderson there was a complicated
situation of exchange of properties, involving a mortgage. All the deeds were executed and delivered and all that remained was the delivery of one mortgage." The
court did not take the trouble to explain just why these facts were significant as
distinguishing factors. Actually they seem to have provided no sensible distinction.
2Of some sixty-odd cases found which turn on this issue, or consider it directly, approximately forty favored an enforcement of the lien on one theory or
another. It is not pretended that these cases make up an exclusive list of the litigation in the field, but it is believed that they include the most important decisions
and are representative of the entire body of the case law on this point.
'237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). The exact issue of Sleeth v. Sampson seems
not to have arisen again in New York, but numerous lower court decisions have
cited the case as authority on related issues. See S. W. Straus and Co. v. Felson,
216 App. Div. 431 at 433, 215 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1926) (action at law for damages
for breach of oral promise to give security); Sinclair v. Purdy, 213 App. Div. 439 at
447, 21o N. Y. Supp. 208(1925)

(action for specific performance of oral contract

to convey land); Life Savers' Club, Inc. v. Mosher, 125 Misc. 341 at 342, 209 N. Y.
Supp. 741 (1925) (same) ; Matter of Estate of Schreier, 153 Misc. 711 at 712, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 932 (1934) (construction of will to determine whether mortgage is interest in
real property) .
"Sprague v. Cochran, j44 N. Y. 1o4, 38 N. E. woo (1892); Smith v. Smith, 125
N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (1891) - See note 5 supra.
2125
N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938).
=1o3 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921).
"OBlake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925) and Spencer v. Williams,
ii3 W. Va. 687, 17o S. E. 179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (1933).
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for several decades, in 1938 seems to have slipped into a rut of faulty
reasoning in denying enforcement of an oral security promise. 27 In
other jurisdictions the decisions have been too uncertain or the cases
28
too few to allow classification as to late tendencies.
2TCassity v. Cassity, 147 Kan. 411, 76 P. (2d) 862 (1938). Earlier cases in Kansas
granting relief on proper reasoning: Farmers' State Bank v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66,
242 Pac. 466 (1926) ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 4o8, 155 Pac. 791 (1916);Foster
Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 8o Pac. 49 (19o5).
'The courts seem to have leaned toward favoring relief in Minnesota: see
Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Hughes v. Mullaney, 92
Minn. 485, 1OO N. W. 217 (i9O4); Hecht v. Anthony, 204 Minn. 432, 283 N. W. 753
(1939) granting relief. But see dictum in Butler Bros. Co. v. Levin, 166 Minn. 158,
207 N. W. 315, 316-317 (1926); Renville State Bank v. Lentz, 171 Minn. 431, 214 N. W.

467, 468 (1927) ; Hatlestad v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 640, 268 N. W.
665, 667-69 (1936), where the Minnesota court definitely indicates its approval of
Sleeth v. Sampson. Also in Texas: See Bagley v. Pollock, 19 S. W. (2d) 193 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929); Floyd v. Hammond, 268 S. W. 146, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Pipkin
v. Bank of Miami, 179 S. W. 914, 915-17 (rex. Civ. App. 1915); McCarty v. Brackenridge, i Tex. Civ. App. 170, 20 S. W. 997, 1001 (1892), approving, in dictum, at least,

the doctrine that a lien may be given on the basis of an oral promise. But see Aaron
Frank Clothing Co. v. Deegan, 204 S. W. 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); West v. First
Baptist Church of Taft, 123 Tex. 388, 71 S. W. (2d) lo9o, 1OO (1934), where the

court denied that a lien on realty can be given by oral agreement. Also in Michigan
where three old cases and a recent federal court case allowed a lien to be enforced
on the basis of an oral promise: Williams v. Rice, 6o Mich. 102, 26 N. W. 846
(1886); Osgood v. Osgood, 78 Mich. 290, 44 N. W. 325(1889); Whitney v. Foster,
117 Mich. 643, 76 N. WV.114 (1898); Schram v. Burt, 111 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 6th,
194o); and see Steggall v. Steggall, 274 Mich. 402, 264 N. W. 842 (relief denied because claimant failed to sustain burden of proving oral agreement). But see Cheff
v. Haan, 269 Mich. 593, 257 N. W. 894, 896-97 (1934) criticizing the ready granting
of liens on oral promises and limiting the scope of such relief.
Relief has been favored, mostly in older cases which are apparently unquestioned, in Arkansas: King v. Williams, 66 Ark. 333, 50 S. W. 695 (1899); Lowe v.
Walker, 77 Ark. 103, 91 S. W. 22 (1905); Florida: Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fla. 282,
135 So. 899 (1931); Illinois: Grigaitis v. Gaidauskis, 214 Ill. App. 111 (1919); Iowa:

Vigars v. Hewins, 184 Ia. 683, 169 N. W. 119 (1918); Oklahoma: Allender v. EvansSmith Drug Co., 3 Ind. Terr. 628, 64 S. W. 558 (191o); see Nelson v. King, 92 Okla.
5, 217 Pac. 36o (1923); Oregon: see Tucker v. S. Ottenheimer Estate, 46 Ore. 585, 81
Pac. 360, 361-62 (19o5); South Dakota: Baker v. Baker, 2. S. D. 261, 49 N. W. 1O64
(1891); Hollister v. Sweet, 32 S. D. 141, 142 N. IV. 255 (1913); Wisconsin: Poole
v. Tannis, 137 Wis. 363, 118 N. W. 188 (19o8); Ludwig v. Ludwig, 170 Wis. 41, 172
N. W. 726 (1919).

Early decisions, still apparently unimpeached, denied relief in Indiana: Irvin
Adm'r. v. Hubbard, 49 Ind. 350 (1874); also Brown v. Stapleton, 24 N. E. (2d) gog
(Ind. 194o); Missouri: Wooldridge v. Scott, 69 Mo. 669 (1879); New Hampshire:
Brown v. Drew, 67 N. H. 569, 42 At. 177 (1894); Tennessee: Durant v. Davis, 57
Tenn. 425, 1O Heiskell 522 (1873); Vermont: Meach v. Stone and Perry, i D. Chip.
182 (Vt. 1814). Nebraska seems committed to the same view by two modern cases:
Herring v. Whitford, 119 Neb. 725, 232 N. W. 581 (193o); Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Kimble, 132 Neb. 408, 272 N. W. 231 (1937).

Opinion in Kentucky appears to be about evenly divided: see Keeton v. Owens,
228 Ky. 522, 15 S. W. (2d) 487, 488 (1929); Lane v. Lloyd, 33 Ky. L. 57o, 11o S. W.
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As to the reason for this apparent shift of opinion, one can only
speculate. Perhaps the tendency against granting relief is traceable to
the increasing popularity in these cases of the part performance doctrine, and to the narrowing of this doctrine generally, evidenced in
the stiffening reluctance of courts to allow the Statute of Frauds to be
circumvented except where the part performance will actually (not
merely possibly) leave the promisee with irreparable losses unless
specific performance is granted. 29 Or perhaps the judiciary is becoming of the opinion that in these days of universal education and a
plentiful supply of legal counsel there is no excuse for the failure to
put business transactions in written form as required by statute. With
this view the writer has no quarrel. If the aim of the courts is to force
upon the business public a more orderly system of dealing, it seems
hardly open to question that the goal is a desirable one. But as to the
methods used to attain this purpose, there is strong need for more
consideration. Nor is the need for dearer thinking confined to the decisions denying enforcement of the oral promise to give security, for
courts granting the relief do so as often as not on inaccurate reasoning.
The difficulty experienced by the courts in making sound determinations in these cases springs from the seeming close parallel between
the situations in which a landowner has promised orally to give security in the land, and that in which a landowner has promised orally to
sell the land. The promise to convey the security interest is thought to
be equivalent to the promise to convey the absolute title, and the return promise to lend money is presumed to stand in the same position
as the vendee's promise to pay the purchase price for the land. Since
the Statute of Frauds is held to cover both conveyances of an absolute
title and of a security interest, the courts, having accepted the analogy
between the two situations as being complete, naturally have reached
the conclusion that the same manner of avoiding the effect of the
Statute must apply identically whether the case involves an oral
30
promise to sell land or an oral promise to give security in land.
401, 402 (igo8); Sandy Hook Bank's Trustee v. Bear, 252 Ky. 6o 9 , 67 S. W. (2d) 972,
974 (1934)-

21In four jurisdictions, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, the
part performance doctrine has been completely rejected: Clark, Principles of Equity
(1919) § 134; McClintock, Equity (1936) § 55. That the stricter view of when specific performance will be given is increasing in favor: Walsh, Equity (193o) § 78.
"'For example: Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923) "We
see no distinction in this respect between a payment for an absolute conveyance and
a payment for a mortgage"; Feldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84,
85 (1938) . In virtually every security promise case turning on the part performance
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Further examination of the two transactions, however, quickly
brings to light several significant differences. In the first place, the intention of the contracting parties with regard to the land is not the
same. The prospective vendee has the essential aim and purpose of
obtaining ownership of the land, presumably motivated by such considerations as an expectation of taking produce from the land, or selling the land for profit, or making a home on it, and so on. The lender,
on the contrary, ordinarily has no direct designs on the land itself.
He does not particularly care to possess the land and has no specific
intention of becoming its owner, either immediately or in the future;
his desire is to assure the repayment of the money being loaned to the
landowner. He takes the borrower's promise that the land shall stand as
security because the land seems to be the best assurance of repayment
that the borrower can give. Had some personal property been available
for as sound a security, or some obligation of personal suretyship, the
lender would probably have been as well satisfied.
From this factual difference arises a difference in the relief needs of
the vendee and the lender. Since the vendee wants the land, and since
land is regarded as of such an unique character that the loss of land
cannot be compensated for in money damages, the need of the vendee
for equitable relief arises instantly upon the making of the oral promise to convey the land. Whether he has or has not paid any or all of
the purchase price, he stands in need of the assistance of equity if he
is to be made whole. In fact, the full payment of the purchase price
adds not one ounce to the weight of his plea to the equity court, for
he is always presumed to be able to recover back by a law action the
money paid out in reliance on the landowner's unfulfilled promise to
convey land.3 1 As has been pointed out, the lender's desire is the repayment of his loan. Thus, until that loan is made, until the money
is actually advanced to the borrower, the lender is in no position to
seek the aid of equity. The making of the promise to give security
establishes no "equity" in the promisee, as does the making of the
promise to sell. The promisee in the first situation needs no equitable
aid at this time because he is thought to have a complete remedy at
doctrine, there is a tacit assumption that the part performance rules of the sale
contract cases applies with the same effect in security promise cases.
"1This statement cannot of course be true in two jurisdictions which appear to
hold that mere payment of the purchase price is sufficient part performance by the
vendee-lowa and Georgia. And in other jurisdictions, payment of the price may
lend weight when accompanied by other acts of performance. But standing alone,
the payment does not give any more of an "equity" than the vendee already had
as a result of the making of the promise to convey.
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law in the form of an action for damages for breach of contract. For
unless the borrower will carry out his promise to give security, the
lender is persumably justified in refusing to make the loan, and the
total result is that the lender loses the prospective profits of the deal.
These profits will be his damages awarded in a law action.3 2 Now
when the loan is actually made on faith of the promise to secure, the
lender's status changes. From the moment the money is advanced to
the borrower, the lender needs equitable assistance, because unless
the borrower gives the security as promised, the lender stands to be
irreparably injured.33 That is, he will have to take his chances as an
unsecured creditor-exactly the thing against which he sought to contract-and no judgment at law for damages can make him anything
but an unsecured creditor as to past transactions 3 4 Although there has
been some confusion on the point, it should be understood that no
right of a lender to enforce a promise to give security should accrue
until he has actually made the loan. 6
OIt may be argued that if there is not a written promise, the law courts will not
recognize an action for damages. However, the action is for breach of the contract
to accept a loan on certain conditions (including the giving of security in land), and
is not for the breach of the contract to give a mortgage. Thus it is believed that a
law court can grant damages for the loss of profits expected to be obtained through
the loan transaction-i.e., interest charges. The oral promise to give security is not
being enforced in such an action; rather it is only significant as being a condition
of the loan which, when refused by the borrower, justified the lender in regarding
the loan contract as breached.
At any rate, the absence of a legal right because of the absence of writing is
not considered such a circumstance as to create an inadequate remedy at law. Failure
to meet legal formalities, without more, obviously cannot be the basis of an equitable right.
uHicks v. Turck, 72 Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339 (1888) (written promise); Irvine
v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J Eq.
496 (81o) ; Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925) ; McClintock, Equity
(1936) § 58, p. 97; Walsh, Equity (193o) § 85.
"Of course, as a judgment creditor he may perfect a lien which will give him
priority over general creditors of the borrower, and over subsequent lien creditors.
But such a lien is not enough to save the lender, because other intervening lien
creditors will be superior in right even though they may not be in the class of "bona
fide purchasers" who would have priority over the equitable lien interest based on
the oral promise to give security. Also, as some cases have mentioned, resorting to
a damages action involves the loss of the intended investment: Hicks v. Turck, 72
Mich. 311, 40 N. W. 339(1888) (written promise); Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn.
316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Hughes v. Mullaney, 92 Minn. 485, ioo N. W. 217 (1904).
Further, the judgment lien will ordinarily come too late to aid the lender, because
the borrower will have become insolvent, and damages judgments will be uncollectable. Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (181o); McClintock, Equity (1936) § 58,
P. 97.
"TFred T. Ley and Co. v. Wheat, 64 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1933); Iowa Loan
and Trust Co. v. Plewe, 202 Iowa 79, 29o N. W. 399 (1926); Milam v. Milam, 138
Tenn. 686, 200 S. W. 826 (1918); Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
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Thus, the security and sale cases are in contrast both as to the
point at which the need for equitable relief arises in the promisee, and
as to the basis on which this need for equitable relief rests. This
contrast is dearly demonstrated where the promises to sell or to give
security are in writing, the Statute of Frauds problem thus being eliminated. When the written promise to sell land is made, the vendee is
in position to seek specific performance of the contract, regardless of
whether he has already paid the purchase price, because he wants to
own the land, and cannot be compensated in money if he is deprived
of this ownership. The lender, even under a written contract to give
security, has no claim to equitable relief until he has advanced the
money to the borrower, and then his need for relief springs not from
the unique value of land but from the fact that only by being given
security can he have a complete remedy for the borrower's breach of
contract.
It was these factors upon which Professor Walsh based his categorical declaration that "these cases of equitable mortgages have nothing to do with the doctrine of part performance under the Statute of
Frauds."3 6 Evidently this statement is intended to refer to the law as
it should be, and not as it actually is, if many of the decisions are taken
as an indication of how the law presently stands. For these decisions
commonly argue not the issue whether the part performance doctrine
is applicable, but rather merely whether there has been sufficient performance under the doctrine. The point of Professor Walsh's theory is
passed by without even being noticed. This judicial snub results from
a failure to realize the basis of the Walsh concept of the source of the
lender's equity. The lender seems to be asking for a decree of specific
performance, as does the vendee. From this it would seem to follow
that his equity rests on his "right"3 7 to have equity grant the decree.
And does not this "right" depend on the same considerations in the
security as in the sale cases? The answer is no, but the fault in the
courts' reasoning lies not only in the last step (though this is certainly
open to criticism, as will be observed later); the basic fault is in the
first and second steps-the assumption that the lender's equity depends
on his right to a specific performance decree. His equitable right
§ 85, p. 414; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
"'Right" is technically a misnomer because the issuance of specific performance
decree is said to be a discretionary power of equity. The remedy is a matter of grace,
not of right. Miller v. Gardner, 198 So. 21 (Fla. 194o); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry Co.
wWalsh, Equity (193o)

v. Douthat,

o S. E. (2d) 881 (Va. 1940); McClintock, Equity (1936) § 52; Walsh,

Equity (193o) §

19,

p. 82-83.
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springs from the fact that only by his being given the security intended
can he be made whole. It is true that in cases where an oral promise
to secure has been made by the borrower, equity in awarding the
lender the benefit of the security is in effect granting specific performance of the promise. But this is only incidentally so, for it is admitted
by all that the recognition of rights under the broad equitable liens
concept includes the granting of a variety of types of relief in addition
to ordering the specific performance of express promises.38 In granting
such relief, equity acts under broader and more elastic powers than
merely its ability to grant specific performance. Stated in most general
terms, it is the power to work justice. Expressed in maxims, it is the
power of equity "to regard that as done which should have been done"
or "to prevent the Statute of Frauds from being made an instrument
of fraud," and so on. The granting of specific performance of oral
promises is only one example of the processes used by equity in executing its fundamental function of preventing injustice and of ordering
fair dealing. In confining themselves to the use of this particular
method 'in the security cases, the courts are mistaking an incident of
their powers for a limitation upon those powers.
It must be noticed that not all courts have fallen into such error.
Decisions are available which show a better understanding of the
true situation. One of the best statements appears in the Kansas case
'Schram v. Burt, iii F. (2d) 557 at 561-62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fa. 282, 135 So. 899 at goi (1931); Rutherford National Bank v. Bogle, 114
N. J. Eq. 571, 69 At. 18o at 182 (1933); Clark v. Armstrong and Murphy, x8o Okla,
514, 72 P. (2d) 362 at 365 (1937); Hollister v. Sweet, 32 S. D. 141, 142 N. W. 255 at 256
(1913); Walsh, Equity (1930) §§ 52, 85; Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 8.
Common demonstrations of the power of equity to grant liens on land irrespective of the intention of the parties include: Equitable mortgages raised in
absence of any promise to give security, see C6nkling v. Conkling, 126 N. J. Eq. 142,
8 A. (2d) 298 (1936); Wright v. Buchanan, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53, 57 (919).
Vendor's and vendee's liens on land granted, see Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 13,
84 N. E. 937 (19O8); Craft v. Latourett, 62 N. J. Eq. 2o6, 49 Atl. 71, (1901); Schram
v. Burt, iii F. (2d) 557 at 561-62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) (comparing vendor's lien
with lien based on oral security promise); Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 1o4, 38
N. E. ooo at 1002 (1894) (same). "Equitable liens" granted, based on unfair
or fraudulent conduct of the defendant, similar in nature to constructive trusts, see
Ringo v. McFarland, County Judge, 232 Ky. 622, 24 S. W. (2d) 265 (1930) (presenting a situation appropriate for either constructive trust or equitable lien relief) ;
Jones v. Carpenter, go Fla. 407, io6 So. 127 (1925). Constructive trusts, raised on
the basis of "fraud," which fraud in some jurisdictions may be no more than an unjust refusal to perform a promise made in good faith, see Becker v. Neurath, 149
Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857 (1912); Edwards v. Culbertson, iii N. C. 342, 16 S. E. 233
(1892).
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of Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank,3 9 which held that the
lender had a lien of an equitable mortgage on the borrower's land,
dating from the time of the making of the loan in reliance on the oral
promise to give a mortgage. The oral character of the security agreement was declared not to affect the validity of the lender's lien, this
because "the lien actually decreed results from the operation of the
law upon the entire conduct of the parties, and hence is, in terms, excluded from the inhibition of the statute." 40 There is some mention in
the opinion of the power of equity to treat that as done which under
the agreement ought to have been done, and the necessity of preventing
the Statute of Frauds from becoming an engine of fraud. It must be admitted that some quoted reference is made to the fact that the agreement had been executed on one side and thus is removed from the
application of the Statute. But that the Kansas court realized the
proper ground for the enforcement of the lien is indicated by a later
case which cites the Foster Lumber Co. case as authority for the proposition that "liens in the nature of equitable mortgages based upon
oral agreements are not at all uncommon, and they are upheld and
enforced where equity and good conscience so require."41 The Florida
1071 Kan. 158, 8o Pac. 49 (1905). The prospective landowner orally promised
to give a mortgage on land to secure a loan to be made by the Bank. The land had
not yet been purchased but the prospective landowner had a contract of purchase
which he left with the Bank to hold until a formal mortgage should be executed.
The Bank then paid the loan money out for purposes as designated by the borrower, including a payment of part of the price of the land, and the Bank, as authorized took the deed to the land from the vendor (apparently the borrower being
named as grantee). The borrower refused to give the promised mortgage, instead
mortgaging the property to the Lumber Company. The latter had full notice of the
claims of the Bank. In a suit by the Bank to collect the amount due on the loan,
the court awarded it a lien on the land, this lien being expressly based on the oral
promise to give a mortgage, as distinguished from any rights which might have been
claimed on the basis of the deposit of a title deed.
1071 Kan. 158, 8o Pac. 49, 50 (19o5).
'"Farmers' State Bank v. St. Aubyn, 12o Kan. 66, 242 Pac. 466, 468 (1926)
(italics supplied). This case has been interpreted, wrongly, it is submitted, as having turned on the part performance doctrine. See Hanna, Cases and Materials on
Security (ist ed. 1932) p. 535, note i.
This interpretation is based on the attention given by the court to the fact
that the representative of the lender took (or continued in) possession of the
property after the oral promise to give security was made. It was thought that this
taking of or continuing in possession was esteemed to be a sufficient part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Apparently some argument
against such a ruling was made by the borrower's counsel, but a careful reading of
the court's opinion indicates that the only regard in which the court considered the
possession of the lender was on the issue of whether such possession gave notice of
the lender's interest to a third party who purported to have purchased the property from the borrower. 242 Pac. 466 at 468.
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court in Craven v. Hartley held that the oral promise to give a real
estate mortgage was not invalidated by the Statute of Frauds; it declared that "The doctrine of equitable liens does not depend on written instruments, but may arise from a variety of transactions to which
equity will attach that character ...

not obnoxious to the statute of

frauds because they arise by operation of law from the conduct of the
parties." 42 In other jurisdictions the courts have from time to time
given clear and appropriate accounts of their powers to enforce equit43
able liens based on oral security promises.
Far more common of occurrence in cases in which enforcement of
oral security promises is sought, are the decisions which turn on the
issue of part performance. In Sleeth v. Sampson,44 already mentioned as
a leading case, the court, after declaring that giving a mortgage is
transferring an interest in land under the Statute of Frauds, found only
one issue remaining in the case-"whether there have been acts of part
'45
performance sufficient to relieve from the production of a writing."
The court ultimately denied that the oral promise could be enforced
because it appeared that the lender's performance went no further than
a payment of the loan to the borrower, while to be sufficient to overcome the absence of writing the part performance must be "'unintelligible or at least extraordinary' unless related to a contract to convey
an interest in land." 46 It was observed that in land sale contract cases,
payment of the purchase price alone is not enough to meet this standard; there must also be such acts as taking possession of the land or
or making improvements thereon. And "we see no distinction in this
;Craven v. Hartley, 1o Fla. 282, 135 So. 899, 9o (1931).
The use of the phrase "operation of law" is apparently a reference to the exception incorporated in some Statutes of Frauds to the effect that there need be no
writing to support the creating or granting of interests in land by operation of
law. See Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, 1927), Tit. I, Ch. 1, § 566o; Kan. Gen.
Stat. (Corrick, 1935) § 33-105. Such provisions are virtually legislative declarations
of the validity of the powers which are exercised by equity courts without the aid
of statutory authorization-i.e., powers to ignore the formal requirements of the
Statute of Frauds when such procedure is necessary to reach a just result. No case
should turn on the presence or absence of this exception in the Statute. These
qualifications in the Statutes of Frauds have seemingly never been thought to refer to matters arising in courts of law; certainly they do not affect the rule that a
legal mortgage must be in writing.
"Schram v. Burt, iii F. (2d) 557 at 562 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o); Sandy Hook Bank's
Trustee v. Bear, 252 Ky. 6o9, 67 S. W. (2d) 972 at 974 (1934) (court refused lien because of special circumstances); Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104 at 112, 38 N. E.
oo at 1002 (1894); Poole v. Tannis, 137 Wis. 363, 118 N. W. 188 at 189 (19o8).
"237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923).

"5237 N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923).
"237 N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923)-
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respect between a payment for an absolute conveyance and a payment
47
for a mortgage."
It may be said that the fault in this case and in a number of others
which are decided in the same manner,48 lies with the lender's counsel
who shaped his prayer for relief along specific performance lines, and
so argued his case in the courts. However, in other situations the procedure in courts of equity has proved to be sufficiently flexible to allow
the courts to give relief when a meritorious case is presented, even
though it be presented in unfortunate terminology. 49 And in fact we
can be sure that it is not the form of the request which governs the
answer, because equally respectable courts have refused relief on the
same reasoning where the plea was that the court should "impress a
lien," or "foreclose an equitable lien" on the land, or where some
other slight variation of this phraseology was used. Newman v. Newman 5o was an action "to subject lands to a lien." After disposing of the
lender's argument that a constructive trust should be declared, the
Ohio court suggested the possibility of giving relief in the form of an
equitable mortgage; but this theory too was held unavailing because
mere payment of the consideration is not sufficient to relieve an oral
agreement to convey an interest in real estate from the operation of
the Statute of Frauds. In the Feldman case the New Jersey Court of
Chancery granted the prayer in an action to have an equitable lien or
mortgage impressed on land. Though the promise to give the mortgage
N. Y. 69, 73, 142 N. E. 355, 356 (1923).
'Washington Brewing Co. v. Carry, 24 Ad. 151 (Md. 1892); Brown v. Drew, 67
41237

N. H. 569, 42 Ad. 177 (1894) ; Bernheimer v. Verdon, 63 N. J. Eq. 312, 49 At. 732
(1901); Meach v. Stone and Perry, 1 D. Chip. 182 (Vt. 1814).
"See McClintock, Equity (1936) §§ 13, 28 and 5o; Walsh, Equity (193o) § 22.

See as examples of the adaptability of equity courts in this respect: Jones v. Gainer,
157 Ala. 218, 47 So. 142, 143 (1908) (though specific performance decree is denied

because plaintiff fails to prove the contract as alleged, equity will declare a lien on
the land for money expended by the plaintiff in improving the land,' even though
plaintiff did not seek such relief) ; Bourke v. Hefter, 202 Ill. 321, 66 N. E. 1084 (1903)
(equity granted personal judgment against defendant, though this type of remedy
was not asked for in the complaint); Sanitary District of Chicago v. Martin, 227
Ill. 260, 81 N. E. 417 (1907) (specific performance denied on ground of unreasonable hardship to defendant, but equity assessed damages for the default, though
damages were not sought in plaintiff's complaint) ; Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass.
496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892) (injunction against violation of building restriction
denied because enforcement would be inequitable, but damages were assessed for
breach of restriction, though not sought by complaint); 25 R. C. L. 345 (though
specific performance decree cannot be given because defendant can not convey
good title, damages will be awarded for breach of contract to convey, though not
sought in complaint).
D1 0 3

Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 70 (1921).
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as security for a loan actually made was oral, the court, finding that
the evidence clearly indicated that the oral promise had been made as
the lender declared, granted specific performance with the statement
that the fact of the agreement being verbal was immaterial "since
equity looks to its purpose and intent rather than to its form." 51 Clinging ever to the part performance theory, it was decided that in New
Jersey payment of the consideration in reliance on,the oral promise
was sufficient part performance to remove the case from the bar of the
Statute of Frauds. This last proved to be more than the Court of Errors
and Appeals could accept. That court reversed the decision of the
Chancery Court, on the ground that a case of part performance was
not made out merely by the payment of money.52 In Spencer v. Williams,53 the West Virginia court was asked to impress a lien on land,
on the basis of an oral promise by the owner to give a mortgage on
the realty as security for the repayment of a loan. The court replied
that it could not grant specific performance of the promise because in
that jurisdiction such remedy was available only where the agreement
was so far executed that a fraud would be worked on the petitioning
party unless specific performance were decreed. It is interesting to note
that this court went on to observe that no fraud would result here because the lender had a full remedy at law in the form of an action to
recover back the money loaned. In fact, the lender showed that, relying on the oral security promise, he had waited so long to seek repayment from his borrower that now the Statute of Limitations barred
any right of action at law-therefore not even a theoretical remedy at
law existed. In this encounter, however, the court turned the lender's
own weapon upon him by concluding that to give equitable relief in
such circumstances would be to "put a premium on his delay." 54
It is hardly understandable how the West Virginia court could
reach this decision when only a few years before it had decided a very
similar case exactly in the contrary manner. 55 The opinion in this
case of Blake v. Blake stands as almost a point to point refutation of
the law as announced in the Spencer decision. First the opinion points
out that the lender has no adequate remedy at law, because an action
at law would force the lender to rely only on the personal liability of
his borrower, which was exactly the eventuality intended to be avoided.
Only equity has the power to give him what he must have to be made
mFeldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 At. 205, 2o8 (1937).
OFeldman v. Warshawsky, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938).
11i3 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E. 179, 89 A. L. R. 1451 (933).
Un3 W. Va. 687, 688, 17o S. E. 179, i8o, 89 A. L. R. 1451, 1453 (1933).
15Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
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whole-the security as promised. Then the court inquired of itself
whether specific performance could be granted when that type .of relief was not expressly asked for. This question was answered affirmatively on the basis of the general prayer for relief included in the
plaintiff's bill, for under a general prayer, the plaintiff is entitled to
any relief justified by the evidence. On the issue of the significance of
the parol form of the borrower's promise, the court concluded that in
this type of case the acts of the lender in advancing the money so that
nothing remained to be done to complete the transaction except the
execution of the mortgage, constitute sufficient performance to take
the oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds. And equity will decree
the relief because the borrower's refusal to execute the security instrument works a fraud on the lender. Finally, it was denied that the long
delay in seeking judicial enforcement of the agreement could be said
to make the lender guilty of laches, because the lender at no time had
shown any disposition to abandon his claim, and because the delay
had benefitted, rather than injured the borrower.
Indicative of the temper of the courts is the fact that even when
relief is to be granted to the lender, the specific performance remedy
and the part performance doctrine bob up to plague the argument.
Of course this is in no sense an error in itself, for admittedly the
granting of specific performance of an oral promise on the basis of the
part performance doctrine is one process which equity may invoke to
give the lender his needed security. The danger springs from the
demonstrated tendency of courts to go one step further and conclude
that this is the only method open to them in such cases. It is that condusion which brings forth such decisions as those discussed above.
One suspects from the language used in the opinion of Blake v. Blakethat even there the court felt that its choice was to give specific performance or nothing-else why the particular effort to establish sufficient acts of part performance. In this respect it in nowise stands;
alone. 56 For example, in Rutherford National Bk. v. Bogle 57 the court
r"Of course it cannot be said absolutely thht the courts in the following cases
would not have granted relief on some other theory had the part performance doctrine not been available; but that impression lingers after a reading of the opinions. See Cole v. Cole, 41 Ind. 3o (1875); Hecht v. Anthony, 204 Minn. 432, 283
N. W. 753 (1939); Rutherford National Bank v. Bogle, 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 Atl.
18o (1933); Clark v. Van Cleef, 75 N. J. Eq. 152, 71 At. 26o (19o8) (relief denied
because claim was barred by limitations); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496.
(181o); Tucker v. S. Ottenheimer Estate, 46 Ore. 585, 81 Pac. 36o (105) (relief denied because of special circumstances); Baker v. Baker, 2 S. D. 261, 49 N. W,
1064 (1891).
57114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 Ad. 18o (1933)-
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was apparently off to a perfect start in exercising its equitable powers
to enforce a lien. It stated that "the whole doctrine of equitable liens
or mortgages is founded upon that cardinal maxim of equity which regards as done that which has been agreed to be, and ought to have
been, done." And "the form which an agreement shall take in order
to create and equitable lien or mortgage is quite immaterial, for equity
looks at the final intent and purpose, rather than at the form."5 8 But
following these pronouncements, the court seemed to lose some of its
enthusiastic confidence in the power of equity to drive straight to the
goal of justice, for it soberly observed that since a mortgage involves a
transfer of an interest in land, it must meet the dictates of the Statute
of Frauds. And "an agreement to give a mortgage upon land is likewise within the inhibitions of the statute and unenforceable if not in
writing unless there has been sufficient part performance to remove it
from the bar of the statute." 59 Hence the vital issue here was whether
there had been sufficient acts of part performance. The court eventually decided that there had been these required acts, and a happy ending was reached. But the whole decision shows disturbing confusion
in the court's mind regarding its authority to grant relief to lenders in
search of promised security. Four years later the same court, in the
person of the same Vice-Chancellor, redeemed itself admirably by
pointing out that the power to grant specific performance on the basis
of part performance by the promisee is "aside from and in addition to
to" 60 the powers of equity to declare a lien under various other doctrines, expressed in such declarations as "treat that as done which ought
to have been done," "prevent the perpetration of a fraud," and "give
effect to puriose and intent rather than to form." Other courts would
better serve the interests of equity and good conscience, justice and
fair dealing if they would better understand the source and foundation of their power to enforce the borrower's promise to give security.
This discussion is not to be understood as a plea for the unquestioned enforcement of every assertion made by lenders that their borrowers have orally promised to give security. Beyond any doubt, such
action would result in an unending procession of frauds, for every
lender anxious about the chances of enforcing the personal liability
of his debtor would have but to raise the claim that an oral promise to
SRI14 N. J. Eq. 571 , 169 At. i8o, 182 (1933).
so'14 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 At. 18o, 183 (1933).
Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, x96

Ad. 205, 2o8 (1937). Ironically enough, the Feldman decision was reversed, 125 N. J. Eq. 19, 4 A. (2d) 84 (1938),
while the Rutherford decision stands unimpeached.
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give security had been made, whereupon a lien on the borrower's land
might be established. Before any court ventures to impress a lien on
land in these cases, it must use every means to make sure that the oral
promise was actually made as contended and that the lender is not asserting a false right. To this end, courts should and often do require
that the lender assume the burden of proving his case and of offering
evidence of clear and convincing nature.6 ' With strict standards of
proof applied, very few fraudulent claims would prove successful.
Even conceding that an occasional lender might obtain the benefit of unwarranted security, can it be said that any particularly lamentable injustice has resulted? What the lender obtains is no more than
just payment of a perfectly honest debt. The borrower has simply been
forced to satisfy a valid obligation. The only parties possibly standingto be unjustly deprived of anything are creditors of the borrower,
whose claims might have been satisfied out of the debtor's propertyhad the other lien not been enforced against it. But the total assets ofthe debtor have been at one time, at least, augmented by the moneys.
advanced by the lender, and why should other creditors be entitled
to benefit exclusively from this increase in the debtor's resources? On.
the other hand, observe the unfortunate consequences of refusing a,
valid security claim of the lender. In the usual case the debtor's personal liability will be no more valuable than the lender has esteemed
it to be, and thus the lender will be unable to collect his debt, or at
least all of it, even though he thought he had provided against the very
contingency which has arisen. Other creditors will profit by the enrichment of the debtor's estate resulting from the advancement of the
loan.
In this consideration lies another distinguishing feature between
security cases and land sale cases. The enforcement of a fraudulent
claim that an oral promise to convey land was made, results in the
landowner being deprived of his land when there has been no intent
on his part to risk his ownership in any way. Of course he receives the
consideration which the purported vendee admits in order to make his
claim enforceable, but the very fact that the owner resists the action
indicates that he was unwilling to part with his land for that price.
The claimant is correspondingly unjustly enriched by receiving the
land for the price paid. The failure of the court to recognize a valid
O'Steggall v. Steggall, 274 Mich. 402, 264 N. W. 842 (1936); Feldman v. Warshawsky, 122 N. J. Eq. 596, 196 Ad. 2o5 (1937); Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1910);
Nelson v. King, 92 Okla. 5, 217 Pac. 36o (1923).
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-and true claim in land sale cases prevents the vendee from making
'expected profits from the purchase of the land. If the vendee has paid
part or all of the purchase price in advance, he stands to lose at least
part of this if the vendor is insolvent and cannot satisfy a judgment at
law for the return of the price paid. The vendor merely remains in the
position formerly occupied-owner of the land.
It thus appears that the consequences of refusing to enforce an
honest claim that an oral security promise was made are more unIfortunate than those resulting from the inability of a vendee to obtain
-specific performance; that the wrong done the landowner when a
fraudulent security claim is enforced is not so harsh as where a false
sale claim is enforced; that therefore, the courts should be quicker to
enforce an alleged oral security promise than an alleged oral sale
promise; that the standards built up to control the sale cases should
thus not be applied blindly in the security cases. In rebuttal of the
above comparisons, it may be argued that there is no difference in the
possible prejudice to the vendee and lender where an honest claim is
rejected because the lender loses money which would represent a payment of the debt while the vendee loses money which would represent the return of the purchase price advanced-this in case of the inability of the landowner to satisfy personal liabilities. In fact, however,
looking at the problem from the standpoint of what the usual circumstances will be, there is a distinction. For while the vendee may or
may not have paid the purchase price in advance, the lender always
will have made the loan. The making of the loan is the essence of his
need for relief, whereas the vendee's need for relief arises with the
promise to convey. Thus, in every case in which a lender needs the
equitable relief, the result of a refusal to grant his request will lead to
a loss of the entire amount loaned-assuming an insolvent debtor; but
in only some of the cases in which a vendee needs equitable relief will
a denial of equitable aid result in a loss of the purchase price.
A further advantage will often stand with the vendee as contrasted
with the lender, where both have actually advanced money to the
landowner. In the normal case the vendee learns within a relatively
short time after paying the purchase price that the vendor is refusing
to carry out his oral promise to convey. The vendee then is warned to
take steps to recover his money promptly, lest the landowner become
insolvent. On the other hand, the lender in the normal case may continue for a considerable time in reliance on the borrower's oral promise,
and not find out until the debt has matured that the borrower intends
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to repudiate his security agreement. In the lapse of time between the
making of the loan and the discovery that no security exists, the borrower has often in fact become bankrupt and unable to pay his
debts. A remedy at law which was perfectly adequate had it been
recognized as necessary to pursue, becomes as a practical matter no
62
remedy at all.
One further practical distinction appears in any comparison of
sale and security cases when the part performance doctrine is under
consideration. In a very large majority of the American states the
courts have decided that mere payment of the purchase price by the
vendee is not sufficient part performance upon which to decree the
specific performance of an oral promise to convey land. 63 The reasoning advanced to support this rule takes two different forms, depending on the particular court's conception of the basis of equity's power
to obviate the Statute of Frauds by application of the part performance doctrine. One view is that equity will enforce the oral promise
where the acts of part performance have put the vendee in such a
position that it is impossible except by granting specific performance
to place him back in as good a situation as he stood before the oral
contract was made. To refuse enforcement is said to countenance a
OSee Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1810). Some cases stress the lender's
loss of his "investment" as an irreparable injury which would result from a denial
of equitable relief. The idea advanced is that even if money damages can be recovered, such an award falls short of the redress required to make the lender whole.
Irvine v. Armstrong, 3i Minn. 316, 17 N. W. 343 (1883); Hicks v. Turck, 72 Mich. 311,
40 N. W. 339 (1888) (written agreement). It has been said that the remedy at law is
not adequate even where the borrower is solvent and there is a written agreement,
because only nominal damages will be given for the breach until such time as an
enforcement of the security is needed. McClintock, Equity (1936) § 58, p. 97.
A further question as to the adequacy of a damages remedy must remain unanswered for lack of authority. It is: Does the refusal of the borrower to give the
security entitle the lender to declare the loan agreement rescinded and sue immediately to recover back the money advanced? The discussion in the text presumes an affirmative answer. If this is not correct, the lender is in a still worse
position than that already described, because then the repayment of the principal
of the loan can not be compelled until the agreed maturity date, and the lender's
hands are thus tied during the interval in which the borrower may be becoming
insolvent and judgment-proof. It is arguable that since the security promise is
merely an incident to the loan transaction, the default on the promise is not suffici'
ent to abrogate the essential purpose of the parties to make and receive a loan. If
it is true, as McClintock states, that only nominal damages for the breach of a
security promise could be obtained even where the promise is in writing, this
may mean that the lender could not recover back the loan until the regular
maturity date.
'3Clark, Principles of Equity (1919) § 131; McClintock, Equity (1936) § 56;
Walsh, Equity (1930) § 78.
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fraud on the vendee, or to subject him to irreparable injury. A different view is that equity will enforce the oral promise where the acts
of part performance are such as to evidence clearly that an oral
promise to convey was actually made by the lender. Here it is said
that the acts must be "unequivocally referable" to a contract to convey, or "unexplainable except as related" to such a contract. Though
a stricter standard of performance is probably applied by the courts
following the first theory, it is agreed that mere payment of money
is not enough under either view, because the vendee can be made
whole (theoretically, at least) by an action at law to recover the
money back, or because the payment of money refers as much to
other possible transactions as to a conveyance of land. Added acts required are commonly the vendee's taking of possession of the land or
his making valuable improvements on the land. 64 Though it is open
to serious question whether such additional actions in fact do make
the performance "unequivocally referable" to a contract or subject
the vendee to irreparable injury, nevertheless they are the forms of
conduct which in most of the cases have persuaded the courts to decree specific performance. Conversely, the absence of such conduct is
most frequently the reason for the courts denying that relief.
Consider then, the chances of a lender to show sufficient part performance in the great majority of our American courts. A prospective
purchaser of land may commonly take possession of land and make
improvements before title is actually transferred to him. How often
does a lender who has loaned on the security of his borrower's land
enter into possession of the land or make improvements on it? The
answer is very, very seldom. In fact, only two cases have been found
in which this procedure occurred. And in both of them there existed
a family relationship between lender and borrower, so that the taking
of possession was actually to be explained on the basis of the kinship
of the parties rather than on their lender-borrower status.6 5 In applying sale promise rules to security promise situations, the courts are
virtually denying that a remedy of specific performance exists in the
latter cases. If a part performance doctrine is to be used in security
O'Clark, Principles of Equity (1919) §§ 132-134; McClintock, Equity (1936) § 56;
Walsh, Equity (1930) § 78.
e&Charpie v. Stout, 88 Kan. 318, 128 Pac. 396 (1912) (lender was a sister of the
borrower, and the latter stated that he put his sister in possession of the land "so
as to give her something to live upon."); Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E.
259 (1891) (lender was husband of borrower; former owned the land then conveyed
it to his wife, the two of them living on the land with the husband managing it;
husband spent substantial sums in improving the land after its conveyance to
wife).
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cases, it must be a different doctrine, designed to take cognizance of
the facts which normally exist in security cases.
By way of summary, the writer ventures to outline a correct process of reasoning in the decision of such a case as is presented by the
simple hypothetical fact situation posed early in this discussion. First,
it is to be conceded that a defence of the Statute of Frauds must be
met, because a contract to give security in realty is a contract to
transfer an interest in land and therefore is required to be in writing
to be enforceable. But while courts of law have been strictly ruled by
the dictates of the Statute, equity has often declared its power to
ignore the formal requirements if only by such measures may justice
be served. Equity has jurisdiction to act because in the usual circumstances attending these cases, the lender has no adequate remedy at
law; only by the processes of equity can he be given the relief necessary to save him for an irreparable injury, for only equity can decree
him a secured creditor. That equity should act is argued by the same
fact-a just and equitable conclusion to the whole transaction can be
attained only by the lender being given the benefit of security in the
land. Without this relief, a deceitful borrower will have perpetrated a
plain fraud on the lender, will escape his obligation to pay an honest
debt, and will leave to other creditors the unearned privilege of sharing assets contributed by the lender. All this assumes the ability of
the court, by applying strict requirements of proof, to make sure
that the borrower actually made the oral promise as contended by
the lender. No reference to "specific performance" and no mention
of "part performance" need be made; nor should they be made, lest
the issue be confused by the use of oft-confusing terminology. The
remedy should be given under the broadest and most fundamental
function of equity, and not under one of the small segments of that
function. And whatever the form of the prayer for relief, such relief
as the facts call for should be given, without question of whether a just
remedy can be applied if not requested precisely in the proper words.
If this be treason in the form of a judicial repeal of the Statute of
Frauds, let the powers of equity make the most of it. And if the considered opinion of the lawmakers is that the interests of orderly and
careful business methods demand that in no case shall lenders be
given the benefit of security in land unless there has been a written
agreement for security, then let the legislature speak with a definite
command directed to the courts of equity. 66
OlAn indication of precisely the opposite legislative sentiment may be thought
to exist in the "except by operation of law" qualifications found in several Statutes
of Frauds. See notes 17 and 42, supra.
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NOTES
THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT IN
RES JUDICATA AND ESTOPPEL BY RECORD

The terms "res judicata," "estoppel by judgment," and "estoppel
by record" are used indiscriminately by the courts to describe the
effect of a prior court adjudication upon a later arising litigation.'
It is the purpose of this note, not to distinguish between, or to criticize these terms, but to outline the extent of their application, particularly with respect to the present-day status of the so-called mutuality requirement. Consideration is necessarily narrowed to existing
judgments in full and operative effect, not reversed or otherwise set
4
aside; 2 to final judgments;3 to those rendered on the merits; to judg5
ments which are not impeachable collaterally for lack of jurisdiction
6
or fraud; and finally, to judgments in personam, since judgments
in rem, and judgments as to status, are considered binding on all the
world, 7 and thus present no problem in the extent of application.
The general statement is that such a personal judgment or decree
is conclusive of the rights of the parties thereto, or their privies in all
other judicial tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.8 A party is defined
2Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and
Anglo-American Law (194o) 39 Mich. L. 238, 253; Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 574.
2Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191, 199, 52 S. Ct. 532, 533-534, 76 L. ed. 1054 (1932); E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 580 (C. C. A. 4th
1924); Hall v. Wilder Mfg. CO., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760 (1927), 52 A. L. R. 723
(1928); 3o Am. Jur. 950; 15 R. C. L. 953.
3Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114, 127, 63 N. E. 823, 827 (1902); Burner v. Hevener,
34 W. Va. 774, 12 S. E. 861 (1891); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 717; 1 Green-

leaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 529.
'Swift v. McPherson, 232 U. S. 51, 34 S. Ct. 239, 58 L. ed. 499 (1914); Clegg v.
U.S., 112 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. ioth, 1940); Bulau v. Bulau, 294 N. W. 845, 847 (Minn.
1940); Garrett v. Greenwell, 92 Mo. 120, 4 S. W. 441 (1887); Payne v. Grant, 81 Va.
164 (1885); Peterson v. Morris, 19 Wash. 335, 205 Pac. 408 (1922); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 723 et seq.; i Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 530; 30 Am.
Jur. 944-948; 34 C. J. 774; 15 R. C. L. 955rArizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 119 Me. 213, 11o Atl.
429 (1920); 2 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed. 1925) § 733; 30 Am. Jur. 940-1; 34 C. J.
768; 15 R. C. L. 957.
eKing v. Emmons, 283 Mich. 116, 277 N. W. 85i, 115 A. L. R. 564 (1938); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 731; 3o Am. Jur. 941; 34 C. J. 769.
7iGreenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 525; Cox, Res. Judicata: Who Entitled to
Plead (1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 241, 245; 15 R. C. L. ioo8.
8Southern Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1, 48, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. ed. 355

234

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

as one who is directly interested in the subject matter and who has
a right to control the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and
cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision if any appeal lies.9 Privity denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property. 1 The reasons given for this general principle are:
that persons should not be vexed by endless litigation," that the
dignity and respect of judicial proceedings must be upheld, 12 and
that there is a public interest in peace and order and in preventing
3
unnecessary and expensive litigation.'
The simplest illustration of the doctrine appears when the second
suit is identical with the first-i.e., brought between the same parties
or their privies, in the same capacity,' 4 on the same cause of action.
The second suit is precluded by the adjudication in the first. In this
case, however, the prior judgment is said to constitute a bar concluding the parties and their privies, not only as to matter actually offered
(1897); Parker v. U. S., 114 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); Virginia Ry. & Power Co.
v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 129 S. E. 700 (1925); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925)
§ 627; 15 R. C. L. 950; 3o Am. Jur. 9o8.
OBigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 126, 32 S. Ct. 641, 642, 56

L. ed. ioog (1912); Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657, 672, 18 L. ed. 427 (U. S.
1866); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 535; 15 R. C. L. lOog. A person not a
party, however, can be bound by a judgment by virtue of interest in the result of litigation, and by active participation therein. Universal Oil Products Co. v. WinklerKoch Engineering Co., 27 F. Supp. 161 (N. D. 111. 1939); Keith v. Willers Truck
Service, 64 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256, 104 A. L. R. 1471 (1936); State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 173 Va. 261, 3 S. E. (2d) 187 (1939); 2 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th
ed. 1925) § 430; 15 R. C. L. oo9-10.
"Litchfield v. Goodnow's Adm'r., 123 U. S. 549, 8 S. Ct. 210, 31 L. ed. 199 (1887).
Privity is classified as being in estate-for example, joint tenancy, donor-donee, lessor-lessee; blood-for example, successor in title by descent; representation-for example, executor-testator; and in law-for example, personal representative-decedent. i Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) §§ 523, 536; Riddle v. Cella, 128 N. J.
Eq. 4, 15 A. (2d) 59 (1940); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 438; 3o Am. Jur.
957-8; 15 R. C. L. 1015-6.
uWilliams v. Daisey, 7 Harr. 142, 18o Atl. 9o8 (Del. 1935); 3o Am. Jur. 9 1; 15 R.

C. L. 954.
"Southern Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1, 49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. ed 355
(1897); State Hospital v. Consolidated Water Supply Co., 267 Penn. 29, 1 1o Atl. 281
(1920); 3o Am. Jur. 9i;
15 R. C. L. 955'2Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Association, 283 U. S. 522, 525, 51 S. Ct.
517, 518, 75 L. ed. 1244 (1931); Bennett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 113
F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1940); Moschizsker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 299,

300; 34 C. J. 743.
1
Bamka v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 61 Minn. 549, 63 N. W. 1116, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 618 (1895); Miller v. Stieglitz, 113 N. J. L. 40, 172 Atl. 57, 59 934); Gibson v.
Solomon, 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N. E. (2d) 996 (1939); Keith v. Willers Truck Service,
6 4 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256, 104 A. L. R. 1471 (1936); 15 R. C. L. 1012.
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to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose. 15 Thus,
where A sues B in tort for a personal injury caused by several acts of
negligence, A must aver all grounds for recovery, and any judgment
secured in the first suit bars subsequent actions for the same injury although other grounds are averred in the second suit.16 The principle
applied in this manner, and in this manner only, is the true form of
res judicata.17 We are not further concerned with it in this note.
The extent of the principle is varied somewhat when the second
suit is again between the same parties, or their privies, but the cause
of action is not the same, although issues adjudicated in the first suit
are incidentally involved in the second. Here the same reasons for
holding the parties precluded by findings in the prior suit apply, but
the rule differs to the extent that only matter that has been actually
adjudicated is conclusive against the parties.'s It is thus necessary,
in the second suit, to determine what issues were actually litigated and
determined in the first.19 Although an infallible standard is difficult to
formulate, it is said that the former adjudication is conclusive only
"Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 319, 47 S. Ct. 6oo, 602, 71 L.
ed. 1069 (1927); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, 117 Fed. 82 (C.
C. A. 8th, 19o2); Luce v. N. Y., Chicago & St. Louis Ry., 213 App. Div. 374, 21x N. Y.
Supp. 184 (1925). As to whether the cause of action is the same, the best test is
said to depend on whether the facts or proofs submitted to sustain each are the
same. Jackson v. Pepper Gasoline Co., 28'4 Ky. 175, 144 S. W. (2d) 212, 214 (1940);
Williams v. Messick, t77 Md. 6o5, ii A. (2d) 472, 129 A. L. R. 1035 (1940); 2 Freeman,
Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 687; 15 R. C. L. 964-5.
-"Columb v. Webster Mfg. Co., 84 Fed. 592 (C. C. A. 1st, 1898); Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 At. 459 (1886); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. i 9 25 ) § 682.
'Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Rison, 99 Va. 18, 34, 37 S. E. 32o, 325 (1900). The
doctrine is frequently referred to as "estoppel." See Blue Valley Creamery Co. v.
Cornimus, 27o Ky. 496, 110 S. W. (2d) 286 (1937); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.
1925) § 676; 30 Am. Jur. 912. Professor Millar, writing in recent articles, notes that
this is not really a form of the common law estoppel but has its roots in early Roman law. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (1940)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 56. Also see Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Juaicata
in Continental and Anglo-American Law (1940) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 253.
"Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, 117 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 8th,
1902); Harding v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186 N. E. 152 (1933), 88 A. L. R. 563 (1934);
Bulau v. Bulau, 294 N. W. 845, 847 (Minn. 1940); Miller v. Stieglitz, 113 N. J. L. 40,
172 At. 57 (1934); Brunner v. Cook, 134 Va. 266, 114 S. E. 650 (1922); 2 Freeman,
Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 677; 3o Am. Jur. 925; 15 R. C. L. 652. See Note (1936)
104 A. L. R. 978.
nRussell v. Place, 94 U. S. 6o6 (1876); Capps v. Whitson, 157 Va. 46, 16o S. E.
71 (1931); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 532; 15 R. C. L. 952.
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as to facts directly and distinctly put in issue and the finding of which
is necessary to uphold the judgment, and also matters which follow
by necessary and inevitable inference from an adjudication, ° This application of the general doctrine is not historically res judicata, but
estoppel. 21 It is often loosely referred to as "res judicata," and as
"estoppel by judgment." It is not the judgment alone, however, but
22
the record, as terminated by the judgment, which creates the estoppel,
and the more correct terminology would seem to be "estoppel by record."

23

A prior adjudication between the parties can be shown in two ways:
as-evidence under the general issue, and by a plea in bar.24 According
to the principles above stated, res judicata or estoppel, when pleaded in
bar, is conclusive upon the parties.2 5 Some doubt has been expressed as
to whether the former judgment is likewise conclusive when submitted
in evidence, but the weight of authority in the United States seems to
be that it is equally as conclusive in effect as if pleaded in bar,28 and
must go to the jury as a conclusive establishment of facts previously
"OWilliams v. Daisey, 7 Harr. 142 , i8o At. 9o8 (Del. 1935); Winters v. Basaillon,
153 Ore. 509, 57 P. (2d) 1095, 1o4 A. L. R. 968 (1936); McCoy v. McCoy, 29 W. Va.
794, 2 S. E. 8o9 (1887); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) §§ 677, 689-693; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (i6th ed. 1899) § 534; 15 R. C. L. 976-980. A careful study has been
made on this point by Professor Millar in the article, The Premises of the Judgment
as Res. Judicata in Continental and Anglo-American Law (194o) 39 Mich. L. Rev.
238. The case of Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler, 157 U. S. 683, 15 S. Ct. 733, 39 L.
ed. 859 (1895), says Millar, enlarged the rule of the "qualified" conclusiveness of the
premises which confined finality to matters in issue as set out in Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876), to the rule of "relative" conclusiveness of the premises which allows a default judgment to conclude the parties
as to matters express or implied in the pleadings, and which is the present majority
rule. See Note (1940) 128 A. L. R. 472.
"Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (194o)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 46.
"See Spaulding v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 96 Vt. 67, 72, 117 AtI. 376, 378
(1922); Outram v. Moorewood, 3 East. 346, io2 Eng. Rep. 630 (1803); Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (1940) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 41 , 55;
15 R. C. L. 953. Also see Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in
Continental and Anglo-American Law (1940) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 262 et seq.
"Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (194o)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 46, 52, 58.
241 Greenleaf, Evidence (t6th ed. 1899) § 531.
2'The theory is said to be that the prior judgment presents evidence of the facts
of so high a nature that nothing could be proved by other evidence which would be
sufficient to overcome it, and therefore the party is estopped from submitting evidence, or precluded by law from doing so: 15 R: C. L. 953-4.
"eSouthern Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. i, 59-6o, 18 S. Ct. 18, 31, 42 L. ed.
355 (1897); Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 At. 459 (1886); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 531. For an extensive annotation on the methods of pleading
estoppel by record, see Note (1939) 12o A. L. R. 8, 55 et seq.
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decided. For the purposes of the remainder of this note, it will be assumed that this difference in the method of presenting a former adjudication in a later case does not create varying results so far as conclusive
effect is concerned.
Whereas a judgment or decree is mutually binding on all the parties
to the proceedings and their privies, either as a bar or as conclusive
evidence, the universal rule is that strangers are not bound. 27 As a concomitant of this rule, its converse has been accepted as established lawi.e., if the person claiming the benefit of the former adjudication is
a stranger to it, and is not bound thereby, he cannot assert the judgment against one who was a former party.28 This is known as the rule
of mutuality. Stated another way, no party is bound in a subsequent
suit by a prior judgment unless the person seeking to secure the benefit of the former adjudication would have been bound by it if it had
29
been determined to other way.
Although this rule of mutuality is obviously applicable where
the same parties are again litigating, difficulty has been encountered
in finding rational support for it as an immutable principle where
third parties are concerned. It frequently operates against the policy
of the res judicata-estoppel doctrine that an end should be put to unnecessary litigation, and it has been expected to, evaded, or abolished
in many situations. As well accepted as the principle itself are the exceptions made when a party to both first and second suits is pitted
against different persons between whom exists derivative liablity. For
example, a plaintiff sues a servant for tortious acts committed by him
in the course of the master's business. The servant is primarily liable
as the wrongdoer, and the master is secondarily, or derivatively liable
by the doctrine of respondeat superior. If the plaintiff fails to recover,
the servant's acts being found not to constitute negligence, the master
is allowed the benefit of this prior adjudication as a bar to a later ac2Litchfield v. Goodnow (Litchfield v. Crane), 123 U. S. 549, 8 S. Ct. 21o, 31 L.
ed. 199 (1887); Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N. Y. i59, 184 N. E.
744 (1933); Rabil v. Farris, 213 N. C. 414,196 S. E. 321, 116 A. L. R. 1o83 (1938); 1
3o Am. Jur. 951 et seq.
Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 407; 15 R. C. L. oOO6;
"Bigelow v. Old Dominion Cooper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641, 56 L. ed. oo9
(1912); Williams v. Messick, 177 Md. 605, 11 A. (2d) 472, 129 A. L. R. 1035 (1940); 1
Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 428; 1 Greenlieaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) §
524; 15 R. C. L. 956.
2New York and Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. of City of
New York, 32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D. N. Y., 1940); State ex rel. First Nat. Bk. v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 207 Pac. 23 (1922); (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 607, 6o8; 3o Am. Jur.
951.
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tion by the same plaintiff against him on the same facts.3 0 The mutuality principle is violated, because if the plaintiff had prevailed in the
first suit against the servant, the master would not have been bound
thereby, being a stranger to that suit.3 ' Yet since the master's liability
is predicated upon the servant's negligence, and the servant has been
found free from negligence, the exception is a most rational one. It
has been uniformly followed where derivative liability exists and
where, as in the above example, the plea is used by the person secondarily liable as against a party to the prior suit who has once tried
his case against the primary wrongdoer and lost.82 Thus where the successive suits are against the agent and the principal, indemnitor and
indemnitee, and lessor and lessee, the exception is made. s3 Since in
all derivative liability cases there is a liability over from the primary
wrongdoer to the party secondarily liable if the latter is subjected to
loss by virtue of suit against him by the injured party,34 these holdings are fortified by the fact that it would be an anomalous situation
3'Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 Fed. 63 (C. C. A.
8th, 1907), 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 677 (19o8); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 469.
3Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Emma Silver Mining Co. of N. Y., 7 Fed. 4ol, 4o8
(C. C. S. D. N. Y., 188o); Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14,
9 N. E. (2d) 758, 760 (1937), 112 A. L. R. 401, 404 (1938); 1 Freeman, Judgments (sth
ed- 1925) § 469; 15 R. C. L. oo6-7; 3o Am. Jur. 951 et seq. If the master had participated in the first suit, he would have been bound by the adjudication. Footnote 9,
supra.
2This is obviously the case where a former judgment in favor of a principal is
used by the surety in a later case, as against a party to the former suit. Here the
surety's obligation does not arise unless the principal is liable. i Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed. 1925) § 466.
uHart Steel Co. v. RR. Supply Co., 244 U. S. 294, 37 S. Ct. 5o6 (1g7); New
Orleans & N. E. R. v. Jopes, 142 U. S. 18, 12 S.Ct. io 9 , 35 L. ed. 919 (1891); Portland
Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), 16 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 677 (19o8); Emma Silver Mining Co..v. Emma Silver Mining Co. of N. Y., 7
Fed. 401 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 188o); Triano v. Booth, t2o Cal. App. 345, 8 P. (2d) 174
(1932); Roadway Express Inc. v. McBrown, 61 Ga. App. 223, 6 S.E. (2d) 46o ('939);
Kavis v. Schimmel, 213 Ind. 518, 13 N. E. (2d) 565 (1938); Hobbs v. Illinois C. R.,
171 Iowa 624, 152 N. W. 40 (1915), L. R. A. 191 7 E, 1o3; Blue Valley Creamery Co.
v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 11o S.W. (2d) 286 (1927); Taylor v. Sartorious, 13o Mo.
App. 23, io8 S.W. 1o89 (19o8); King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9,41 Am. Dec. 675 (1844);
Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N."Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937),
112 A. L. R. 401 (1938); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C.
501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570 (1939); Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 71o, 63 Pac. 572 (1901), 54
L. R. A. 649 (1902). See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 127-128,
32 S.Ct. 641-642, 56 L. ed. 1009 (1912).
1'Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657, 18 L. ed. 427 (U. S. 1866); Jentick v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 105 P. (2d) ioo5 (Cal., 1940); Betcher v. McChesney, 255
Pa. 394, 1oo Atl. 124 (1917); Richmond v. Sitterding, 1o1 Va. 354, 43 S.E. 562 (19o3),
65 L. R. A. 445 (1904); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 447.
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if the party who is secondarily liable should sue the primary wrongdoer on the liability over where the primary wrongdoer has once -been
exonerated of the very same wrong in a former suit. Thus the principle has also been applied in favor of a municipality which is sued for
injuries caused by the negligent condition of streets, railways, etc.,
when the municipality has the right of recovery over against the primary wrongdoer who may be an abutting landowner, railway company,
and the like.3 5
The same exception to the mutuality rule has been made where
a suit is first brought against the party secondarily liable instead of
against the primary wrongdoer, and the judgment is against the
plaintiff. Here the person primarily liable is allowed to take advantage of the former adjudication. 36 For example, the plaintiff sues the
master for injuries caused by his servant in the course of the master's
business, and the master prevails on the ground that the servant was
not negligent. The plaintiff then sues the servant as the primary
wrongdoer for the same injuries. The servant is held to be entitled
to the benefit of the prior adjudication, although he was nota party
to it and thus could not be bound if the prior judgment had been in
favor of the plaintiff. Here it is necessary to show that the prior adjudication was upon the issue of the wrongdoer's negligence and not
upon some collateral defense available to the master alone, such as
lack of authority of the servant to do the act in question. 7 The ex35Betor v. City of Albany, 193 App. Div. 349, 184 N. Y. Supp. 44 (1920); Brobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 Atl. 849 (1927), 54 A. L. R. 1285 (1928); Hill v. Bain,
15 R.. 1. 75, 23 AtI. 44, 2 Am. St. Rep. 873 (1885); Town of Waynesboro v. Wiseman,
163 Va. 778, 177 S. E. 224 (1934); Sawyer v. City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66, 116 S. E. 245
(1923); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 451.
3*Anderson v. West Chicago St. R., 2o0 111. 329, 65 N. E. 717 (1902); Chicago &
R. I. R. v. Hutchins, 34 Ill. io8 (1864); Atkinson v. White, 6o Me. 396 (1872); Emery
v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326, 63 Am. Dec. 627 (1855); Brown v. Wabash Ry., 222 Mo. App.
518, 281 S. W. 64 (1926); Tighe v. Skillings, 297 Mass. 504, 9 N. E. (2d) 532 (1937);
Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 17o N. E. 246 (1932); Wolf v. Kenyon, 242
App. Div. 116 (N. Y. 1934); Lasher v. McAdam, 125 Misc. 685, 211 N. Y. Supp. 395
(1925). See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 58o,
583 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Featherston v. N. & C. Turnpike, 71 Hun 1o9, 111, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 6o3 (1893); Jepson v. International Ry., 8o Misc. 247, 249, 14o N. Y. Supp. 941
(1913); Whitehurst v. Elks, 212 N. C. 97, 192 S. E. 850, 851 (1937); Jenkins v. Atlantic
Coast Line R., 89 S. C. 408, 71 S. E. 1o1o (1911); Vukelic v. Upper Third St. Savings
& Loan Assoc., 222 Wis. 568, 269 N. W. 273 (1936); Cox, Res Judicata; Who Entitled
to Plead (1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 245, 247; Notes, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 404, 405; (1924) 31
A. L. R. 194; (1902) 54 L. R. A. 649; (1908) 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 677; 15 R. C. L. 1027.
,"Griffin v. Bozeman, 234 Ala. 136, 173 So. 857, 858-9 (1937); Tighe v. Skillings,
297 Mass. 504, 9 N. E. (2d) 532, 534 (1937); Cox, Res Judicata: Who Entitled to Plead
(1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 245, 247; 30 Am. Jur. 978.
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ception made in such cases is a defensible one. Since the master's liability is completely dependent upon a determination that the acts
of the servant were acts wrongful in law, it would follow that where
the master is exonerated upon a trial on those issues alone, the servant should not be liable on the same issues in a later suit. To reach
this result, however, a significant step is taken. The servant is absolved, not because his guilt is dependent upon the master's guilt, but because it is dependent upon those identical facts and issues which have
been given judicial consideration in the former suit and found to be
legally non-actionable. It is difficult to support this position under
the rationale of the cases making exception to mutuality where one
person's culpability is dependent upon the culpability of another.
Mutuality appears to be actually ignored under the guise of the case
being one of derivative liability. 88
The only remaining successive suit which can arise involving derivative liability is that by which the party secondarily liable has been
sued, has had a judgment taken against him, and in the second action
is suing the party primarily liable on the basis of the liability over.
The ultimate liability rests upon the party primarily liable and it is
his duty, therefore, to defend in the first suit if he knew of that suit.389
Under such circumstances he is the same as, a party to the suit and is
bound by that adjudication.4 0 If, however, the party primarily liable
has not had notice of the suit, he should in no wise be bound by the
prior adjudication since he was not a party to it and should not be
prejudiced thereby.41 Of course, if the party secondarily liable prevailed in the first suit, there is no basis for a liability over.
In the above cases the party to the former suit is said to have had
his "day in court" on those issues and is thus not prejudiced, although
a stranger to the first suit asserts that judgment against him. Under
the general rule of mutuality it might seem that the purpose is not
only that of avoiding undue prejudice to the former party, but also
that of avoiding undue benefit to the stranger. But the latter con331 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed. 1925) § 469.

'Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657, 18 L. ed. 427 (U. S. 1866); City of Richmond v. Davis, 135 Va. 319, 116 S. E. 492 (1923).
'0E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 58o (C. C. A.
th,
1924); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Twiss, 35 Neb. 267, 53 N. W. 76, 37 Am. St. Rep.
4
437 (1892); Hartford Accident Co. v. First Nat. Bk. of Hudson, 281 N. Y. 162, 22 N. E.
(2d) 324, 123 A. L. R. 1149 (1939); Crawford v. Turk, 24 Gratt. 176, 83 Am. Dec. 38o
(Va. 1874); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 447.
'"Cox, Res Judicata: Who Entitled to Plead (1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 245, 249.
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sideration would not be compelling so long as the former party is not
unduly prejudiced. It thus appears that in the derivative liability
cases, the former party is subjected to a greater degree of prejudice unless it can be said that those cases have some quality which justifies the
mutuality relaxation. Such a quality appears to inhere in the fact that
there is greater ease in showing that two people's cases are necessarily
upon the same issues where the fact of derivative liability exists. If
such is the correct explanation, it would seem to follow that where
two people's cases are necessarily upon the same issues and each
participates in a separate suit against a common adversary and the
first prevails in the prior suit, the second could plead an estoppel irrespective of a derivative liability connection.
Many, though not all, such cases involve joint tort-feasorship. The
orthodox statement is that an adjudication in favor of one joint tortfeasor is not a bar to a suit against the other.42 It is based upon the
thought that even though the tort-feasors participated in one act of
wrong and the issues of liability are the same for either, it is the separate wrong of each upon which the judgment rests, 43 and that any other
result would violate the principle of mutuality. The question still remains, however, when the identical issues are given judicial considerain one suit, should not an adjudication operate against a party to that
suit when he presents the same facts as the basis of a claim against
another person in a later suit, irrespective of the mutuality requirement?4
All cases involving a third person's use of estoppel by record as
against a party to a former suit can be divided into two general catagories: first, where the winner of the prior suit is later either suing or
being sued, and is asserting the estoppel against a stranger to the
former suit; and second, where the loser of the first suit is suing or
being sued in a later action, and is met by a plea of estoppel asserted
by a stranger to the former suit. The first group may be quickly disposed of. As has been seen, a stranger to a judgment is not bound by it
since he has had no opportunity to try the issues.45 It is with the sec"Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641, 56 L. ed. iooq(1912); Lewis v. Ingram, 57 F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. ioth, 1932); Griffin v. Bozeman, 234

Ala. 136, 173 So. 857, 858 ('937).
' 3 McNamara v. Chapman, 81 N. H. i69, 123 At. 229, 231-2

(1923),

31 A. L. R.

188, 192 (1924).

"The question is posed in Staunton Mut. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, io8 Va. 8io. 62
S. E. 928 (19o8), but is not answered since issues in the two suits differed. But seeCoca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260, 264 (1934).
OCoca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260, 263 (1934); See Notes
27 and 31, supra.
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-ond group that we are mainly concerned. There are four cases in
which the prior judgment was against a party to the present suit, and
a stranger asserts that judgment as an estoppel against him in the
.second suit:
(i) A formerly losing plaintiff brings another suit against a third
party on the same issues.
(2) A formerly losing defendant brings a suit against a third party
on the same issues.
(3) A formerly losing plaintiff is sued by a third party in a suit involving the same issues.
(4) A formerly losing defendant is sued by a third party in a suit
involving the same issues.
The majority of cases dealing with the derivative liability situation
arises under the first category, and it is apparently here that the greatest
willingness to abolish the mutuality doctrine has been shown, even
where no derivative liability exists. A now-leading authority for this
latter proposition is the Delaware case of Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola
C0o.46 The Coca-Cola Company had brought a suit in equity against
three dealers apparently to prevent their putting Pepsi-Cola into CocaCola bottles. The complaint had been dismissed on the grounds that
the dealers did not do the acts in question. In a second action, the CocaCola Company sued the Pepsi-Cola Company on a claim for a reward
which the latter company had offered to whomever should give infor"
mation leading to the detection of any person who put Pepsi-Cola into
other than Pepsi-Cola bottles. The court, noting that identity of issues
was necessary, and assuming such to be true, held:
"... a plaintiff who deliberately selects his forum and there
unsuccessfully presents his proof, is bound by such adverse judgment in a second suit involving all the identical issues already
decided. The requirements of mutuality must yield to public
policy. To hold otherwise would be to allow repeated litigation
of identical questions, expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant havinglost on a question of fact to re-open and re-try all
obtain a new adversary not in
the old issues each time he can
47
privity with his former one."
Although this language restricts the holding of the case to above-listed
situations (i) and (3) where the formerly losing party was a plaintiff
in the first suit, additional language apparently comprehends all four
"Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 26o (1934).
"Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 26o, 263 (1934).
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situations, whereas the facts of the case are limited to situation (i)
48
alone.
In the California case of Duell v. Metro-Gotdwyn Mayer Corp.,4 9 a
plaintiff had sued a defendant in equity to enjoin a breach of contract,
and the controversy had been determined for the defendant on the
ground that no contract existed because the plaintiff had acted fraudulently. The same plaintiff was barred by a plea of estoppel by record
from suing a second defendant for inducing a breach of the same con-tract. A similar holding was made in the Minnesota case of Wilson v..
Erickson5 o where a plaintiff had sued his guardian for an accounting.
on the ground that the guardian sold the plaintiff's property to an
eventual purchaser through several buyers, fraudulently securing tothese buyers a substantial profit. The proceeding had been dismissed
because the charge was not sustained. The intermediate buyers, later
sued by the same plaintiff on the same facts, were allowed to use the
plea of estoppel by record on the issue of the fraud although they werenot parties to the first suit. In Sonnentheil v. Moody51 the plaintiff had
brought a suit against a U. S. marshal for wrongful attachment of
property, and had lost in that suit. In a second action against others forwrongfully inducing the marshal to levy the attachment in question,.
the Texas court allowed the former adjudication as a bar to the second.
suit.
Although it thus appears that the mutuality requirement is.
abandoned where the same plaintiff brings another suit against a thirdi
party on the same issues, a few cases have applied the mutuality rule to,
52
prevent the defendant from raising the prior judgment.
In the second type of case, where a formerly losing defendant sues
a third person on the same issues, it seems that, unless the theory of
mutuality is strictly adhered to, the losing defendant should be barred
from later suing another on issues which have already been decided
against him in a previous suit which he has defended on the merits.5a
The case differs from the first type only in that it is an adjudication
upon a defense, rather than an offense which binds the present plaintiff.
"The rule of the Coca-Cola case has been followed by the federal court sitting
in Delaware. Colen v. Superior Oil Corp., 16 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1936).
'"Duell v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Corp., 128 Cal. App. 376, 17 P. (2d) 781 (1932).
WXWilson v. Erickson, 152 Minn. 364, 188 N. W. 994 (1922).
1
Sonnentheil v. Moody, 56 S. W. iooi (Tex. Civ. App. igoo).
n=See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641, 56 L. ed.
ioog (1912); Tyrrel v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, iog Vt. 6, 192 Atl.
184 (1937).
"See Note (1938) 112 A. L. R. 404, 405-6.
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A North Carolina case has apparently so held, 54 and in the derivative
liability situations, this change of parties has not been held to affect
the outcome.5 5 Most cases, however, seem to abide by the strict mutuality requirement and deny the right plead an estoppel where no derivative liability exists. An interesting example is the Alabama case of
Interstate Electric Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland.56 Here
-the Electric Company, believing that an employee had defrauded it,
-made a report to its bonding company, setting out facts upon which
the alleged fraud was predicated. The employee sued the Electric
,Company for the publication of this report as a libel, and recovered,
the report being found false. In a later suit the Electric Company sued
:the bonding company on the fidelity bond for the losses allegedly
-caused by the fraud of the employee. The bonding company was not
:allowed to plead the former adjudication that the report was false. The
ground for the holding was the mutuality requirement. Again in the
Utah case of Taylor v. Barker57 there was a collision between cars A and
B, whereby both cars were damaged, and a guest in car A received personal injuries. The guest was assigned the claims for property damage by
the owner of car A. In a suit against the owner of car B for the personal
injuries and property damage, the guest recovered on both claims. Later
the owner of car B sued the owner of car A for property damage to car
B. Although the former suit had necessarily decided the issues of negligence and contributory negligence against the owner of car B, no
estoppel was permitted as against him "since- there was nothing to
show an exception to the rule which requires the estoppel of a judgment to be mutual." No privity was held to exist as between assignor
and assignee. 58 A similar holding was made in Vermont in the case of
"Garret v. Kendrick, 201 N. C. 388, i6o S. E. 349 (931). A doctor sued a patient for services rendered and secured judgment. Later the patient sued the doctor
for damages caused by malpractice in performing the services in question. The court
held that the patient was estopped because the defense of malpractice should have
been raised in the first case. The adjudication was also held to be available to prevent the patient from suing another doctor who cooperated in performing the services.
"Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 1 0 S. W. <2d) 286 (1937);
Carter v. Public Service Gas Co., ioo N. J. L. 374, x26 At. 456 (1924); Good Health
Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937), 112 A. L. R.
401 (1938); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C. 5o, 2 S. E.
(2d) 570 (1939); Vikulic v. Upper Third St. Savings & Loan Assoc., 222 Wis. 568, 269
N. W. 273 (1936).
"Interstate Electric Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 228 Ala. 210,
253 SO. 427 (1934).
' Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262 Pac. 266 (1927), 55 A. L. R. 1032 (1928).
"In cases similar to this one, the former adjudication has been binding since
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Fletcher v. Perry.59 A car owned by Fletcher was involved in an accident with a car owned by Kingsley. Kingsley's car being damaged, he
joined Fletcher and Fletcher's driver in a joint suit for property damage and recovered a judgment, it being found that Fletcher's driver
was negligent. Fletcher later sued the bailee-driver of Kingsley's car
for property damage caused to his car and was met by a plea of estoppel to the effect that he had already lost in a prior suit on the identical
issues necessary to the maintenance of this suit. A demurrer to the plea
was sustained on the grounds of the mutuality requirement.80
The same problem arises where a present plaintiff has been previously convicted of a crime and is asserting claims in a civil action
which are inconsistent with issues formerly decided against him. It is
said to be the weight of authority that a judgment of conviction or
acquittal in a former criminal case cannot be given in evidence in a
purely civil action to establish the truth of the facts on which it was
rendered. 61 The reasons given for this rule are that a criminal case
involves different purposes and procedures, and is controlled by different standards of burden of proof.62 In addition to these reasons, an
acquittal, being beneficial to the party to the prior criminal action,
would be set up against a stranger to the prior suit who would have
had no opportunity to try those issues.6 It appears, however, that the
reasons for the general rule do-not bear weight when the person previously convicted asserts civil rights, in a later action, on issues which
hbave been' formerly decided against him in the criminal action. Thus
privity was found to exist as between assignor and assignee. Goldberg v. Schlessinger,
86 N. Y. Supp. 2og (1904); Godding v. Colorado Springs Livestock Co., 4 Col. App. 14,
34 Pac. 942 (1893); Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1o37.
8Fletcher v. Perry, 104 Vt. 229, 158 Ad. 679 (1932).

eOA very similar case is Kessler v. Fligel, 24o App. Div. 232, 269 N. Y. Supp. 664
(1934). Here a president of a corporation accused A of the crime of coercion and A
was prosecuted and discharged. Later the corporation sued A in equity for the same
acts of coercion and A was found guilty. In a third suit, A sued the president for
malicious prosecution and the president was not allowed to take advantage of the
adjudication against A in the prior equity suit. The holding was based on the
mutuality requirement alone.
OStone v. U. S., 167 U. S. 178, 17 S. Ct. 778, 42 L. ed. 127 (1897); Interstate Dry
Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301 (1922), 31 A. L. R. 258 (1924);
i Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 537; Notes, (1928) 57 A. L. R. 504; (1932) 80
A. L. R. 1145.
62Helvering v. Mitchell, 3o3 U. S. 391, 397, 58 S. Ct. 630, 632 (1938); Note (1924)
31 A. L. R. 261, 264.
&Cottingham v. Weeks, 54 Ga. 275 (1875); Corbley v. Wilson, 71 111. 209, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 98 (1874); Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 261, 270 et seq.
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64
in the New York case of Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., under
those circumstances the rule was relaxed to the extent that the criminal
conviction was admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts involved
5
in it, although not as conclusive evidence, or as a bar.6 The Virginia
66
case of Eagle Star & British Dominions Insurance Co. v. Heller extended this relaxation even further by holding a prior conviction conclusive as to the facts adjudicated, irrespective of the mutuality rule,
where one convicted of burning his buildings to defraud was later
suing an insurance company for recover of insurance on those buildings. In spite of the obvious expediency and logic of these latter posi67
tions, both appear to be minority holdings.
Although it can thus be seen that there is a diversity of opinion
as to the mutuality requirement to estoppel by record where the formerly losing party is prosecuting the second suit and sets up issues formerly decided against him in a prior suit, the cases appear to hold, almost without exception, that mutuality is necessary where a formerly
68
losing party is being sued, and the estoppel is set up in offense. Here
the plaintiff in the second suit asks that the formerly losing party be
estopped to set up as defenses, issues formerly decided against him.
Practically all such cases have arisen where the defendant in the second
suit was a defendant in the first, 69 and most involve automobile or railway accidents.

"Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N. Y. 3 o, 179 N. E. 711, 8D A. L. R. 1142
(1932).
e3See also Tucker v. Tucker, ioi N. J. Eq. 72, 137 Atl. 404 (1927); N. Y. & Cuba
Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. of City of New York., 32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940).

O'Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314
(1927), 57 A. L. R. 490 (1928).
,"Girard v. Vt. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 30, 154 Ad. 666 (1931); Notes (1928)
57 A. L. R. 504, 505; (1932) 8o A. R. L. 1145, 1147. Cf. U. S. v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479
(E. D. N. Y. 1940). Note that in suits for malicious prosecution, the former acquittal is part of the cause of action, and a former conviction is therefore admissible
as a bar. Turbessi v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 25o Mich. 110, 229 N. W. 454, 69 A. L.
R. 1o59 (193o); Ward v. Reasor, 98 Va. 399, 36 S. E. 470 (190o).
"Cases indicating a more liberal result are Savage v. McCauley, 302 Mass. 457,
19 N. E. (2d) 695 (1939) where a defendant was prevented from relitigating essential
issues in the same case after a substitution of parties plaintiff against him; and
U. S. v. Wexler, 8 F. (2d) 88o (W. D. Mo. 1925) where a judgment in a former divorce action was held to bind the then defendant on issues later asserted against
him in proceedings brougnt under the Naturalization Law to set aside his certificate
of naturalization. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N. Y.
305, 183 N. E. 506 (1932).
"In Macedonia State Bk. v. Graham, 198 Iowa 12, 199 N. W. 248 (1924), 34
A. L. R. 148 (1925), a former plaintiff was a defendant in the second suit and was
there bound by the first suit on issues pertaining to existence of certain negotiable
paper of which he was the maker.
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In Haverhill v. InternationalRy.70 a truck collided with a street car.
The driver of the truck recovered a judgment against the railway
company for personal injuries, the issues necessarily decided being
that the railway company was negligent and that the driver of the
truck was not. Later the truck owner sued the railway company on the
issues of negligence. It was held that the prior judgment, because of
the mutuality rule, did not constitute a basis for recovery by the owner.
It should be noted that this decision was made in spite of the fact that
it was a case of derivative liability. In the Virginia case of Rhine v.
Bond 1 a man, his wife, and three children, riding in their automobile,
were run into by defendant. The man, as administrator, recovered a
judgment against the defendant for the death of one of the children,
the issues necessarily decided being that defendant was negligent and
that the father was not. In later actions for their own personal injuries,
the other occupants of the car asserted the prior judgment against the
defendant as conclusive of the issues of negligence. It was held that the
case fell within the general rule of mutuality, and that the former adjudication could not be utilized. The court said:
"We have not been cited to, and have not found, any case in
which a judgment in an action of tort in favor of a sole plaintiff
injured by the negligence of a defendant has been held to conclude that defendant when sued by another person for personal
injuries received by him at the same time and in the same accident." 2
3
a final adjudiIn the recent New York case of Bisnoff v. Herrman,7
cation in an action commenced by plaintiff's fellow passengers against
defendant for injuries received in an automobile accident with defendant's vehicle was held not to establish the liability of the defendant as
a matter of law where the plaintiff later brought suit for personl injuries received in the same accident. Said the court:

"The holding of the former [Good Health case: derivative
liability case in which the mutuality rule was followed] is that
a prior judgment may constitute a defense, while the determinaof the latter [Haverhill case: derivative liability case in which
1

"Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N. Y. Supp. 522
(1926), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E. 905 (1927).
1
7 Rhine v. Bond, 159 Va. 279, 165 S. E. 515 (1932).
-Rhine v. Bond, 159 Va. 279, 284, 165 S. E. 515, 517 (1932). (italics supplied)

The same rule was followed on facts closely similar in the later Virginia case of
Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 196 S. E. 688 (1938).
73

Bisnoff v. Herrman, 260 App. Div. 663, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (1940).
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the mutuality rule was followed] is that 74a recovery may not be
predicatedupon such a priorjudgment."
The court, however, by dictum, went further than the necessities
of the case required, and adopted the completely orthodox view:
"Where as here, there is no privity or relationship approximating privity, a judgment cannot be res judicata, even as a defense, in favor of one who was not a party and who75 would not
have been bound had the judgment been adverse."
Another recent New York decision contains some pertinent suggestions. In Elderv. New York and Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc.,7 6
there was a collision between two motor trucks, one owned by the U. S.
Trucking Corporation (hereinafter called U. S. Corp.), and the other
owned by the New York and Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc. (hereinafter call Penn. Corp.). Each corporation sued the other for property
damage to the trucks. The actions were consolidated and a jury verdict
was rendered resulting in judgment for the U. S. Corp. The issues
necessarily decided were that Penn. Corp.'s driver was negligent and
that U. S. Corp.'s driver was not contributorily negligent. A later action
was brought by Elder, the driver of U. S. Corp.'s truck, against Penn.
Corp. for personal injuries received-in the'accident. Elder asked for
whatever benefit he was entitled to from the prior adjudication against
the Penn. Corp. in the previous action. It was held that to allow the
driver to take advantage of the prior adjudication on the issue of Penn.
Corp.'s negligence, and U. S. Corp.'s driver's freedom from negligence,
would "eliminate entirely the requirements of mutuality of estoppel
and of privity ....
overturn fundamental conceptions and overrule
authorities."
Upon a new trial of the same issues, the jury found'precisely contrary to the previous jury finding, and the case was dismissed. The dissenting judge felt that because of the consolidation of the two actions,
the first jury necessarily decided the vital issues against the Penn. Corp.,
and that therefore the truck driver was entitled to an estoppel by record. The dissenting statement, however, is expressly limited to situations where the formerly losing party was a plaintiff in the prior action.
The statement is made that mutuality has not been relaxed where the
7
'Bisnoff v. Herrman, 260 App. Div. 663, 666, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (1940). (italics
supplied)
7

5Bisnoff v. Herrman, 26o App. Div. 663, 666, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (1940). (italics

supplied)
7'Elder v. N. Y. & Penn. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N. Y. 350, 31 N. E. (ad) 188
(1940).
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party against whom estoppel is pleaded is the defendant in both actions; and that ordinarily where such a party was a plaintiff in the
former action and a defendant in the present action, estoppel does not
apply. It can readily be seen that if Penn. Corp. had been a plaintiff in
the former action, and failed to rocover, the failure may have been due
to the contributory negligence of its own driver rather than the lack of
negligence of U. S. Corp.'s driver, in which case the driver of U. S.
Corp.'s truck could not plead the former judgment, since the absence
of his own contributory negligence was not there adjudicated. It is
fundamental in all estoppels by record, however, that the issues concerned in both actions be the same. It appears that the prior action in
which Penn. Corp. lost as a defendant would be the one most apt to
contain issues identical with those in the second suit, since that case
necessarily decided both that Penn. Corp.'s driver was negligent, and
that Elder was not.
The policy of res judicata and estoppel by record would appear to
prompt the abandonment of the mutality requirement where a person
has had one opportunity to prove his case before a court of competent
jurisdiction and has failed. To allow him to assert a position contrary
to the former adjudication merely because his opponent in the second
case is not bound by the first is apparently-an acknowledgment "on the
part of the courts that the first adjudication may have been incorrect.
Such acknowledgment of undependability is out of harmony with the
policy that there be an end to unnecessary litigation. Insofar as judges
and juries are affected by the personal element, and render verdicts
subjectively according to parties, rather than objectively according to merits, fairness to the formerly losing party might prompt the
assumption that the first court was unduly favorable to his opponent.
Also it might be argued that the formerly losing party would have urged his case more strenuously had he known that he would be bound
thereby in later suits by or against third partles.77 Neither argument
is compelling. The first is a rather weak-kneed admission of judical incompetence. The second may explain the greater willingness of the
courts to protect the formerly losing party when he was a defendant in
the first suit, rather than a plaintiff, as noted by the dissenting judge in
the Elder case, and particularly where the formerly losing party is a defendant in both suits. It seems, however, that the party could hardly
claim this protection in derogation of the well-recognized public policy
7Moschizsker, Res Judicata

(1929)

38 Yale L. J. 299, 303.
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of avoiding relitigation of issues, where he has been once afforded a
fair tribunal in which to try them.
Certainly, however, there is something in the nature of the cases in
which a formerly losing party was a defendant in the first suit, and the
cases in which the formerly losing party is "hauled into court" with
the issues already decided against him, that makes the courts wary of a
liberal rule of estoppel by record. Up to this point, however, it seems
that public policy in preserving peace, the desire for freedom from
vexatious litigation, and the interest in the dignity of tribunals of
justice hold sway in liberal courts where a formerly losing party tries to
sue another on issues formerly decided against him in a court of competent jurisdiction.

FRE BARTENSTEIN, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE PRESSURE TO INDUCE
ACCEPTANCE OF ELECTIVE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

ACTS

Workmen's Compensation Acts' are now widely adopted in recognition of the fact that the common law negligence action against an
employer is entirely inadequate from both a social and economic point
of view to meet the need for monetary compensation for the injuries
befalling workmen in modem industry. These acts have been passed,
therefore, to facilitate the legal procedure available to workingmen injured in the course of their employment by assuring them of a speedy
2
and certain recovery for the injuries.
Although the statutes of the several states vary in many important
respects, the fundamental difference from a constitutional point of
view is whether the act be optional or compulsory. The right of a legislature to impose liability upon the employer, independently of his
negligence, is no longer open to question under either type of statute.
The courts have held that the compulsory statutes, and a fortiori the
optional statutes, do not impinge upon the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Today, therefore, the legislative power
1

Hereinafter referred to as "W. C. A."
2Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.)489 (1911).
soptional Statutes: Deibeikis v. Link-Belt CO., 261 Ill.
454, 104 N. E. 211, Ann.
Cas. i9t 5 A, 24t (1914); Shade v. Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement CO., 93
Kan. 257, 144 Pac. 249 (1914); In re Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 6o7, 96 N. E. 308
t
(19 1). See Note, L. R. A. 19 t6A. 409. Compulsory Statutes: Western Indemnity
Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398 (1915); State ex rel Davis-Smith Co. v.
Clausen. 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 11ol (911), 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466 (1912).
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to create absolute liability under a compulsory W. C. A. is settled, 4 and
litigation is mainly concerned with problems growing out of optional
or so-called "elective" statutes.
In every instance in which a state legislature has been content to
adopt an elective statute, it has been found that its provisions were not
sufficiently attractive to the employers within the jurisdiction to enlist
their unanimous adherence. Methods of making the employers who
took advantage of their statutory right to elect not to come under the
compensation system, see the "desirability" of a change of mind became
necessary to eradicate the evils that a W. C. A. is designed to eliminate.
These methods have taken three forms: (L) Abolition of the em.
ployer's common law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule; (2) Imposition of presumptions of negligence against the employer; (3) Creation of rules of
evidence designed to facilitate the proof of the injured employee's case.
A. Abolition of Common Law Defenses
The first persuasive legislative device was that of the abolition of
the common law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine as to employers who
refused to enlist. The power to abolish these defenses rests upon the
principle that no person has any property right or vested interest in
any rule of law, and that the legislature may change such rules if they
deem it best for the good of the state.5 It has been held that to do so as
a means of compelling employers to accept the provisions of the act is
not unreasonable coercion, 6 but merely a declaration of the public
policy of the state. 7 Legislative action of this character has been uniformly upheld, s but standing alone has lacked the vigor of a compelling force. Resort to additional means became necessary.
'This is true unless, of course, a peculiar state constitutional prohibition is
contravened, it being settled that the Federal Constitution has no applicable
measures.
"In re Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 3o8 ('9"); Matheson v.
Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn, 286, 148 N. W. 71 (1914); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147
Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 489 (1911).
'Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N. W. 1037 (1915);
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 489 (1911).
7
Appeal of Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Ad. 245 (1915).
'This method of coercion is well sanctioned as being constitutional. The cases
are collected in Note, L. R. A. i9i6A, 409, 413.
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B. Imposition of Negligence Presumptions
In legal effect there is no difference between saying that for accidental injuries received by a workman is the course of his employment,
and employer shall be (i) "absolutely liable," or (2) "conclusively
presumed to be negligent." 9 A legislature could, therefore, without contravening the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, phrase an act so as to provide for a "conclusive presumption of negligence against an employer" in proceedings under its
W. C. A. Under an elective act, however, as against an employer who
did not enlist, the action of an injured employee would still be based
upon negligence. To make the liabilities of both types of employers as
equal as possible under an elective act, the legislature might do away
with the necessity, or at least ease the burden, of the employee's proving negligence against a non-complying employer. To effectuate this
purpose an absolute liability or conclusive presumption of negligence
might be imposed upon the non-complying employer; or merely a
prima facie or rebuttable presumption of negligence might be used to
be inferred from the fact of the injury itself. By this means, the fact that
the workman was injured in the course of his employment would create
either a conclusive or prima facie presumption that such injury was
caused by the negligence of his employer. Such an enactment brings
into issue the extent of the power of a legislature to tamper with the
precepts of logic, and by fiat to declare that upon proof of one fact
another shall be inferred. Many cases have dealt with this legislative
right, and it is now well established that a state has the general power
to prescribe the evidence which shall be received and the effect that
shall be given to it in her courts. The state may exert this power by
providing that proof of one particular fact shall be prima fade evidence
of another. The only qualification upon this right is that the enactment
be not an arbitrary mandate or one that discriminates between different persons in substantially the same situation; if this demand has been
met, the legislation will not create a denial of due process or equal
protection of the laws. 10 As was said in the leading case on statutory
"This would not be true had not the employer been already denied the common law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule.
"The leading case affirming this right is the United States Supreme Court
decision in Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136, 55
L. ed. 78 (igo). A Mississippi law provided that in all actions against railroads
for damages done to persons or property, proof of injury inflicted by the running
of locomotives or cars of such company should be prima facie evidence of the
want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the servants of such company.
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J. & K. R. R. v. Turnipseed, it is "... only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."' 1
Under the principles laid down in the Turn ipseed case, prima facie
presumptions have been upheld from one instance in which the fact of
recklessness was inferred from the fact of driving an auto ten m.p.h.
through a city street,12 to one in which violations of the city's garbage
ordinance were inferred in certain instances from the use of the city's
water supply.' 3 A multitude of rebuttable inferences possessing varying
4
degrees of rationality have been sustained in attacks upon both civil'
presumptions, Mobile

This was upheld by the Court, which said: "The statute does not, therefore, deny
the equal protection of the law or otherwise fail in due process of law, because it
creates a presumption of liability, since its operation is only to supply an inference
of liability in the absence of other evidence contradicting such inference. That
a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute
a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law it is
only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof
of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So
also it must not under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus
presumed." 219 U. S. 35, 43, 31 S. Ct. 136, 138, 55 L. ed. 78 (191o).
11219 U. S.35, 43, 31 S.Ct. 136, 138, 55 L. ed. 78 (gio).
12Morrison v. Flowers, 308 Ill. 189, 139 N. E. 10 (1923). A motor vehicle -act
provided that if the rate of speed through town on a public highway exceeded ten

miles per hour, such rate of speed should be prima facie evidence that the person
operating such motor vehicle was running at a rate of speed greater than was
reasonable and proper. This Illinois statute survived an attack based on the Fourteenth Amendment.
lzState v. Spiller, 146 Wash. 18o, 262 Pac. 128 (1927). Under a city ordinance,
it was made mandatory that all who had garbage to dispose of should do so by
means of a certain type of garbage can prescribed. If the householder did not
possess such a can, the fact that he was using city water raised the prima facie presumption that he was creating garbage, and, therefore, violating the statute. This
statutory presumption was held not to be a violation of due process of law.
"'Cunningham v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 215 S. W. 5 (Mo. 1919) (delay by carrier creates presumption that the carrier was negligent); People v. Polthemus, 367
I11.185, 1o N. E. (2d) 966 (1937) (presumption that transfer was made in contemplation of death); Goldstein v. Maloney, 62 Fla. 198, 57 So. 342 (1911) (presumption that a sale was fraudulent); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88, 48 S.Ct. 443, 72 L.
ed. 796 (1928) (insolvency at time of deposit is prima facie presumption that officer knew of insolvency and assented to the deposit); Commonwealth v. Kroger,
276 Ky. 20, 122 S. W. (2d) ioo6 (1938) (prima fade inference that a traffic violation
was committeed by or with the car owner's consent). Contra: Tipton v. Estill Ice
Co., 279 Ky. 793, 132 S. W. (2d) 347 (1939) (mere failure to secure an operator's
permit not prima facie evidence that the driver involved in the accident was negligent).
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and criminal 15 statutes, under the due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Federal Constitution.
Similarly, though less frequently, conclusive presumptions have
been enacted and have been upheld by the courts. In Packard v.
O'Neil'6 an Idaho statute created an absolute legal presumption of
negligence for personal injuries and property damage against a man
who drove a car while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
court held that this presumption was created not as a principle of evidence, but as a measure to insure and regulate safety upon the highways. The legislature had thought that there might be difficulty in
establishing lack of due care, and that this would leave room for so
much question that the conclusive presumption of negligence ought
to prevail.
In many instances, however, legislatures have gone even further,
extending the class of injuries for which a defendant is absolutely
liable.17 Thus, railroads have been made absolutely liable for property
damage caused by sparks emitted from their engines, I8 and automobile
owners have been held to an absolute liability for injuries caused by
the negligence of operators driving with their consent. 19
sHawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 42 S. Ct. 204, 66 L. ed. 431 (1922) (prima facie
evidence that the person in actual possession had knowledge of a still on the
premises); Yee Hem v. U. S., 268 U. S. 178, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L. ed. 904 (1925)
(opium presumed to have been imported illegally); Bandini Petroleum Co. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 284 U. S.8, 52 S. Ct. 103, 76 L. ed. 136 (193)
(the blowing, release, or escape of natural gas into the air prima facie evidence of
unreasonable waste); Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 45 S.Ct. 490, 69 L. ed. 944
(1925) (presumption that a conveyance was made with intent to avoid escheat);
People v. Fitzgerald, 14 Cal. App. (2d) t8o, 58 P. (2d) 718 (1936), cert. denied, 299
U. S. 593, 57 S.Ct. 115, 81 L. ed. 437 (1937) (possessor of dynamite made prima face
guilty of a felony); State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347 (1920) (possession of cigarettes prima facie evidence of the selling or keeping for sale); State v.
Elkin, 177 La. 427, 148 So. 668 (1933) (failure to pay worthless check in ten days
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud); State v. Fitzpatrick, 141 Wash. 638, 251
Pac. 875 (1927) (possession of burglary tools prima facie evidence of the intent to
use the same to commit crime). Contra: McFarland v. American Sugar CO., 244 U. S.
79, 39 S. Ct. 498, 6o L. ed. 899 (1916) (presumption of being a party to a monopoly
or a combination in restraint of trade or commerce held invalid); Stafford v. City
of Valdosta, 49 Ga. App. 243, 174 S. E. 81o (1934) (purchase of intoxicating liquors
within the city limits not to be presumed from mere possession).
1645 Idaho 427, 262 Pac. 881 (1927).
1In cases other than those involving W. C. A. controversies, this is going much
further because the common law defenses are still available to the defendant
under a conclusive presumption of negligence, while under liability without fault
they are immaterial.
"St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 243, 41 L. ed. 61x (1897).
"Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 284 U. S.335, 52 S. Ct. 144,
76 L. ed. 323 (1932). See also Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 18o, 184, 17 S. Ct. 282, 284,
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A review of the numerous cases in which statutory presumptions
have been upheld establishes the power of a legislature to declare that
upon proof of one fact another shall be inferred. With the view of
persuading non-complying employers to enlist under a V. C. A., legislatures have, in several instances, declared that the fact of the workman's being injured in the course of his employment shall be prima
facie evidence that such injury was caused by the negligence of the
employer. In Lykes Bro. S. S. Co. v. Esteves,20 a federal court considered a provision in the Puerto Rican W. C. A., creating a prima facie
presumption of negligence against an employer who had elected not to
come within the act, and the constitutionality of the provision was upheld under a due process attack. The court reasoned that it was not
dealing with liability for negligence generally, but with a W. C. A.
confined entirely to industrial injuries, in which a jurisdiction if it
wished could impose absolute liability. It was observed that the employer could preclude resort by the employee to such action by securing accident compensation in accordance with the act, and the presumption was sanctioned as a constitutional means of coercion.
In Hawkins v. Bleakly21 a statute with a presumption to substantially the same effect was upheld under an equal protection attack. It
was held not to be arbitrary as it treated all employers alike and all employees alike. The fact that it served as a "strong inducement" to the
employer to come within the W. C. A. was again held not to be unconstitutional coercion.
In the light of such precedent, it is surprising that the Pennsylvania
court in the decision of Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore22 reached the
opposite conclusion. There, the wording of the act creating the prima
L. ed. 677 (1897). Where an owner or tender of sheep, cows, etc., drove them
over a public highway constructed on a hillside, he was held to be absolutely
liable for all damages they did to the banks, etc. The Court held that "The
statute, being general in its application, embracing all persons under substantially
4

like circumstances, and not being an arbitrary exercise of power does not deny to
the defendant the equal protection of the laws." And "So, also, as the statute
clearly specifies the condition under which the presumption of neglect arises, and
provides for the ascertainment of liability by judicial proceedings .. .", that it was

not a taking of property without due process of law. In the opinion the Court observed that the legislature had said, in effect, that such a passage was so likely, if
great caution was not observed, to result in damage to the road, that where this
damage followed such a driving, there ought to be no controversy over the existence or non-existence of negligence, but that there should be an absolute legal
presumption to that effect resulting from the fact of having driven the herd.
289 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1937).
2243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 6i L. ed. 678 (1917).
2334 Pa. 449, 7 A. (2d) 302 (1939)-
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facie presumption against the non-complying employer was unusually
cautious, expressly providing for the right of the employer to introduce
testimony showing the irijury to have arisen from another cause, and
making the final determination a question of fact for the jury. 23 This
provision was held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
under both the due process and equal protection clauses. 24 In failing to
recognize a "manifest connection between the fact proved and the fact
presumed," the decision not only ignored the fact that the courts have
not applied the highest degree of logic in the inferential step, 25 but

completely turned its back on two rulings of federal courts to the contrary. 26 Such a decision stands in need of support, for it is thought that
the somewhat limited authority on the issue goes to support state legislatures in creating a prima facie presumption of negligence against an
employer in an action by his employee for injuries received in the
course of employment.
On the question of the power of a legislature to create a conclusive
presumption in this regard, however, even less case authority is available. In 1923, a legislative effort to make a non-complying employer
liable without fault was sustained2 7 by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Fahler v. City of Minot.28 In 194o, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in the decision of Pragerv. W. H.
Chapman & Sons Co.,2 9 held that it violated the principle of due proUSection 210, 1 (a) of 77 Penn. Stat. § 42.
"The court also held the act invalid as contravening the Pennsylvania Bill of
Rights which declares that no person can "be deprived of his life, libexty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." Pa. Const. Bill of
Rights Art. I, § 9.
2

State v. Nossaman, io7 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347 (1920) (rational connection be-

tween the possession of cigarettes and the sale of them or the keeping of them
for free distribution); Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 38, 122 S. W. (2d) ioo6
(1938) (violation of a traffic law had a rational connection with the inferred fact
that same was committed with the car owner's authority or permission); State v.
Spiller, 146 Wash. 18o, 262 Pac. 128 (1927) (use of the city's water made prima
facie evidence in certain situations of the violation of a garbage disposal ordinance).
"Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 10, 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678 (1917); Lykes
Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1937). See notes 2o and 21,
supra.
"The North Dakota legislature had provided that a non-complying employer could be sued by a complying employee either before the administrative
tribunal or at his option before the courts of law. If he chose the latter he was
held to have the benefit of the conclusive presumption of negligence the same as
if he were before the tribunal. Laws of 1939, Ch. 162, § 11.
2849 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
19 S. E. (2d) 88o (W. Va. 1940), noted (1940) 2 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 170.
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cess of law for the legislature to make non-complying employers liable
regardless of fault. The court believed the act to be unconstitutional
because the W. C. A. was not compulsory and had not, therefore, sought
to impose liability upon all employers. It was observed that the provision might have been intended to compel all employers to become
subscribers to the W. C. A., but that this fact did not make the act
effective, because if the legislature had that purpose in mind, there was
open to it a plain, simple, and direct way in the passage of a compulsory
W. C. A.30

The reasoning of this conclusion is not in line with precedent. It
must be remembered that conclusive presumptions applying to other
situations have been upheld,31 and that the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are not contravened by legislation of this type if a rational
basis exists for the rule enacted. 32 The true idea of due process of law
is that the processes of government shall not be exerted or imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner at the whim of some judge or executive, but rather in accordance with the letter and spirit of certain prescribed rules or well established usages.33 Thus, unless there is a substantial invasion in a highhanded manner so as to represent unguided
or arbitrary action, the courts of the United States are reluctant to interfere on the ground that a state has violated the due process clause;
and therefore, unless outstanding, matters of state procedure, in parti34
cular, are not subject to these attacks.
Upon an attack under the equal protection clause, also, there is a
a°Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 138 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489 (1911).
31Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. i8o, 17 S. Ct. 282, 41 L. ed. 677 (1897); Packard v..
O'Neil, 45 Idaho 127, 262 Pac. 881 (1927).
nMobile, J. & K. C. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136, 55 L..

ed. 78 (1910).
"Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 4 Wheat. 235, 1 L. ed. 878 (U. S. 1819); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (19o8); Arizona Employers'
Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed. io58 (1918); see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 329-30, 42 S. Ct. 124, 128, 66 L. ed. 254 (1921), 27 A. L. R_
375, 384 (1923), where the Court said: "It is true that no one has a vested right in
any particular rule of the common law, but it is also true that the legislative
power of a state can only be exerted in subordination to the fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment is intended to preserve, and that a purely arbitrary or capricious
exercise of that power whereby a wrongful and highly injurious invasion of property rights, as here, is practically sanctioned and the owner stripped of all real'
remedy, is wholly at variance with those principles."
"Matson v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of Washington, 284 U. S. 55. 5- S..
Ct. 69, 76 L. ed. 214 (1934).
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presumption in favor of the classification 3 5 made by the legislature,30
and of legitimate grounds for distinction.37 The one who assails a classification under the equal protection clause must, therefore, carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but
is essentially arbitrary.3 8
Upon these principles, accompanied by a recognition of the fact
that a legislature if it wishes may impose an absolute liability under
a compulsory statute, the decision of the North Dakota court 39 allowing liability without fault is to be preferred. The best reason that can
be given in support of this conclusion is that which underlies the very
public purpose justifying a compulsory W. C. A.-i.e., the realization
that there is a pecuniary loss resulting from these industrial injuries
which the employee should' not bear. The primary if not the legally
termed "proximate cause" of these injuries is the employment itself, and
in this adventure both the employer and the employee are engaged.
Compensation acts provide for reimbursement to the employee because it is on him that the first brunt of the loss falls. They further require that payment shall be made by the employer because he takes the
gross receipts of the common enterprise, and can, by reason of his control, make the proper adjustments to distribute the loss. 4 0 This is certainly a public policy of great worth. 41
There is one obvious objection to a conclusive presumption in
these cases, however, that remains yet to be treated. It is one thing to
hold an employer liable for damages occurring without fault when the
damages are more or less limited by a prescribed scale (as under a W.
C. A.), and quite another to hold him liable for all the damages a jury
might assess. The latter allows the legislature to subject the non-comBy classification is meant the fact that the legislature made the terms of the
act applicable only to a certain group or kind of cases rather than giving it universal application.
"Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 55 S. Ct. 187, 79 L.
ed. 281 (1934); N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct.
bi.

81 L. ed. 893 (1937).

'People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 234 Pac. 398 (1925).
3Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. ed. 369
('91').
Fahler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
4OBy insurance, by increasing selling prices, and by reducing wages. (But the
latter action is obviously not possible since the advent of large scale union contracts).

"New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 662
(1917); Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed.

MV. (1918).
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plying employer to a jury assessment after stripping him of his common law defenses. A question of whether such an employer has been
afforded the equal protection of the law is, therefore, appropriately
raised. In Fabler v. City of Minzot 42 the court met this objection by
saying that where the employer did not come within the statute, the
claim of the injured employee was necessarily subject to the hazard of
the employer's financial responsibility and the delay and inconvenience
of a suit through the regular legal channels rather than the simplified
procedure before a Workmen's Compensation Bureau. This seems a
fair exchange, and with this objection also erased, there can be no
further logical basis for a Fourteenth Amendment attack upon a con-.
clusive presumption of this type. Any remaining discriminations must
be accepted. The whole basis upon which a W. C. A. is conceived is
that there is an adequate distinction between the employer class and
43
the employee class.
Finally, all the employer has to do if he finds the role of a noncomplier too burdensome is to subscribe to the act, the power to adopt
44
these means of coercion being recognized.
C. Liberalizationof Rules of Admissibility of Evidence
Under an elective statute, when a workman is suing a non-comply;ing employer, there are several things that he must prove if he would
take advantage of the statutes abolishing the common law defenses of
his employer. In such a case, the workman must prove that the injury
'249 N. D. 96o,

194 N. W. 695 (1923).

"aThis may be admitted, but still the question asked whether there is any
adequate basis of distinction between an employer who elects to come within the
act and one who does not? It seems that the courts have long recognized this distinction when they have denied the common law defenses to the latter class. In
Fahler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923), the court answered
this question further by pointing out that the employee was forced to submit to
the inconvience of a law suit and the danger that his employer would be insolvent.
"Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678 (1917); Lykes
Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). In Ferry v. Ramsey,
277 U. S. 88, 94, 48 S. Ct. 443, 444, 72 L. ed. 796 (1928), a Kansas act provided that
the fact that a banking institution was insolvent or in a failing condition at the
time of the reception of a deposit should be prima facie evidence that the director
or officer had knowledge and had assented to such deposit. The Court held that the
legislature might have made the director personally liable to the depositors in
every case if it had wished, and thereby have made one taking the position assume
the risk. The Court said: "The statute in short imposed a liability that was less
than might have been imposed, and that being so, the thing to be considered is the
result reached, not the possibly inartificial or clumsy way or reaching it." See also
Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1937).
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was the result of his employer's negligence; that it was sustained "in the
course of his employment"-i.e., occurred while he was on his job; that
is was sustained "out of the course of his employment"-i.e., occurred
as a consequence of his employmeni; a 5 and that it resulted in certain
damages to him. To facilitate the proof of these issues by the workman, a legislature might make evidence which was prohibited at common law admissible in the proof of these points.
In the only instance in which this has been attempted the statute
,was declared void in the Pennsylvania case of Rich Hill Coal Co. v.
lBashore.46 To supplement a provision creating a presumption of negligence, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a further enactment that
anything the injured employee said to anybody within twelve hours
after the injury would be adjudged "competent evidence" in any action
brought to recover damages for personal injuries against a non-complying employer. This was the construction put upon the following
statute by the highest court of the state:
"When an employee sustains an injury in the course of his
employment, declarations, remarks, and utterances, made by the
injured employee within twelve hours after the injury was
sustained shall be admissible as competent evidence." 47
The court held this provision to deny to the non-complying employer the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 In reaching this conclusion the court regarded the act as having the effect of creating a conclusive presumption of negligence and
therefore to be invalid for the same reason that a direct attempt to
create that result would have been.4 9 If this were the only ground for
'3 See Harper, Law of Torts (1933) § 212.
48334 Pa. 449, 7 A. (2d) 302 (1939)'"Section 201.1 (b) of 77 Penn. Stat. § 42-this provision being applicable only
in respect to employers who had elected not to come within the scope of the act.
"SThe court found two other grounds of unconstitutionality: (1) the act contravened the principle that the rules of evidence must be uniform and impartial,
(2) it was "special legislation" and therefore invalid under a provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution that the legislature "shall not pass any local or special
law ... regulating the ... rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding or inquiry
before courts .. " Pa. Const. Art III, § 7.
"9While recognizing the logical distinction between making a fact conclusive
proof of a fact in issue and making an unsworn utterance of an injured employee
"competent evidence," the court thought that the "practical effect" of the latter was
to make a finding of the employer's fault almost inevitable from the mere fact of
the employee's injury. The basis of this reasoning was that in most injuries of this
type the only witness was the employee himself and thus the rule would make
the employer's right of rebuttal practically valueless. This would put the employer
in the same position as if the legislature had made the mere fact of the injury
conclusive proof of the employer's fault.
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holding the act invalid, the decision of the court would be very doubtful, for it has been seen that the right to create conclusive presumptions
in workmen's compensation cases has been affirmed by other courts.
The court, however, found several other faults. The employee might
use these statements even though he survived the injury and was able to
appear on the witness stand. 50 The employee might make willfully
false statements within the twelve hour period 51 to third persons. Such
remarks could be testified to by these third persons, who would not in
testifying stand in danger of being prosecuted for perjury, which danger
would face the workman if he were to testify falsely himself. Thus, the
employee could absent himself from the jurisdiction,52 and establish his
case by these witnesses. Cross examination of such witnesses upon this
hearing would not be effective, 53 because their knowledge would be
limited in most instances to the content of the employee's own statements. The declarations made would, furthermore, not have to relate
to the injury, but could be prejudicial remarks on irrelevant matters. 54 The court held these ex parte declarations to be unacceptable
as evidence for four reasons: (i) they did not have to be made under
oath; (2) they were not part of the res gestae; (3) they did not need
to be made under the solemnity of impending death; (4) they were not
subject to cross examination.
The statute does seem to present an imposing array of irregularities,
and there is no doubt that as a general rule of evidence, it would be
open to serious objections. It must be remembered, however, that it is
"'A witness is not allowed to testify as to an unsworn statement made by himself upon a former occasion. A declaration of a witness out of court inconsistent
with his testimony is not admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated, but only
for purposes of impeachment. Spear v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 16 Cal.
App. 637, 117 Pac. 956 (1911); Backes v. Movsovich, 82 N. J. L. 44, 81 Ad. 497 (1911);
Southwestern T. & T. Co. v. Thompson, 157 S. W. 1185 (Tex. Civ. App. 193).
"Which the court observed was ample time for the designing of testimony.
rC"Hearsay evidence does not become admissible by reason of the fact that
the declarant has left the jurisdiction or is sick or cannot be examined or compelled
to testify or is incompetent as a witness." 22 C. J. 217.
r-The court held cross-examination to be more than a privilege-that it was
a right.
5
This construction seems not only unnecessary, but to be unrepresentative of
the usual treatment of a court passing on the constitutionality of a statute. A court
will, if possible, put a construction upon a statute that will make it possible to
hold the act constitutional. If the court had construed the act so that the only
remarks available would have been remarks relevant to the issue-that is, have
made the rule of "relevancy, competency, and materiality" paramount to the implications of the legislative enactment-it could have avoided this objection, at
least.
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confined to cases of a particular type, and will serve only as an aid on
certain particular issues in suits of that type. It might be well, therefore, to analyze the act as it would apply to the several proofs that a
workman must establish in a suit against a non-complying employer. 55
It will be noticed that the act opens with the words "when a workman
is injured in the course of his employment." It is a possible construction that the legislature intended that before the rule of evidence under
review is to be available to the employee, he must first establish that he
was injured "in the course of his employment"- which term in Pennsylvania also embraces the requirements of the usual "out of the course
of employment" phrase. 56 Under such an interpretation, evidence of
the type made admissible by the statute could not be used by the employee to show that he was injured in or out of the course of his employment. 57 Perhaps a more common construction would be that the
evidence is to be admissible on any issue in the case, including whether
the injury happened in or out of the course of the employment. Under
this interpretation, the act would be open to serious objection, as it
would be a threat to extend an employer's liability to all cases in
which his employee was injured, whether on the job or not. As a means
of avoiding an unnecessary invalidation of the statute, the court might
well have adopted the former construction, even though it may not be
the most obvious meaning of the words used by the legislature.
As to this "radical" rule of evidence being available to prove damages received, it is hard to see how the act in any way prejudices the
5As set out, supra, these points are: (i) that the injury was caused by the employer's negligence; (2) that it was sustained in the course of the employment; (3)
that it was sustained out of the course of the employment; (4) and that it resulted
in certain damages to the employee.
6'Pennsylvania is a state that has eliminated the customary "out of the course
of the employment" requisite. Thus the term "in the course of the employment"
is usually deemed to embrace both concepts. For a discussion of this point and the
general distinction between "in the course of" and "out of the course of", see
Harper, Law of Torts ('933) § 212.
5'On the issue of whether the injury was "accidential" or not as it is customarily used in a W. C. A. an interesting point is raised. When a W. C. A. requires
that an injury be accidental it means that it shall not be caused by the attempt of
the workman to commit suicide or wilfully to inflict injury upon himself or another person. This, however, only applies to suits against workers under the W. C.
A. As to suits against non-complying employers, which suits are common law
actions, such an issue would not come up because it would ordinarily arise under
the defense of contributory negligence, and this defense has been taken from noncomplying employers. It will be noticed that the Pennsylvania act read "When injury results .. " It did not require it to be an accidental injury as it would have
had to be under the W. C. A.
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employer. Statements of general pain and suffering constitute a recognized exception to the hearsay rule and are thus admissible without the
aid of a statute. 58 It is difficult to conceive of any other kinds of statements that the employee might make within twelve hours after his injury that could be used effectively to establish damages that did not
in fact exist. Of course very abusive statements about the employer
might be introduced to incite the jury's general prejudice against him,
but still the employer would have available the usual sources of objective proof regarding the extent of the employee's injuries. If the
award of the jury exceeded to any substantial extent the injuries received, the verdict could be set aside upon this ground.
The mere fact that the evidence is admissible, moreover, does not
mean that it will be credible. If the plaintiff is in court, cross-examination is available to disprove the truth of his statements; and if he is
not at the trial, it is likely that his very absence would raise serious
doubts in the jurors' minds as to the validity of the evidence. If an injured workman with designs on undeserved economic gain remarked
within the period that he had received everything from a fractured
skull to a lacerated little toe, that he anticipated a nervous breakdown
and life long ill-health as a result, he might absent himself from the
jurisdiction and use these remarks to establish his damages. However,
he could hardly remove the attending doctors, the ambulance drivers,
and the hospital nurses from the jurisdiction and destroy doctors' and
hospital records as well. It is for these reasons that the rule of evidence
seems harmless as far as any chance of increasing the amount of damages is concerned.
This leaves only one other matter in which the rule of evidence may
be thought to facilitate the proof: the question of the negligence of the
employer. But it has been seen that a legislature has the right to create
a W. C. A. that imposes absolute liability, 59 as well as an act that
creates an absolute presumption of negligence against a non-complying
employer. 60 This, then, is a return to the old issue of whether the legislature can do indirectly what it has the right to do directly. That is, if
the legislature has the power to create an absolute presumption of negligence against a non-complying employer, can it not create a rule that
operates to enable the presentation of merely a strong case of negligence
"'See Wigmore, Evidence (1940) § 1718.
"'State ex rel Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 177 Pac.
L. R. A. (N. s.) 466 (1912).
O'Fahler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
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against a non-complying employer? The thing to be considered is the
result reached, not the possibly artificial or clumsy way of reaching it.61
When the operation of the particular rule of evidence under review
is analyzed, it is difficult to see upon what ground the Pennsylvania
court could have held it to be violative of the principles of the equal
protection clause. The theory of workmen's compensation is based
upon the assumption that there is a sufficient basis of distinction between employer and employee. The cases upholding the denying of
common law defenses and the imposing of the presumptions of negligence established the view that there is a valid basis of distinction between enlisted and unenlisted employers.
The court said, however, that this rule of evidence was denied to
the defendant employer, and considered that the legislature was thereby opening the door of "loose hearsay testimony" for the benefit of one
party, while keeping it closed to the other. It is doubtful whether there
are any evils implicit in this situation. True, the rule relates to remarks made by the employee only, and not to remarks made by the
employer, but the justification for this discrimination rests upon the
very nature of the relief being afforded as well as the nature of the employment relationship which has long been recognized as the basis of
aW.C.A.
The rules of hearsay have been meddled with before by the legislatures. It is a well-known rule of common law evidence that what is
hearsay does not cease to be so because the person who made the remark may have died.6 2 In situations like this, however, statutory
changes in two states have admitted the statements of decedents as exceptions to the hearsay rule.6 Although. involved in numerous cases,
these statutes have apparently never been questioned under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Moreover, cases have held that the admission of incompetent evidence is not a denial of due process of law. 65
Statutes making a writing or memorandum of any kind, whether made
in the regular course of business or not, admissible evidence may be
found, and have been held not to violate the principles of due process
6Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88, 48 S. Ct. 443, 72 L. ed. (1928), see note
44, supra.
"Updike v. Mace, 194 Fed. iooi (S. D. N. Y. 1912); Rulofson v. Billings, 140 Cal.
452, 74 Pac. 35 (19o3); Griffin v. Train, go App. Div. 16, 85 N. Y. Supp. 686 (19o4).

mSee Wood v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 87 Conn. 341, 87 At. 983 (1913);
Crosby v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 461, log N. E. 365 (1915).
"See cases collected in 22 C. J. 216.
"State v. Owens, 124 S. C. 220, 117 S. E. 536 (1922); State v. Thorson, 202 Wis.
31, 231 N. W. 155 (1930).
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of law. 66 This is an analgous situation to the rule under discussion, and
the chances for fraud and deceit are as great in the memorandum cases
as in the oral remark cases. When it is considered that the memorandum statutes are statutes of general application and the statute under
review is one confined only to a particular type of action which is
created to effectuate a great public purpose, it seems that the Pennsylvania court became unduly alarmed about the efficacy of this rule of
67
evidence as an agency for the forces of evil.
A look into the way the common law rules of evidence have been
relaxed with an increasing degree of liberality in administrative procreedings before workmen's compensation boards further strengthens
the argument against the Pennsylvania decision. Many statutes provide that the commission shall not be bound by the common law or
statutory rules of evidence. In at least two states great liberality exists
in that the courts may not reverse a finding because of any informality
in the manner of taking evidence.68 Thus, either as a result of express
statutory command or by construction of statutes relaxing the rules
of evidence, hearsay may be admitted and considered by the commissions in several states.6 9 When it is seen that employers who have accepted a W. C. A. are subjected to these relaxed rules of evidence in a
proceeding before a commission, is it such a discrimination to subject
a non-complying employer to the same "ordal" before a court of
law?7 0 As long as a rule of evidence is available only in aid of finding
of an employer's negligence, it should not be considered objectionable
in the constitutional sense. Should it be so drawn as to facilitate proof
nGile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N. W. 7o6 (1937) upheld a Michigan act
of this type. See also Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124, 170 N. E. 517 (1930).
nConversely, legislative attemps in the opposite direction, in the way of excluding testimony admissible at common law, have been made. In the recent case
of Kirsch v. Posimal, 294 N. W. 865 (Wis. i94o), a statute provided that no statement made by an irjured person within seventy-two hours after receiving an accident or injury should be received in evidence in an action for damages for personal injuries unless the same should be admissible as part of the res gestae. The
constitutionality of this statute has not been questioned under either due process
or equal protection clauses.
"Cal. Labor Code (Deering, 1937) § 57o9; Mont. Rev. Ann. (Choate, Supp.
1935) § 2938.
"Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 175, 269
Pac. 1127 (1938); Baker v. Industrial Comm., 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N. E. 1o (1933);
see Note, (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 576.
7'The point is arguable, however, that such a relaxation of rules might be
permitted before commissioners experienced in the evaluation of testimony, but
that a jury might not be equally fortified against the deceptions of hearsay testimony.
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on other issues, such as that the workman was injured in the course of
his employment, then its constitutionality might be questioned.
Conclusion
It should be remembered that workmen's compensation legislation,
made to equalize the liabilities of the two types of employers and to
persuade the non-complying employer to enlist under the act, is not
dealing with injured plaintiffs in general, but only with plaintiffs who
are employees injured in the course of their employment by the negligence of their employer. These are pieces of legislation with great
public purpose behind them. The object of all these acts is to create a
liability against the employer for a certain class of injuries regardless
of his fault. If an employer chooses not to come within the W C. A.,
an attempt to aid a workman in proving the employer negligent is in
order. Abolition of common law defenses, imposition of presumptions
of negligence and regulations of the admissibility of evidence are proper
if exercised in this direction, and in this direction only. They are not,
furthermore, to be considered as unconstitutional means of coercion
when their only efficacy is in the carrying out of this purpose.
WnUL4M M. MArnm
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AGENCY-RIGHT OF PRINCIPAL GIVING PROPERTY TO AGENT FOR ILLEGAL
PURPOSE TO RECOVER FROM THIRD PARTY FOR CONVERSION OF THAT

PROPERTY. [New York]

Public policy, a phrase that seems inherently indefinable, is employed continually in courts of law and equity in a multitude of instances.
It is so flexible and so all-inclusive that a decision based upon one or
more phases of it rarely escapes scrutiny directed toward the propriety
of the particular application. Individual conceptions of sound public
policy vary to such an extent that agreement, even among members of
the same court, is difficult.
Flegenhezmer v. Brogan' presents an example of the confusion- that

too frequently results from decisions based upon public policy. The
plaintiff's intestate 2 organized a corporation, of which he was virtually

the sole owner, for the purpose of operating a brewery. Unable to obtain a permit from either the New York or the United States liquor

authorities, he transferred the capital stock to one Vogel as his agent
and dummy. 3 By this manipulation the identity of the intestate was

concealed and the permits were secured. After the death of the intestate, Vogel transferred the stock to the defendant, who gave no
consideration and took with notice of the fact that the stock was the

property of the intestate. The plaintiff, as administratrix, sued the defendant for conversion.
The Court of Appeals of New York, assuming the allegations of the
plaintiff to be true, held for the defendant. It was said that the transaction between the intestate and Vogel was for the purpose of circumventing the state and federal liquor control statutes and was "so far

against the public good as to disable the plaintiff from invoking the
'284 N. Y. 268, 3o N. E. (2d) 591

(1940). Noted in (1941) 1o Brooklyn L. Rev. 307.
The intestate, Mr. Flegenheimer, is doubtless better known as "Dutch Schultz"
of "bootlegging" fame. This fact may well be considered as partially explaining the
decision of the court.
iThe fact that this agent had legal title to the stock may lead one to inquire
whether the true relationship was not that of trustee and cestui que use. But it appears that it is not unusual for an agent to hold general title to lands or chattels.
i Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees (1935) § 15. The court here did not question
the allegation that Vogel was an agent, and indeed, it is believed that the distinction is immatrenal in this case.
2
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aid of the court in her endeavor to disengage herself (as administratrix) from the unlawfulness of the conduct of her intestate." 4
The first objection to the holding is that the court was apparently
so impressed by the weakness of the position of the plaintiff that it
either completely overlooked or completely ignored the real nature of
the cause of action. This was not a suit upon a contract. There was
never at any time any contractual relationship between the plaintiff's
intestate and the defendant. Therefore, the ordinary rule, barring ac2
tions upon illegal contracts, had no application as between them. Yet
the majority of the court implicitly, and the minority of the court explicitly,5 relied upon this rule. Such errors in the application of legal
principles do not necessarily lead to incorrect results. Nevertheless,
even though the correct result be achieved, the commission of the error
is unfortunate in that there is introduced into the law an element of
needless confusion. The commission of the error is especially unfortunate in cases involving public policy, a doctrine inevitably confusing
in many respects.
The second objection to the holding is that the result of the decision, when examined in the light of what is believed to be the correct
principle is neither logical nor warranted as an expression of the most
desirable public policy. The true relationship among the parties here
seems to be that of principal and agent and transferee with notice from
the agent. Therefore, the right of the defendant to retain the stock depends upon the right of the agent to dispose of the stock. In turn, the
right of the agent to dispose of the stock depends upon the legal effect
of his contract with his principal.
It is elementary that an agent is liable, to account to his principal
for property coming into the former's hands by virtue of the agency.
And anyone taking the property from the agent with notice of the fact
of the agency and of the limitations upon the powers of the agent can
stand in no better position than did the agent himself. On the other
hand, if the agent has a defence to an action by the principal to recover
'Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 284 N. Y. 268, 273. 3o N. E. (2d) 591 , 593 (194o).
5
Judge Finch, dissenting, considered the case from the standpoint of illegal contract, and concluded that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover since she relied
only on her ownership of the property which was the subject of the contract. He
made no distinction between cases in which the suit was between the parties to the
contract and cases in which the suit was between one party to the contract and a
stranger. Judge Conway, dissenting, considered the case solely from the standpoint
of public policy. He was of the opinion that public policy would bar recovery in
an action by the principal against the agent, but should not bar a recovery against
the defendant.
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the property, such a defence should be available to the transferee from
the agent.6 Thus the immediate, and what is believed to be the controlling question in the case: Did Vogel, the agent, have a valid defence to an action by the intestate, the principal, to recover the stock?
There is no defence by virtue of anything expressed or implied in the
contract of agency. There is only the possible defence that the contract
was executed for an illegal purpose.
By the general rule an agent who has received property from his
principal cannot defeat an action brought to recover it by contending
that the purpose to which it was devoted was illegal. 7 Kearney v.
Webb, s somewhat analagous on its facts to the principal case, illustrates this rule. The plaintiff had given money to his agents to be used
in a gambling house which he conducted in violation of a state statute.
The money was seized by the district attorney following a raid by the
police. In an action to recover the money from the district attorney,
the latter contended that by the delivery of the money to the agents,
the plaintiff had parted with all right and title to it and could not have
recovered it from them. The court held for the plaintiff, saying that
the rule denying recovery on an illegal contract did not apply in cases
where the plaintiff did not found his cause of action on such a contract, and that if he was able to prove his title without relying on the
contract, the defendant could not introduce and rely on it.
"In determining the equities in such a case, the respective
rights of the parties ...are only to be considered. If the money
is found to belong to the plaintiff, and the defendant shows no
right thereto whatever, courts will not go back to inquire by
what unconscionable or illegal methods the plaintiff obtained
it, or to what illegal purposes he had in other transactions employed the use of it."9
Although the rule of the Kearney case is supported overwhelmingly
in both prior and subsequent decisions by many courts,' 0 it has been
6

Harper, Law of Torts (1933) § 29. The author states the rule to the effect that
the plaintiff's right to recover in an action for conversion is conditioned upon his
showing himself either to have been in possession or entitled to immediate possession of the goods at the time the defendant interfered with them.
i Mechem, Law of Agency (2d ed. 1914) § 1332; 6 Williston, Law of Contracts
(1938) § 1785. Accord: i Halsbury, Laws of England (2d ed. 1931) § 421; Salmond
and Winfield, Law of Contracts (1927) § 54-4.
8278 Ill. 17, 115 N. E. 844, 3 A. L. R. 1631 (1917).
"Kearney v. Webb, 278 Ill. 17, 115 N. E. 844, 847, 3 A. L. R. 1631, 1634 (1917).
1
OBrooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, 17 L. ed. 732 (U. S. 1863) (recovery of profits from
the illegal purchase and sale of soldiers' warrants); Clarke v. Brown, 77 Ga. 6o6
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criticized by legal writers," and not without cause. Today, when legal
problems are approached with much less emphasis upon their strictly
formal aspects, it is evident that the earlier reason for the rule-that
the illegality of the contract is irrelevant since the action is based upon
the agent's receipt of property belonging to the principal-will no
longer suffice. Consequently, the whole problem is resolved into a conflict betweent two phases of public policy. On the one hand is that
policy which requires the strictest fidelity on the part of the agent.12 On
the other is that policy which requires that courts be free from the burden of enforcing honor among thieves.
Recognizing this conflict, the Restatement of the Law of Agency 3
qualifies the rule as follows: An agent who has received property from
his principal is under no duty to return it (i) if to do so would aid in
the commission of a crime (2) if it was given to the agent for the purpose of accomplishing a very serious crime (3) if a crime involving
more than a minor offense has been accomplished by the delivery to
the agent.
Applying the third qualification of the rule of the Restatement to
the principal case, has a crime involving more than a minor offense
(1886) (recovery of money given to be used in speculation in grain futures in spite
of a statute providing that no rights could arise in either party out of an agency
created for an illegal purpose); Ware v. Spinney, 76 Kan. 289, 91 Pac. 787 (19o7) (recovery of money given to procure an agent's violation of his duty to his principal);
Decell v. Hazlehurat Co., 83 Miss. 346, 35 So. 761 (0o4) (recovery on contracts decared void by statute when made by a firm which had failed to pay the privilege
tax); Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 14o (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1863) (recovery of money
received by an agent on an illegal contract between the principal and a third person); Morgan v. Groff, 4 Barb. 524 (N. Y. Sup Ct. 1848) (recovery of money bet with
and lost to the wrong person by the agent); Kohler v. Rosenthal, 135 App. Div. 438,
12o N. Y. Supp. 325 (19o9) (recovery of money given for betting); Monongahela
Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of California, Pa., 226 Pa. 270, 75 Atl. 359, 26 L. R. A.
(N. s.) io98 (191o) (recovery of the proceeds of a check which the principal had obtained by fraud); Hutzler v. Geigley, 196 Pa. 419, 46 Atl. 366 (igoo) (recovery of
profits made in the illegal sale of liquor); Keen v. Price, [1914] 2 Ch. 98 (recovery
of money given to a bookmaker to be used in betting). In the following more recent
cases the rule has been affirmed: Kyne v. Kyne, 98 P. (2d) 738 (Cal. App. 194o), rev'd,
io6 P. (2d) 620 (Cal. 194o); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 276 N. W. 849
(1937); Ocean Forest Co. v. Woodside, 184 S. C. 428, 192 S. E. 413 (1937); Cuffman v.
Blunkall, 124 S. W. (2d) 289 (Tenn. App. 1938).
116 Williston, Law of Contracts (1938) §§ 1785, 1786; Woodward, The Law of
Quasi Contracts (1913) § 148.
"2That there has always been a limit beyond which courts will not go in enforcing this fidelity is evident from Everet v. Williams, 9 Law Quar. Rev. 197 (Exch.
1725). In that case a bill for an accounting between two persons engaged in highway robbery was abruptly dismissed.
"Restatement, Agency (1933) § 412. See also Restatement, Contracts (1932) §§
598--6og; Restatement, Restitution (1937) §. 14o; Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 422.
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been accomplished? The New York statute 4 provides that persons
making false statements in applications for a license or permit shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both. The federal statute 5 provides for a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars, and further provides that the administrator
of the statute, with the consent of the Attorney-General, may. compromise the liability. It cannot be fairly implied from these statutes that
either the Legislature of New York or the Congress of the United States
intended to inake one guilty of such a misconduct an outlaw, to be
barred from legal relief which in no way enforces or upholds the violation of the statute. To refuse relief here is to enforce a punishment
other than that prescribed by law and to violate the public policy
against forfeiture of property for crime,' 6 as well as to enable the defendant to escape all responsibility for the tortious conversion of a
7
small fortune.'
In such a decision as was reached in the principal case there is unquestionably an unjust deprivation and an unjust enrichment as between the parties. Logic demands a recovery. The refusal to heed that
demand can only be justified on the ground of public policy. But there
is " more than one phase to sound public policy. One of these that
ought to be paramount is that courts should close their ears when dishonest men attempt to wrest and quote rules of law in an effort to
shield them from their misdeeds."' 8
BRYCE REA, JR.

" tLaws of 1934, c. 478 § 13o.
'49 Stat. 985 (1935), 27 U. S. C. A. 207 (Supp. 1940).
"See 6 Williston, Law of Contracts (1938) § i75o on the similar problem arising in suits by beneficiaries in life insurance policies. The author notes an increasing tendency to allow recovery in cases where the insured died while committing a felony.
1
"The loss alleged to have been suffered exceeded $2oo,ooo.
"5Memphis & Arkansas City Packet Co. v. Agnew, 132 Tenn. 265, 177 S. W. 949,
951, L. R. A. ig6A 641, 645 (1915) (corporation doing business in Tennessee without a license allowed to recover profits from its agent). Accord, Franzer v. Zimmer,
go Hun 103, 35 N. Y. Supp. 612 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1895). Contra: Thomas Mfg. Co.
v. Knapp, ioi Minn. 432, 112 N. W. 989 (19o7).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-"NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES"
HELD TO INCLUDE STREAMS CAPABLE OF BEING MADE NAVIGABLE BY

IMPROVEMENTS. [United

States Supreme Court]

The tendency of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
past ten years toward a liberalized constitutional interpretation as a
means of centralizing power in the federal government has resulted in
a continual widening of the scope of federal authority under the commerce clause. One important phase of this trend has been the extension
of federal control over water power development in navigable streams.
The recent case of United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.1
presents what appears to be the most radical step yet taken by the
Court in this field of the law. It is a step which may well bring despair
to the advocates of states rights, as its effect is to curtail the right of the
states to develop water power in their streams, and to extend greatly
federal control over hydro-electric power development.
In 1926, the Appalachian Electric Power Co., proceeding under
the provisions of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920,2 petitioned the
Federal Water Power Commission for a license to construct a dam on
the New river above Radford, Virginia. The commission made a finding that the New river was not a navigable water of the United States
but that interests of interstate commerce would be affected by the dam.
After some further controversys the commission adopted another
resolution stating that the New river was a navigable water of the
United States under the Federal Water Power Act. 4 Notwithstanding
this, the Appalachian Co. began construction work, which caused the
federal government in 1935 to file a complaint seeking to enjoin the
construction of the dam on the ground that it constituted an obstruction to navigation in violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189o 5
and the Federal Water Power Act of i92O.6 The Federal District Court
261 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. ed. 201 (1940).
241 Stat. 1077 (192o), as amended by the Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 847
(1935), 16 U. S. C. A. §§ 791-825 (1941).

3A suit was begun by the Appalachian Co. to enjoin the commission from interfering with the construction, but the action was dismissed because of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Smith,
4 F. Supp. 3, 6 (W. D. Va. 1931), aff'd, 67 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
'41 Stat. io63 (192o), as amended by the Federal Power Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 838
(1935), 16 U. S. C. A. § 796 (1941).

526 Stat. 454 (i8go), as amended by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat.
1151, 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 4o-464 (1928).
641 Stat. 1077 (192o), as amended by the Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 847
(1935), 16 U. S. C. A. §§ 791-825 (1941).
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and the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the New river was not in
fact a navigable water of the United States and that the construction of
the dam would not impair the "navigable capacity" of any "navigable
waters of the United States." 7 The Supreme Court in the instant decision reversed this finding and held that the New river was in fact
navigable. Furthermore, the Court held constitutional certain license
provisions of the Federal Power Act, the terms of which were not related to navigation.8
The courts in the United States have generally accepted the civil
law test of navigability, 9 that all rivers which are navigable in fact are
-United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 23 F. Supp. 83 (W. D. Va.
1938), aff'd, 107 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1939).
"Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. io68, as amended by the Federal
Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. A. § 8o3. The Supreme Court held that
the power of the federal government over navigable waters of the United States is.
not limited to the purposes of navigation, and in effect overruled the dicta in thecases sustaining this restrictive principle. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 3o.
U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 2o8, 82 L. ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318 T1937); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U. S.46, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L. ed. 956 (19o7); Port of Seattle v. Oregon and Washington Ry., 255 U. S.56, 41 S.Ct. 237, 65 L. ed. 5o0 (1921); United States v. Oregon,
295 U. S. 1, 55 S.Ct. 61o, 78 L. ed. 1267 (1935); United States v. River Rouge Improvement CO., 269 U. S.411, 46 S.Ct. 144, 70 L. ed. 339 (1926); Wisconsin v. Illinois,
278 U. S.367, 49 S.Ct. 163, 73 L. ed. 426 (1929). The Court would seem to have taken
the correct approach in holding these license provisions constitutional on this basis.
For since the federal government does have a plenary power to license obstructions
in navigable streams, and since in regulating navigation other objectives may beincidentally accomplished, it would seem to follow logically that the government
could impose license provisions not related to navigation if they were secondary to
the principal consideration of keeping the stream open for navigation.
However, suppose the stream was not navigable but a dam thereon would'
effect the navigable capacity of navigable waters of the United States; can theFederal Power Commission under § 202 of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 839 (1935),
16 U. S. C. A. § 797 (1941), require a license containing provisions not related to.
navigation? It is doubtful whether the federal power over non-navigable streams.
would extend this far.
"It has generally been stated that at common law navigable streams were only
those in which the tide ebbed and flowed. Grand Rapids & Indiana R. R. v. Butler,.
159 U. S. 87, 15 S. Ct. 991, 40 L. ed. 85 (1895); Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578, 73 Am.
Dec. 439 (1859); St. Louis I. M. 9:S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 195, 8 L. R. A. 559 (189o); See also 45 C. J. 404; 27 R. C. L. 1299, § 211; Note
(1899) 42 L. R. A. 305. This doctrine was adopted in England because all of thestreams were short and few were navigable in fact above the ebb and flow of thetide. But some cases have refused to accept this definition on the ground that theebb and flow test was not the only measure of navigability at common law, and that
the prevailing test was actual usability for navigation. Schurmeier v. St. Paul & P. R.
R., 1o Minn. 82, 88 Am. Dec. 59 (1865); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa i(1856); Seealso 27 R. C. L. 1300, § 212. The confusion of navigable with tidal water prevailed
in the United States for some time notwithstanding the differences existing between the topography of England and America. Barney v. Koekuk, 94 U. S. 324, 24
L. ed 224 (1876).
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navigable in law. 10 The classic definition in The Daniel Ball has been
the basis of the federal rule in this respect:
".... Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers
in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in
fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water .... 11
This rule has been frequently repeated and approved,'2 and had
never been overruled or essentially modified until the decision in the
principal case. Rather, later cases had affirmed and clarified it. In The
Montello13 it was made dear that the true criterion of a stream's
navigability is its capacity for use in its natural state by the public for
purposes of transportation and commerce, rather than the extent and
manner of that use. In Leovy v. United States' 4 it was stated that
"navigable waters of the United States" has reference to commerce of
a substantial and permanent character. 15 Only occasional or exceptional use under abnormal conditions is not sufficient,' 6 nor is a theo1
The Daniel Ball, lo Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999 (U. S. 1870); United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 7o L. ed. 465 (1926); Little Rock M. R. & T.
R. R. v. Brooks, 39 Ark. 403, 43 Am. Rep. 277 (1882); Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich.
519, 59 Am. Dec. 2o9 (1853); See also 45 C. J. 406; 27 R. C. L. 13oo, § 212. Some of
the early cases interpreted this rule. The streams must be valuable for commerce,
Neaderhauser v. State, 28 Ind. 257 (1867); must have a public terminus at both
ends, Chisolm v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285 (C. C. D. S. C. 1894); must be more than a
periodical stream, Hubbard v. Bell, 54 Ill. 11o, 5 Am. Rep. 98 (1870); and mere
obstructions will not render the stream non-navigable, Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N. C.
675. 55 Am. Rep. 633 (1886).
ni o Wall. 557, 563, 19 L. ed. 999 (U. S. 1870)..
"Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 S. Ct. 522, 75 L. ed. 1154 (1931);
Brewer-Elliott Oil and Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77, 43 S. Ct. 6o, 67 L. ed.
140 (1922); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 33 S. Ct. 449, 57 L. ed. 82o, Ann.
Cas. 1913E, 710 (1913); Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113,
41 S. Ct. 409, 65 L. ed. 847 (1921); Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 S. Ct. 797,
44 L. ed. 914 (1900); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 42 S. Ct. 406, 66 L. ed. 771
(1922); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 7o L. ed. 465
(1926); United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 55 S. Ct. 61o, 79 L. ed. 1267 (1935); United
States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 69o, 19 S. Ct. 770, 43 L. ed.
1136 (1899); United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 51 S. Ct. 438, 75 L. ed. 84.t (1931).
"320 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1874).
4 177 U. S. 621, 20 S. Ct. 797, 44 L. ed. 914 (10oo).
"Other decisions of the Supreme Court have interpreted the rule to mean that
the stream must be capable of valuable public use in its natural conditions, United
States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 S. Ct. 38o, 61 L. ed. 746 (1917); must have a capacity
for general and common usefulness for purposes of trade and commerce, United
States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 55 S. Ct. 61o, 79 L. ed. 1267 (1935).
"1Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 42 S. Ct. 406, 66 L. ed. 771 (1922); United
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retical or potential navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious
or unprofitable.' 7 But it is not necessary that a boat be able to pass
over all portions of the stream, and occasional interruptions or retardations of navigation by falls or rapids do not render the stream nonnavigable where in fact it is used or susceptible of use for navigation.' 8
It was early decided by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbonsv. Ogden' 9'
that the power to regulate commerce given to the federal government
under the commerce clause20 included the power to regulate navigation 21 in the "navigable waters of the United States." Thus, the question has frequently arisen as to what streams are navigable in the sense
that the federal government has a power to regulate them. The firstcase on this point was The Daniel Ball, where it was stated:
"...And they constitute navigable waters of the United

States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradis-tinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they
form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by unitingwith other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is.
or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in
modes in which such commerce is conducted bythe customary
22
water."
Even though a body of water lies wholly within a state it may be
a navigable water of the United States,2 provided it is utilized under
common control in connection with other means of transportation for
purposes of interstate commerce.2 4 But if the stream is wholly intrastate
and does not form a continuous highway for commerce, it is not a
States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., x74 U. S. 69o, 19 S. Ct. 770, 43 L. ed.
1136 (1899).
"United States v. Doughton, 62 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1933).
8
"The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1874); Economy Light and
Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 409, 65 L. ed. 847 (1921); StAnthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 168 U. S.349, 18
S. Ct. 157, 42 L. ed. 497 (1897).
19 Wheat. 1,6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
21U. S. Const. Art. i, § 8, cl.3,"The Congress shall have Power ...to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .. "
"This is distinct from the admiralty power of the federal government, U. S.
Const. Art. 3,§ 2, cI. 1.
Wall. 557, 563, 19 L. ed. 999 (U. S. 1870). See also Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3
o10
Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. 96 (U. S. 1865); Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S. 385, 3 S
Ct. 228, 27 L. ed. 971 (1883).
r"The Montello, ii Wall. 411, 2o L. ed. 191 (U. S. 187o ).
"The Katie, 40 Fed. 480, 7 L. R. A. 55 (S.D. Ga. 1889).

276

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

navigable water of the United States. 25 From these decisions and those
defining navigability, it is apparant that a navigable water of the
United States is one that meets certain conditions as a highway for
-commerce between the states. These would fall into two categories:
interstate streams, and intrastate streams that form a highway for inter:state commerce.
On the basis of this comprehensive body of precedent, an examinattion of the physical characteristics of the New river strongly confirms the
,correctness of the lower courts' determination that the river is not in
.fact a navigable water of the United States. The river has its source in
Itwo creeks in northwestern North Carolina, several miles from the
Virginia border. The stream flows in a general northwesterly direction
through Virginia for 16o miles after which it reaches the West Virginia
border. About go miles into West Virginia it meets the Gauley river,
and just below this point, at Kanawha Falls, the stream becomes the
Kanawha river which flows 95 miles to Point Pleasant, where it joins

the Ohio. Defendant's proposed dam was to be situated about 6o miles
toward the head of the New from the West Virginia state line and
several miles above Radford, Virginia.
The river is generally rocky and turbulent, and drops rapidly from
its head to its mouth. For a good portion of its length it passes through
steep cliffs and unusual geological rock formations. Its course is marked
by numerous rapids and shoals, and here and there by pools of deeper
water. From its mouth at Kanawha Falls up to near Hinton, West Virginia, about 50 miles, the river is the most precipitous of its entire
length, and forms a barrier between the navigable Kanawha and any
possible navigable waters of the New.
The evidence showed there were only two sections of the river which
were in fact navigated by any appreciable amount of commerce at anytime. From Hinton up the river for about 25 miles and from Radford
up the river for about 30 miles, the river was navigated in about 185o
by some 18 or 2o keel boats drawing two feet of water. These boats
were used to ship grain and tobacco down stream to railheads at these
two points. Even this small local commerce was abandoned by 18go;
26
and there is no appreciable commerce on the river today.
2The Montello, ii Wall. 411, 20 L. ed. 191 (U. S. 1870); The Katie, 40 Fed. 48o,

-7 L. R. A. 55 (S. D. Ga. 1889); Veazie and Young v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 14 L. ed.
545 (U. S. 1852).
2See the lower courts' decisions for an excellent analysis of the physical characteristics of the New, 23 F. Supp. 83 (W. D. Va. 1938). and 1O7 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A.
4

th, 1939)-

1941]

RECENT CASES

The strip of river from Radford downstream, across the VirginiaWest Virginia border, to 25 miles above Hinton, is one of the most
impassible of the entire stream. This stretch of about 6o miles is rocky
and drops rapidly. Any trips made on this part of the river were irregular and attended with great difficulty. There is no evidence that
any trips in keel boats were made between Radford and Hinton, nor
that appreciable commerce of any kind was ever conducted between
27
these points.
Thus, the character of the commerce on the New was purely intrastate. It occurred in two widely separated stretches of the river with
little traffic of any sort between them. The improvements made by
the federal government between 1876 and 1885 on the stretches above
Hinton and Radford in no way altered the local character of the navigation, and no attempt was made to create a continuous channel between these two sections.
In spite of this evidence, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions
of the lower courts, and decided that the New river was a navigable
water of the United States in contemplation of law, since it was capable
of being made navigable in fact by improvements. 28 This conclusion
rested on findings of fact made de novo. The Court held, contrary to all
that had theretofore been said on the subject, that the natural and
ordinary condition of the stream, however impassible it may be, is not
the proper test. Rather, if by reasonable improvements the stream may
be rendered navigable, then it is navigable in law without such improvements. 29 Nor is it necessary for Congress to have appropriated
"The section of the river from 3o miles above Radford to the head of the New
at Wilson Creek, just short of the North Carolina border, was not given much consideration by any of the courts as it was too shallow to carry anything but small
boats.
"The opinion of the Supreme Court shows the meagre evidence upon which
the couit based its conclusions of navigability. The Court assumed that the stretches
of river above Hinton and Radford were navigable in contemplation of law without considering that the commerce was purely local in character. The section of the
river from Kanawha Falls to Hinton was mentioned only in a general summary of
the physical characteristics. The most important stretch covering the Virginia-West
Virginia border from Radford to 25 miles above Hinton received most of the Court's
attention. The only evidence cited as to navigability of this section of the stream was
trips by government survey parties, attended with great difficulty and requiring considerable portage, and certain vague statements as to isolated bits of boating. No
valuable commerce of any type was shown to have been carried in interstate traffic.
Clearly, this is not enough to make the river a navigable water of the United States,
under the usual tests. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 S. Ct. 380, 61 L. ed. 746
(1917); Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 S. Ct. 797, 44 L. ed. 914. (1900).
2"It
will be noticed that the Supreme Court made a statement that when once a
stream becomes a navigable water, it always remains so. 61 S. Ct. 291, 299. The only
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money to improve the stream or even contemplated doing so. The only
limitation is that there must be a balance between cost and need at a
time when the improvement would be useful. No authority is cited to
uphold this position and none could be found.3 0 But, even applying
this test, it is inconceivable that the New river could be made navigable
by anything approaching a reasonable expenditure of money.31
In considering de novo the facts of navigability, the Supreme Court
violated its well established practice of accepting the concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts, if supported by substantial evidence.
This was an express basis of the decision in Brewer-Elliott Oil and Gas
Co. v. United States,82 where the Supreme Court refused to review
a judment based on concurrent findings by the lower courts that a
stream was not navigable. Until the instant decision, the Supreme
Court had consistently refused to consider the evidence as to navigability anew, and had merely examined the opinion to see if the
33
lower courts had applied the correct principles of law to the facts.
Despite the surprising nature of the Court's reasoning, the obvious explanation for this decision lies in the fact that the policy of
authority cited for this holding is Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States,
256 U. S. 113, 41 S.Ct. 409, 65 L. ed. 847 (1921). An examination of this case fails to
uphold that premise. The Court there said: ". . . a river having actual navigable
capacity in its natural state and capable of carrying commerce among the states is
within the power of Congress to preserve for purposes of future transportation,
even though it be not at present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such
use according to present methods, either by reason of changed conditions or because of artificial obstructions." 256 U. S. 113, 123,41 S.Ct. 409, 413, 65 L. ed. 847
(1921). This would indicate that mere disuse because of cheaper transportation by
rail, or the existence of dams or other man made obstructions, would not make a
stream non-navigable in contemplation of law if it were in fact navigable. But if a
once-navigable stream becomes a small creek, or if natural obstacles appear in it so
that it becomes non-navigable in fact, then it should become non-navigable in law.
If a non-navigable stream can become navigable through changed conditions, it
would equally appear that a navigable stream could become non-navigable.
3°In fact, all authority is exactly contrary. In United States v. Cress, 243 U. S.
316, 37 S. Ct. 38o, 61 L. ed. 746 (1917) the Court said the stream must be capable of
valuable public use in its natural condition. Only occasional or exceptional use
under abnormal conditions is not sufficient. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 69o, 19 S. Ct. 770, 43 L. ed. 1136 (1899). A theoretical or potential navigability will not make a stream a navigable water of the United States. United
States v. Doughton, 62 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A, 4th, 1933)"See 23 F. Supp. 83, 97 (W. D. Va. 1938) for a report of the chief of engineers on
the impossibility of making the river navigable by improvements.
226o U. S.77, 43 S. Ct. 6o, 67 L. ed. 14o (1922).
1
'Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 S.Ct. 409, 65
L. ed. 847 (1921); Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 S. Ct. 797, 44 L. ed. 914
(igoo); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 70 L. ed. 465
(1926); United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 19 S. Ct.
770, 43 L. ed. 1136 (1899).
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the federal government to extend its control over the development of
hydro-electric power was blocked by the conventional tests of navigability, and thus the Supreme Court was obliged to seek a new test
to effectuate this policy. But if a departure from established principles
of law has become a practical necessity, it would seem better that the
Court should make a direct and express break with precedent by
simply stating that because of changed conditions the old views are no
longer adequate. Instead, the Court has stated new rules of law, unsupported by previous decisions, and yet has failed to acknowledge that any
new principles are being adopted. Perhaps the most satisfactory means
for relieving the Court from making further strained interpretations in
this field lies in the adoption of a constitutional amendment giving
the federal government plenary power over all streams, whether navigable or not, for the regulation of navigation, power development,
flood control, and irrigation.

CAT

GERLAss,
III

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROHIBIT

CHILD LABOR IN INDUSTRY. [United States Supreme Court]

By its decision in United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co.,' the
Supreme Court of the United States has again acknowledged the urgency of present-day demands for social reform; on this occasion it has
overruled its earlier adjudication which had denied that Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce embraced the right to prohibit
child labor in industry. This move has in its general effect further
broadened the scope of the commerce clause, and has given to the federal government a regulatory function previously thought to rest exclusively with the states. Thus the query is raised whether, in the lighft
of this decision, there is now any necessity for the passage of the longproposed Chiid Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution. But in
spite of the apparent new departure of the Court, it may be questioned
whether the overruling of Hammer v. Dagenhart2 is actually an innovation in the law, or whether it comes merely as a confirmation of
principles already established.
The Darby Lumber Co. case arose as a test of the validity Of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 3 which embodies a comprehensive
scheme for preventing the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
261 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
1247 U. S. 251, 58 S. Ct. 529,62 L. ed. 11o1 (1918), 3 A. L. R. 649 (1919).
352 Stat. 1o6o (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 2o-219 (Supp. 194o). The real purpose
behind the act was probably the protection of New England industry against
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manufactured under labor conditions which fail to conform to the requirements set up by the act. The act fixes both minimum wages and
maximum hours of work for employees coming within its provisions.
The defendant was engaged in the business of acquiring raw materials
which he manufactured into finished lumber with the intent to ship in
interstate commerce when manufactured; and he did in fact so ship
a large part of the lumber produced. He was charged with violating
the act by having employed workmen at less than the prescribed minimum wage or for more than the prescribed maximum hours, without
4
payment of wages for overtime.
The Court in upholding the act was faced with two questions.
First, could Congress prohibit the carrying of goods in interstate commerce if the goods were manufactured under conditions other than
those imposed by the act; and second, could it prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods for commerce at other
than the prescribed wages and hours? In answering the first question,
the Court found that the prohibition of shipment of the proscribed
goods in interstate commerce was a valid exercise of congressional control over commerce between the states. It was declared that the power
to control embraced the power to prohibit. In connection with this
holding, the Court specifically overruled the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart.5 To the second issue, also, an affirmative answer was given. The
Court found that the defendant's activities came within the phrase
"production for commerce" and were within the meaning of the statute. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce was decompetition with the low wage standards of the deep South. But in the words of
the Court, "The motive and purpose of the pre~ent regulation is plainly to make
effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce
should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods
produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to
the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows." 61 S. Ct.
451, 457 (1941).

'Specifically, the appellee was charged with violating § 15 (a) (1), (2) and (5) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. io6o (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-219
(Supp. i94o). Section 15 (a) (i) prohibits the shipment in interstate commerce of any
goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of § 6 or
§ 7 of the act. Section 6 fixes minimum wages to be paid to employees engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, while § 7 sets maximum
hour of work for such employees. Section 15 (a) (5) makes it unlawful to violate
§ i (c) which requires the employer to keep such records of the persons employed
by him and of their hours of work and wages as shall be prescribed by the administrator of the act.
"247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (18), 3 A. L. R. 649 (1919). The
Court need not have even considered the child labor question in the principal case,
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dared not to be confined to commerce among the states alone, but to

extend to intrastate activities which are so connected with interstate
activities as to make their control necessary in order to accomplish the
desired end. 6 As a consequence, labor conditions in the manufactory
may be controlled by Congress, and Congress may prohibit the employment of workers for the production of goods for interstate commerce at other than the prescribed wages and hours.
Since 1918, the decision of Hammer v. Dagenhart7 has stood as an
obstacle to the extension of the federal government's power to control

working conditions in industry by the use of its authority to regulate
interstate commerce. Prior to that case, the congressional power over
commerce between the states had in several important instances been

successfully invoked to prohibit the shipment of certain objectionable
commodities, and thus to prevent the use of those commodities.
Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case),S decided in 19o3, represents

the earliest successful attempt by Congress to prohibit the shipment of
particular goods in interstate commerce. In that case the Supreme
Court upheld an act of Congress suppressing traffic in lottery tickets
in interstate commerce.9 However, the decision did not define the
extent of this prohibitory power, and the Court expressly decided only

the case before it.10 Eight years later, in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United

States," the Court upheld the power of Congress to prohibit the introduction of impure foods and drugs into states by means of interbut it nevertheless seized upon the opportunity to settle once and for all this old
controversy.
OAccord: Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L.
ed. 72 (191 1); United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. i9, 39 S. Ct. 445, 63 L. ed. 936 (1919);
Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. and Q. R. R., 257 U. S. 563,42 S. Ct.
232, 66 L. ed. 371 (1922).
1247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 11o (1918), 3 A. L. R. 649 (1919).
88 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321, 47 L. ed. 492 (1903).
OThe act was entitled, "An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through
National and Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service, Subject to the Jurisdiction and Laws of the United States," 28 Stat. 963. The present form of this statute
is found at 35 Stat. 1136 (19o9), 18 U. S. C. A. § 387 (1927).

20In the words of the Court: "The present case does not require the court to declare the full extent of the power that Congress may exercise in the regulation of
commerce among the states." 188 U. S. 321, 362, 23 S. Ct. 321, 329, 47 L. ed. 492

(i9o3); and again: "The whole subject is too important, and the questions suggested
by its consideration are too difficult of solution, to justify any attempt to lay down
a rule for determining in advance the validity of every statute that may be enacted
under the commerce clause." 188 U. S. 321, 363, 23 S. Ct. 321, 330, 47 L. ed. 492

(1903).

1220

U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364, 55 L. ed. 364 (1911).
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state commerce. 12 In 1913, Congress was sustained in prohibiting the
transportation in interstate commerce of women for immoral purposes.13 And subsequently, Congress was allowed to prohibit the shipment of whiskey in interstate commerce into any state or territory in
contravention of the laws of that state or territory. 14 In all of these
cases the prohibitions dealt with goods which could become harmful
in their use, and interstate commerce was necessary to bring about the
harmful consequences of such usage.
In 1918, the decision of the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart dosed
the door, at least temporarily, on federal power to prohibit the shipment of innocent and harmless goods in interstate commerce. In that
case the Court declared unconstitutional an act of Congress 15 prohibiting the interstate transportation of the products of any mine or
quarry in which within 3o days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of 16 had been permitted to work, or any article
or commodity, the product of any mill in which children had so worked.
The majority of the Court took the view that the act was aimed at a
standardization of working conditions within the state and that that
was a matter solely for state control. The attempt of the federal government was therefore branded as an interference with the exercise by
the states of their reserved police powers. The situation was distinguished from those of the earlier cases, in the following language:
"In each of these instances the use of interstate transportation
was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results....
This element is wanting in the present case."' 6
Thus it was decided that where the undesirable feature of the goods
lay in the manner in which they were produced, rather than in the
effects of their use, the passage of the goods in interstate commerce
"The act concerned here was the "Pure Food and Drug Act." 34 Stat. 768 (i9o6),
U. S. C. A.-§ 1 (1927). The act was declared constitutional, the Court taking the
view that Congress in its power to regulate interstate commerce could prohibit entirely illicit or adulterated articles.
"Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 3o8, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. ed. 523, 43 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 9o6, Ann. Cas. 19i3E, 9o5 (1913). The act upheld was "The White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 191o," 36 Stat. 825 (191o), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 397-399 (1927). This
prohibition was later upheld when the purpose of transportation was unaccompanied by any expectation of financial gain, but when the sole purpose was debauchery
of the women. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 6i L. ed. 442
(917)2AClark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. i8o, 61
L. ed. 326 (1917), upholding the "Webb-Kenyon Act," 37 Stat. 699 (1913).
"39 Stat. 675 (1916).
"247 U. S. 251, 271, 38 S. Ct. 529, 531, 62 L. ed. 11o (1918), 3 A. L. R. 649, 653
(1919).
21
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was not sufficiently related to the harms sought to be avoided to enable the federal government to prohibit their shipment among the
states. However, even at this time four justices joined in a dissent, contending that this act was a valid exercise of the power of Congress over
interstate commerce.
While the Court in the instant case could probably have distinguished Hammer v. Dangenhart,in such a way as to avoid its application to the present situation, yet it chose rather to overrule the decision directly, and so to destroy the distinction between the shipment
of goods harmful in their use and of goods innocent in themselves but
produced in an undesirable manner.' 7 The Court may be commended
for its forthright action in overruling its own precedent, but Mr.
Justice Stone, in writing the opinion in the instant case, was unnecessarily harsh in his condemnation of the decision of Hammer v. Dagenhart. He declared:
"The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart,
was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in
the interpretation of the commerce clause both before and since
the decision...."is
It is true that Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been accorded the
esteem of being followed as a precedent in recent cases; but when decided, it was no more novel than any other case of first impression. Irrespective of the correctness of the decision as judged by standards of
social consciousness a quartef of a century after the case arose, there
was dearly an understandable basis for the Court's distinguishing between the facts of that case and the facts of the other cases decided
prior to it. All of the earlier cases, except for United States v. Delaware
and Hudson Co.,' 9 readily distinguishable on other grounds,2 0 dealt
with prohibitions of things which when transported in interstate com1"The instant case and Hammer v. Dagenhart may be thought to be distinguishable since there seems to be a difference between the two cases in what goods are
prohibited. In the instant case it is apparent that the only goods prohibited were
those manufactured under conditions prohibited by the act; whereas in Hammer v.
Dagenhart all of the products of the mill or mine were prohibited if children had
worked within 3o days prior to their removal. This, of course, included not only the
goods actually made by child labor, but also all of the products made in the mill
whether by child labor or otherwise.
1s1 S. Ct. 451, 458 (1941).
22 13 U. S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527, 53 L. ed. 836 (19o9), upholding the Hepburn Act,
34 Stat. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-9 (1929).
2"This case is easily distinguished from the other cases mentioned in note 21,
infra. The Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584 (sgo6) , 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-9 (1929), made it unlawful for a railway carrier to transport in interstate commerce articles or commodities "manufactured, mined or produced by it or under its authority or which it may
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merce became harmful in their use. 21 In reality, then, Hammer v.
Dagenhart for the first time presented a case of prohibition of goods
in themselves harmless; and even though the decision of the Court may
have been wrong, it cannot be said that the Court failed to follow the
then prevailing interpretation of the commerce clause.
In any event, Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been well received
and it is best that it be overruled. 22 It can be said that even before the
instant case, Hammer v. Dagenharthad in effect been overruled. The
shift away from its rule began in 193 7, with the case of Kentucky Whip
and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.2 This case upheld the
Ashurst-Summers Act, 24 which made it unlawful for one knowingly
to transport in interstate or foreign commerce goods made by convict
own in whole or in part or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect." The

purpose of the act was obviously not to prohibit the transportation of any particular
goods, but to disassociate the carrier from the goods hauled. Its purpose was to prohibit a relationship, not to prohibit the transportation of goods.
nChampion v. Ames, x88 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321, 47 L. ed. 492 (19o3) (lottery
tickets); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364, 55 L. ed. 364
(1911) (impure foods and drugs); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 3o8, 33 S. Ct. 281,
57 L. ed. 523, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 906, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905 (1913) (prostitutes);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S.470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. ed. 442 (1917) (same);
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S.311, 37 S. Ct. i8o, 61 L. ed.
326 (1917) (whiskey).
UProfessor Willis says, "This decision was another five to four decision, and it
is believed that it was an incorrect decision, that it is a stumbling-block in the way
of necessary social control, and that the constitutional law on the subject of interstate commerce will never be in a satisfactory state until this decision has been overruled." Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 341.
2299 U. S.334, 57 S.Ct. 277, 81 L. ed. 270 (1937). Several cases were decided prior
to this case and after Hammer v. Dagenhart, butthey did not indicate as definitely
as did this case, the trend away from the former holding. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817 (1922), held that an excise tax was unconstitutional if its purpose was the regulation of child labor, and Brooks v. United
States, 267 U. S.432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. ed. 699 (1925) dealing with the National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 41 Stat. 324 (1919), 18 U. S. C. A. § 408 (1927) went much
on the same basis as did Hammer v. Dagenhart. The statute provided a criminal
punishment for anyone who transported a stolen motor vehicle in interstate or
foreign commerce, concealed, stored or disposed of one moving as a part of interstate commerce. The Court in its decision took the position that stolen goods came
within the category of harmful commodities and that therefore the prohibition was
valid. Even though this case was based on Hammer v. Dagenhart, it would seem
that stolen automobiles do not come in the same class as lottery tickets, whiskey
and impure foods, since automobiles are harmless in their use; and that actually a
trend away from Hammer v. Dagenhart was begun. However, it remained for Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 57 S. Ct. 277,
8 L. ed. 270 (1937), to give impetus to this attitude.
249 Stat. 494 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-64 (Supp. 1940).
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labor, into any state where the goods were intended to be received,
possessed, sold or used in violation of the state's laws. The plaintiff had
tendered to the defendant shipments of prison-made goods, some of
which were consigned to states prohibiting the sale of such goods. The
defendant refused to accept the shipment and the plaintiff sued to force
him to do so. The Court, in holding the act valid, ruled that Congress
had the power to exercise prohibitions designed to prevent interstate
commerce from being used to impede the carrying out of a state's
25
policy.
Any remaining doubt as to Congress' power to prohibit specific
goods, harmless in their use, from being carried in interstate commerce
was removed in 1939, by Mulford v. Smith.28 The Court upheld the
provisions of the A.A.A.27 which established and appointed marketing quotas for tobacco and penalized the marketing of tobacco in excess of those quotas. In other words the act prohibited the marketing
of tobacco in interstate commerce if the tobacco concerned had been
produced in excess of the quota allowed. This was held to be a valid
exercise of the power vested in Congress to control and regulate interstate commerce. Obviously this case conflicts directly with Hammer v.
Dagenhart,and its effect was to overrule the case, although the Court
did not there express itself as intending to overrule that precedent.
Thus, even without the instant decision, Hammer v. Dagenharthad already lost its force, and United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co. is in
no wise revolutionary, but rather sets forth the law as it had come to be
established.
In view of the principal decision, a serious question is presented
as to whether there is now any necessity for the passage of the proposed
OIt has been said in an effort to distinguish Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v.
Illinois'Central R. R. Co. from Hammer v. Dagenhart, that in the latter case the
effect of the statute was to bring about a control by the federal government in the
state of origin of the goods, whereas in the former case the effect was to exercise control in the state of destination. For other discussions of Kentucky Whip and Collar
Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., see Notes (1937) 1i U. of Cin. L. Rev. 357. and
(1937) 15 Tex. L. Rev. 37.

One must remember in reading these comments, how-

ever, that they were written before the deciding of Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38,
59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. ed. 1092 (1939).
23o7 U. S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. ed. 1.092 (1939).
2752 Stat. 31 as amended March 26, 1938, 52 Stat. 12o, April 7, 1938, 52 Stat. 202,
May 31, 1938, 52 Stat. 586, and June 20, 1938, 52 Stat. 775, 7 U. S. C. A. § 1281 et seq.
(1939). The portions of the act under which the appellants were charged are 7 U.LS.
C. A. §§ 1311-1314 (1939).
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Child Labor Amendment. 28 Since Congress by virtue of the present
state of the law can regulate child labor by means of prohibiting the
shipment in interstate commerce of the products of child labor, it is
apparent that no amendment is necessary to enable Congress to control
child labor effectively in industries sending their products into other
states. Further, because it has long been accepted that Congress can
control intrastate commerce if it is so connected with the interstate
commerce as to make its control necessary in order to regulate interstate commerce, 29 Congress can to a large extent prohibit child labor
in intrastate commere also. Due to the increasing complexity of modem industry and commerce, almost every business to some extent affects interstate commerce, and hence wide powers of regulation are
permissible. Thus, without extending the basis of its powers, Congress
can readily regulate child labor in almost any industry in which such
regulation seems advisable, and such powers are almost as broad in
30
scope as any that would be granted by amendment.
EDMUND SCHAEFER,

III

3This amendment was proposed by Congress to the legislatures of the several
states in 1924. By 1932, only seven states had ratified, and thirty-two had rejected it.
In 1933, an attempt was made to resurrect the amendment, and since then twentyeight states have ratified and eleven have rejected. According to reports at the time
of the instant decision, the officials of the Children's Bureau intend to continue to
press for the passage of the amendment. However, some have taken the view that
it cannot now be ratified because of an unreasonable lapse of time and because of
its previous rejection by many states; they insist that a new proposal by Congress is
necessary. Committee Report-Child Labor Amendment (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 11. But
see Dowling, Clarifying the Amending Process (1940) 1 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 215.
2In Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L. ed.
72 (1911), the Supreme Court allowed Congress to require railroads doing an inter-

state business to comply with safety requirements in their equipment which was
used solely in intrastate transportation. This was done upon the theory that in order
to regulate interstate commerce effectively, it was necessary to regulate the interdependent intrastate commerce also. In United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 39 S.
Ct. 445, 63 L. ed. 936 (igig), the Court allowed Congress to regulate bills of lading
because of their effect upon interstate commerce. See also, Railroad Commission of
Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. and Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. ed. 371
(1922), and National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 3o
U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937). This rule is expressed in the instant case in

this way: "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it
as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." 61 S. Ct. 451, 459 (1941).

31Law review writers have taken the view that such an amendment is unnecessary. Notes (1937) 13 Notre Dame Lawyer 59, and (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 401. It
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CONTRACTS-LIMITS OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS BASIS OF ENFORCING
GRATUITOUS PROMISES. [Pennsylvania]

The doctrine of equitable estoppel has long been employed to prevent injustice where the defendant has made a representation as to past
or present conduct' calculated to induce reliance thereon, and which
the plaintiff has reasonably relied upon to his injury. 2 Because consideration has become so firmly embodied in the roots of our common
law, the courts are reluctant to waive the requirement of this necessary
safeguard and extend the principle of equitable estoppel to the enforcement of promises as to future conduct.3 In enforcing such gratuitous promises relied on by the promisee, some courts have sought desperately for a consideration in order to prevent an injustice to the
promisee.4 For example, in Alleghany College v. National Chautauqua
has been suggested that legislation patterned after the Ashurst-Summers Act, 49
Stat. 494 (935), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-62 (Supp. 1940), upheld in Kentucky Whip and
Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 57 S. Ct. 277, 81 L. ed. 270
(1937), would be a good substitute for the proposed amendment. Note (1937) 13
Notre Dame Lawyer 59.
This would also avoid a constitutional problem as to whether or not the proposed amendment is now susceptible of ratification.
1
Bank of America of California v. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, Inc., 122 Cal. App,
554, io P. (2d) 478, 482 (1932): "It is the general rule that, in order to work out estoppel by representations, the representations must be as to facts either past or present
and not as to promises concerning the future." Butler Bros. Co. v. Levin, 166 Minn.
158, 207 N. W. 315 (1926); Exchange National Bank of Tulsa v. Essley, 173 Okla.
2, 46 P. (2d) 462 (1935); 1o R C. L. 69o.
2
The doctrine finds frequent application where the promisor announces his intention of abandoning an existing right and thereby misleads another relying on
this representation by some action or forbearance. Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich. 159
(1873), where the plaintiff promised the son of the deceased mortgagor that if he
would remain on the land and cultivate it, the mortgage would never be enforced.
Thom v. Thom, 294 N. W. 461, 464 (Minn. 194o): "A promise relating to the intended abandonment of an existing right which influences the promisee to act to
his prejudice may be the basis of an estoppel, where substantial injustice will result
unless the promise is enforceu, although there is no consideration for the promise."
Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N. C. 191, 119 S. E. 210 (1923).
This particular enforcement of promises unsupported by consideration has been
regarded as an extension of the doctrine of equitable estoppel beyond its usual application as to representations concerning past or present conduct. Exchange National Bank of Tulsa v. Essley, 173 Okla. 2, 46 P. (2d) 462 (1935)31n denying the application of the doctrine, the courts reason that promises as
to future conduct, if binding at all, must be binding as contracts and must be supported by consideration. Rottman v. Hevener, 54 Cal. App. 474, 202 Pac. 329 (1921);
Langdon v. Doud, io Allen 433 (Mass. 1865); 21 C. J. 1142, and cases cited therein.
4
See (1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 569.
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County Bank of Jamestown,5 Judge Cardozo ruled that the setting up
of an endowment fund in the promisor's name was consideration for
the promise to contribute the money for the fund. Upon closer analysis,
however, it seems clear that no consideration in the orthodox sense
was present and that the decision in effect rests upon the principles now
generally termed promissory estoppel.
Because of the public interest involved, promissory estoppel has
developed rapidly in the enforcement of charitable subscriptions. In
such cases several courts have taken the realistic stand of admitting the
futility of trying to find consideration, 6 instead granting recovery by
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.7 It is thus coming
to be accepted that though a charitable subscription is a promise to
make a gift in the future,8 and is not enforcible as a true contract because of lack of consideration, 9 yet it may be enforced where money has
been expended or liabilities incurred in reliance upon the promise and
such liabilities and expenditures would cause loss or injury to the
promisee unless the promise is performed.1 0
In only a comparatively few cases has a promise between two individuals been enforced by promissory estoppel. One of the earliest
'246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927), 57 A. L. R. 98o (1928), noted, (1928) 13 Corn.
L. Q. 270.
OThe courts of some jurisdictions in enforcing charitable subscriptions have
held that the several promises of the subscribers constituted a sufficient consideration
for each other. Lagrange Female College v. Carey, 168 Ga. 291, 147 S. E. 390 (1929);
Cotner College v. Hyland, 133 Kan. 322, 299 Pac. 6o7 (1931); Greenville Supply Co.
v. Whitehurst, 202 N. C. 413, 163 S. E. 446 (1932). In the same kind of situation
some courts have relied on the performance of the enterprise for which the subscription was given as the'consideration. Board of'Home Missions v. Manly, 129 Cal.
App. 541, 19 P. (2d) 21 (1933); Alleghany College v. National Chautauqua County
Bank7 of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927), 57 A. L. R. 98o (1928).
Board of Trustees of Upper Iowa Conference of Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Noyes, 165 Iowa 6o, 146 N. W. 848 ('914); In re Stock's Estate, 164 Minn. 57, 204
N. W. 546 (1925); School District of the City of Kansas v. Stocking, 138 Mo. 672, 40
S. W. 656 (1897).
8South v. First National Bank of Fayette, 17 Ala. App. 569, 88 So. 219 (1920).
OMissouri Wesleyan College v. Shulte, 142 S. W. (2d) 644 (Mo. 1940). A promise
to make a gift in the future is not actionable because of lack of consideration; but
where the promisee in reliance on the subscription has assumed the performance of
some duty, or has performed services, done work or expended money, the gratuitous
promise is converted into a valid and enforcible contract. See 6o C. J. 956.
1A defense of lack of consideration can not be made to a promissory note given
as a gift, if money has been expended or liabilities incurred which cause injury or
loss to the person so expending money. Trustees of Baker University v. Clelland,
86 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); South v. First National Bank of Fayette, 17 Ala.
App. 569, 88 Co. 219 (1928); Miller v. Western College of Toledo, 177 Ill. 280, 52
N. E. 432 (1898). For complete discussion, see Eastern State Agricultural and Industrial League v. Vail's Estate, 97 Vt. 495, 124 At. 568 (1924).
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clear applications of the doctrine was made by the Nebraska court in
1898."1 It appeared that deceased had given his granddaughter a promissory note for $2,000, saying that none of his granddaughters worked
and he did not like for her to do so. Though the deceased did not
actually request her to stop working, the granddaughter gave up her
job in reliance on the note. She later sued to collect on the note, and
was met by the defence of lack of consideration. The court conceded
that heretofore equitable estoppel had been applied only to representations of past or present facts, but in this case it was deemed necessary,
as a means of preventing injustice, to extend the estoppel principle to
enforce representations as to future conduct, or promises which were
calculated to induce reliance on the part of the promisee and upon
which the promisee did reasonably rely so as to suffer a detriment.
The Restatment of the Law of Contracts, published in 1932, recognized the doctrine of promissory estoppel as follows:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only
12
by enforcement of the promise."'
The sanction thus accorded by the American Law Institute has giverr
new energy and prestige to the doctrine, 13 and the Restatement defini-tion has been followed by nearly all the recent cases invoking a promissory estoppel. Thus, where a wife gave a note for the debt of her husband to her father so that she would not be disinherited, the court estopped her from pleading a lack of consideration as a defence to payment of the note; 14 and a promise by a company to give a retired employee $ioo a month was enforced by estoppel.' 5 The same result was
reached in a case involving a promise to pay the debt of an estate, madeby the widow to induce creditors to delay in asserting claims against
the estate. 16 In a 1938 Pennsylvania case, a promise by the lessor to release one of the partners of the lessee firm from the payment of rent
"Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365, 73 Am. St. Rep. 491 (1898).
'Restatement, Contracts (1932) § go.
rrhis adoption gave rise to considerable disapproval and adverse criticismfrom thbse who relied on the American Law Institute merely to restate the law as
'it was already established. Even at this late date, the adoption of promissory estoppel
was branded as a radical attempt to change the law.
"Fluckey v. Anderson, 132 Neb. 664, 273 N. W. 41 (1937).
"sLanger v. Superior Steel Corp., io5 Pa. Super. 579, 161 At. 571 (1932), rev'don other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 Atl. 490 (1935).

8W. B. Saunders Co. v. Galbraith et al, 40 Ohio App. 155, 178 N. E. 34 (1931).
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was enforced by estoppel, because the promisee in reliance on the
promise had gone into another business. 17
In spite of the increased employment of promissory estoppel as an
accepted legal principle, the true purpose and nature of the doctrine
are often misunderstood. An instance of this situation is afforded by
,therecent Pennsylvania case of Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co.'8 The
plaintiff in purchasing the title to surface land had expressly waived all
rights he might have or acquire against the owner of the minerals for
damages to the surface caused by subsidence of the land resulting from
mining operations. At a later time defendant's agent promised the
plaintiff that the defendant would prevent threatened damage to the
buildings and would repair damage already caused by subsidence. of
the soil. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover for losses
resulting from the defendant's failure to perform. The plaintiff contended that the defendant should be estopped from denying consideration for the promise. However, the court very properly ruled that this
was not an appropriate situation for the operation of promissory estoppel because the plaintiff suffered no injury by reliance on the defendant's promise, inasmuch as the damages to his land would have been
incurred irrespective of the promise to repair and restore. Plaintiff
failed to show any action on his part in reliance on defendant's promise, and no injustice would result from a refusal to enforce the promise.
Unless there were facts in the case which were not revealed in the
court's opinion, it seems that the plaintiff's concept of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel would involve a rule for enforcing any promise
made under any circumstances, if the failure to perform the promise
would cause a loss to the promisee. Such a broad principle has not been
adopted by any court and is certainly not within the word or spirit of
the Restatement rule. The protection of that rule may be invoked only
where plaintiff shows (i) a promise reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance, (2) actual action or forbearance in reliance on
the promise, and (3) injustice resulting from a refusal to enforce the
promise. Under the facts as stated in the Stelmack case, the first requisite may be found, but nothing appears of the actual reliance and
threatened injustice. If the plaintiff had made preparations, prior to
defendant's promise, to prevent the damage to his land, and then on
the promise of defendant to undertake this task, abandoned his efforts,
'Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196 At. 39, 115 A. L. R. 147 (1938). Though this
is a leading Pennsylvania case on promissory estoppel, actually the case is very near
to the scope of operation. of equitable estoppel, as it might be said to have involved
a representation relating to the future abandonment of an existing right.
814 A. (2d) 127

(Pa.

1940).
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relying on defendant to preserve the land, then if defendant failed to
perform and the land was damaged, it would seem that plaintiff would
be entitled to invoke the promissory estoppel doctrine.
One explanation of the observable lack of an exact understanding
of the proper sphere of operation of promissory estoppel undoubtedly
lies in the fact that in the use of this rule, as of any "justice-making"
rule, considerable flexibility of application must be preserved. Once the
scope of the estoppel becomes rigidly set, its intended use to prevent injustice in the individual case may be seriously hampered.
Another reason for the uncertainties surrounding the use of the
principle springs from the long acceptance of the doctrine of considera-tion as a fundamental precept of law, and the courts' distrust of any,
proposition which tends to question the necessity of consideration. In:
these two factors lies the significance of the controversy over the nature
of promissory estoppel as it bears on consideration concepts. JudgeHand said that promissory estoppel is "a recognized specie of considera-tion."'19 However, estoppel is not to be confused with consideration,.
because it is not a relaxation of the accepted definition that considera-tion is a swap, bargain, or trade.20 The injury to the promisee in reli-ance on the promise is not regarded as consideration that binds thepromisor. The reliance by the promisee gives rise to an estoppel which is.
independent of any consideration. It is clearly stated by the Pennsylvania court that "... the basis of the doctrine is not so much one of'

application of thecontract, with a substitute for consideration, as the
'21
general principle of estoppel to certain situations."
The objection that promissory estoppel destroys the fundamental
concepts of consideration 22 is minimized by the fact that in many cases
in which the doctrine could have been applied, the courts have enforced
the promise by finding a consideration of doubtful existence. Inasmuch
as the trend of the law seems to be to enforce gratuitous promises relied on by the promisee, 23 the outright adoption of the promissory
"Porter v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 60 F. (2d) 673, 675 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
"'Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 75.
-Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, x96 At. 39, 41, 115 A. L. R. 147, 150 (1938). Alsor,
Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N. W. 74, 75 (1887): "This [enforcement of the promise] is based on the equitable principle that after allowing thedonee to incur obligations on the faith that the note would be paid, the donor must
be estopped from pleading want of consideration."
-Ashley, Must the Rejection of an Offer Be Communicated to the Offeror?
(1903) 12 Yale L. J. 419; See i Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) § 539.
"Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ? (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 9o8. After
making an exhaustive survey of cases enforcing gratuitous promises, it was con-
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estoppel principle is the practical answer to a problem made increasingly difficult when a solution is sought in the orthodox rules of consideration.
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AUTHORIZING

RETROSPECTIVE MODIFICATION OF PRIOR AwARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY.

[Virginia]

In 1938, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in considering
an amended statute of 19341 which gave the courts power to "increase,
decrease, or cause to cease, any alimony" as the circumstances of the
case might make proper, held that the act was one of prospective operation only.2 By a subsequent amendment that same year the legislature extended this power to ". . . any alimony that may thereafter accrue whether the same has been heretofore or hereafter awarded...."S
The constitutionality of the retroactive portion of this statute was up4
held in the recent case of Eaton v. Davis.
The present defendant had been granted an absolute divorce from
the present plaintiff in 1929, and at that time the court had overruled
the plaintiff's .motion to retain the cause upon the docket and to reserve
in the decree the right to modify the alimony award of $5o per month.
Proceeding under the 1938 amendment, in the present case the plaintiff sought to have the former award reduced because of his now destitute circumstances. The defendant demurred to the bill, alleging that
the legislature was without power to enact the retroactive portion of
the 1938 statute; that vested rights had accrued by virtue of the 1929
decree which the legislature was powerless to invade. After affirming
the right to legislate retroactively, the court held that the act in question invaded no constitutional guarantee of the defendant; unaccrued
cluded that the courts are creating a new writ which is neither in the category of
contracts or torts. It was argued that damages awarded to the promisee should be
determined by the extent of his injury suffered in reliance on the promise.
'Acts 1934, c. 329, Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5111. Lovegrove v. Lovegrove,
128 Va. 449, 1o4 S. E. 804 (192o) held that a decree allowing alimony was not a final
and irrevocable settlement of the right to support for the wife and infant children.
Cf. Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 532, 153 S. E. 879, 885 (1930), 71 A. L. R. 700, 711
(1930-

2Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496, 194 S. E. 706 (1938).

3Acts
1938, c. 418, Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1938) § 511'.
4
io S. E. (2d) 893 (Va. 1940), noted (1941) 19 N. C. L. Rev. 388; (1941) 27 Va. L.
Rev. 415. Holt, J., dissented.
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alimony, though fixed by a final decree, was not a vested property
right.5 By this decision the Virginia court refused to follow the New
York decision in Livingston v. Livingston6 which had established the
prevailing rule that the retrospective portions of statutes authorizing
a subsequent alteration of the alimony provisions of an absolute divorce decree are unconstitutional interferences with the wife's vested
right in unaccrued alimony. 7
It is thought that the process of judicial groping by which it may
be shown by analogy that a final award of alimony incident to a decree
of divorce a vinculo may or may not possess certain of the characteristices of a property right8 adds little to an intelligent understanding of
5By the general rule accrued alimony payments are vested. Sistare v. Sistare, 218
U. S. i, 3o S. Ct. 682, 54 L. ed. 9o5, 28 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1068 (1910), 20 Ann. Cas. 1o61
(1911); Epps v. Epps, 218 Ala. 667, 12o So. 150 (1929); Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 26
P. (2d) 3oo (1933); Boehmer v. Boehmer, 259 Ky. 69, 82 S. W. (2d) 199 (1935); Nelson
v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1o66 (1920). Contra: Hartigan v. Hartigan, 142
Minn. 274, 171 N. W. 925 (igig). See (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 314. On the power of the
legislature to enact retroactive divorce legislation see Note (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 512.
0173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123, 61 L. R. A. 8oo, 93 Am. St. Rep. 6oo (1903). 3 of the
7 judges dissented.
'Fuller v. Fuller, 49 R. I. 45, 139 Ad. 662 (1927), noted (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev.
664; Blethen v. Blethen, 177 Wash. 431, 32 P. (2d) 543 (1934); Notes (19o3) 3 Col. L.
Rev. 356; (1903) 16 Harv. L. Rev. 521; (1903) 1 Mich. L. Rev. 675. See Note (1935) 97
A. L. R. x188.

sAccrued alimony is assignable and may be recovered from the husband by the
assignee. Cederberg v. Gunstrom, 193 Minn. 421, 258 N. W. 574, 97 A. L. R. 207
(1935), noted (1935) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 146. Unaccrued alimony has been held to

be a personal right and incapable of being assigned. Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq.
736, 52 AtI. 694 (1902), 58 L. R. A. 471 (1903), 97 Am. St. Rep. 692 (19o4). Such an
assignment has also been held to be contrary to public policy. Wells v. Brown, 226
Mich. 657, 198 N. W. 18o (1924); Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 547. See Note

(1935) 97 A. L. R. 2o8.
A husband may not offset a debt owed by divorced wife against his obligation
for accrued alimony. Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 26 P. (2d) 300 (1933), noted (1934)
22 Calif..L. Rev. 697.
The divorced wife's creditors may not subject the alimony payments to the
satisfaction of a debt contracted prior to the divorce decree. Romaine v. Chauncey,
129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E. 826, 14. L. R. A. 712, 26 Am. St. Rep. 544 (1892). The con-

trary rule apparently obtains for debts contracted subsequent to the decree. The
Romaine case would imply that alimony is not property in the general sense of the
term, but is an allowance for the wife's maintenance. A debt contracted after the

decree is presumably for her support; the creditor relies upon the award as the
means of payment.
Alimony is not such a debt as to be subject to garnishment in the hands of
the husband for debts of the wife. Malone v. Moore, 204 Iowa 625, 215 N. W. 625
(1927), 55 A. L. R. 356 (1928). It is not a debt provable in bankruptcy, nor is it affected by a discharge granted the husband. Audubon v. Shufeldt, i8i U. S. 575, 21
S. Ct. 735, 45 L. ed. ioo9 (190).
Alimony, accrued but unpaid at the time of the wife's death, may be collected
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either Eaton v. Davis9 or Livingston v. Livingston.'0 Upon analysis it
would seem that the sound and socially desirable position was taken by
the Virginia court.
Although today the power of the courts in respect to divorce mat-

ters is regulated by statute in fifty of the fifty-one American jurisdictions," the rules of the Ecclesiastical Courts12 continue to be the dominant influence upon our case and statutory law.' 3 Permanent alimony,
originated as an incident to the divorce a mensa,14 had as its basis the
by her personal representative, even against the divorced husband's estate. Van Ness
v. Ransom, 215 N. Y. 557, 109 N. E. 593 (1915).
The alimony decree constitutes a lien on the real estate of the defendant. Isaacs
v. Isaacs, 117 Va. 730, 86 S. E. 1o5 (1915), L. R. A. 1916B, 648. However, the divorced
wife has no right to specific property of the husband. Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand.
662 (Va. 1826); Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, 128 Va. 449, 104 S. E. 804 (1920). See Note
(1905) 102 Am. St. Rep. 700.
A judgment for alimony is a final judgment within the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution as regards accrued and unpaid installments where no
modification of the award has been made, and no power has been retained to modify
the accrued installments. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. i, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. ed. 905, 28
L. R. A. (N. S.) io68 (1910), 20 Ann. Cas. io6i (1911); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 117
Ohio St. 558, i6o N. E. 34 (1927), 57 A. L. R. iio8 (1928).
The type of the alimony award may influence a court's analysis of its nature.
In Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 112 So. 19o (1927) the court held that an award in
gross made without a reservation of the power to modify was a vested right. But in
Epps v. Epps, 218 Ala. 667, 120 So. 150 (1929) a monthly allowance was held to be in
the nature of maintenance and subject to modification. Cases collected, Notes (1931)
71 A. L. R. 723, 730; (1940) 127 A. L. R. 741, 743.
For a limited discussion of the problems raised, see (1941) 27 Va. L. Rev. 415.
9io S. E. (2d) 893 (Va. 194o).
"173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123, 61 L. R. A. 800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 6oo (19o3).
"South Carolina prohibits absolute divorce. Jurisdictions included are Alaska,
District of Columbia, and Hawaii and the forty~eight states. 2 Vernier, American
Family Laws (1932) § 62.
"Prior to the Divorce Act of 1857, 2o and 21 Vict. c. 85, the Ecclesiastical courts
granted the divorce a mensa et thoro for adultery and cruelty, and a nullity sentence, divorce a vinculo matrimonii, which declared the marriage to be void ab
initio because of an impediment existing at the time of the marriage. Dissolution
of a valid marriage was had by a private act of Parliment. Vernier and Hurlbut, The
Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure (1939)
6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 197. See also the historical analysis by Epes, J., in Gloth
v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S. E. 879 (1930), 71 A. L. R. 700 (1931).
12 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 104. See Francis v. Francis, 192 Mo.
App. 710, 179 S. W. 975 (1915).
"Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony and Its Present
Statutory Structure (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 197. Twenty-seven American
jurisdictions, including Virginia, Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 51o4, recognize
the divorce a mensa (temporary divorce). In Colorado this divorce from bed and
board is called "separate maintenance." Apparently Florida is the only state which
forbids the limited divorce. 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 114; id. (1938

Supp.) § 114.

1941]
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duty of the husband to support his wife. 15 As the primary object of the
award was to provide a continuing maintenance for the wife, the basic
factors determining its amount were the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay. 16 Changed circumstances of the parties were
7
considered sufficient to justify a subsequent revision of the award.1
The statutes and decisions which have established the divorce a vinculo s for the most part are reflective of these ecclesiastical practices.' 9
In 1938, Professor Vernier found statutes authorizing the revision of
alimony awarded by a final decree of absolute divorce in thirty-four
American jurisdictions.20 A few states recognize that the power to revise
inheres in the courts without such authority and absent a reservation
2
of the right to modify. '
Before the enactment of its statute empowering courts to alter alimony awards, Virginia had, by judicial decision, 22 adopted the general
rule that permanent alimony in a final decree of absolute divorce cannot be altered in the absence of fraud, legislative authority, or a power
of modification reserved in the divorce decree.23 This rule proceeds
2Harris v. Harris, 31 Grat. 13 (Va. 1878); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 68 W. Va. 15,
69 S. E. 381 (igio), Ann. Cas. 1 9 12A, 889; Otway v. Otway, 2 Phill. Ecc. log, i6i Eng.
Rep. 1092 (t813). See Ritzer v. Ritzer, 243 Mich, 406, 22o N. W. 812 (1928).
"Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony and Its Present
Statutory Structure (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 197. See Cooey, The Exercise
of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob.
213. Cf. Cralle v. Cralle, 84 Va. 198, 202, 6 S. E. 12, 14 (1887).
1De Blaquiere v. De Blaquiere, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 322, 162 Eng. Rep. 1173 (183o).
See Saunders v. Saunders, i Sw. and Tr. 72, 164 Eng. Rep. 634 (1858). The overwhelming rule in the American jurisdictions is that permanent alimony incident
to a divorce a mensa may be modified as the changed circumstances of the parties
require. Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 5ti, 153 S. E. 879 (1930), 71 A. L. R. 7oo (1931).
Cases collected, Note (1931) 7 A. L. R. 723, 724.
"There is statutory authority for absolute divorce in all American jurisdictions
save South Carolina. 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 62. The power
of the.legislature in respect to divorce matters is generally recognized by the cases.
Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898), 45 L. R. A. 8o6 (1899); Livingston
v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123, 6i L. R. A. 8oo, 93 Am. St. Rep. 6oo (1903);
Fuller v. Fuller, 49 R. L 45, 139 All. 662 (1927); Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496,
194 S. E. 706 (1938); Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1063, L. R. A. 1917F, 721.
Cases collected, Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 723, 728.
'92 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 104.
2D2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) §1o6; id. (1938 Supp.) § 106.
"Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898), 45 L. R. A. 806 (1899);
Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 At. 1033 (1913); Simpson v. Simpson, 154
Ore. 396, 60 P. (2d) 936 (1936). Cases collected, Notes (1917) L. R. A. 1917F, 729;
(1931) 7 A. L. R. 723, 726, 738; (1940) 127 A. L. R. 741, 742, 745- See Note (1913) 26
Harv. L. Rev. 441.
2Brin v. Brin, 147 Va. 277, 137 S. E. 503 (1927).
3Smith v. Smith, 45 Ala. 264 (1871); Kennard v. Kennard, 131 Fla. 473, 179 So.
66o (1938); Hardy v. Pennington, 187 Ga. 523, 1 S. E. (2d) 667 (1939); Gilcrease v.
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upon the general theory that an adjudication by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties is conclusive as to the
matters controverted and those which should have been litigated as an
incident thereto. The divorce decree not only dissolves the marriage
relation, but is also a final determination of the right to alimony.24
Since the parties are no longer married, the court's jurisdiction over
the marital status is exhausted save as to the enforcement of the alimony provision.2 5 Moreover, the plea of res judicata would preclude
future modification of its terms.26 When a power to modify is reserved
in the decree, the court does not thereby confer jurisdiction upon itself
to alter the alimony award subsequently; it merely retains the right to
exercise the unexhausted portion of the jurisdiction which it already
had, to subject the unaccrued payments to revision based on the parties'
27
changed conditions.
As has been stated, the statutes now in force in most states abandon
this once-general view and allow courts to modify alimony awards. Yet
when the constitutionality 28 and construction 29 of the retroactive portions of such statutes have been questioned, the old concept of finality
of the decree of permanent alimony has led most courts considering the
problem to spell out a vested property interest in the unaccrued payments. A leading example is the Livingston case, which arose under
Gilcrease, 186 Okla. 451 , 98 P. (2d) 906 (ig3g), 127 A. L. R. 735 (1940), noted (1940) 88
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 88o; Sampson v. Sampson, 16 R. I. 456, 16 At. 711, 3 L. R. A. 349
(1889); Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496, 194 S. E. 706 (1938); Ruge v. Ruge, 97
Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1o63, L. R. A. 1917F, 721 (1917). Cases collected, Notes (1917)
L. R. A. 1917F, 729; (193 71 A. L. R. 723, 726, 734; (1940) 127 A. L. R. 741, 742,
744. Generally, when alimony is omitted from the divorce decree, it cannot thereafter be inserted, even though statutory authority empowers the courts to modify
the award. Duvall v. Duvall, 215 Iowa 24, 244 N. W. 718 (1932), 83 A. L. R. 1242
(1933). Cases collected, Note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1248.
2"Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. i63, L. R. A. 1917F, 721 (1917); Brin v.
Brin, 147 Va. 277, 137 S. E. 503 (1927).
Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496, x94 S. E. 706 (1938).
,
'*Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51 165 Pac. 1o63, L. R. A. 1917F, 721; Brin v. Brin,
147 Va. 277, 137 S. E. 503 (1927).

2'Brin v. Brin, 147 Va. 277, 137 S. E. 503 (1927). See Gloth v. Gloth 154 Va. 511,
153 S. E, 879 (193o), 71 A. L. R. 700 (1931); Capell v. CapelI, 164 Va. 45, 178 S. E.
894 (1935); Casilear v. Casilear, 168 Va. 46, 19o S. E. 314 (1937).

21Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123, 61 L. R. A. 8oo, 93 Am.
St. Rep. 6oo (19o3); Fuller v. Fuller, 49 R. I. 45, 139 At. 662 (1927); Blethen v.
Blethen, 177 Wash. 431, 32 P. (2d) 543 (1934).
9Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535, 182 So. 205 (1938); Walker v. Walker, 155
N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663 (1898); Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496, 194 S. E. 7o6 (1938).
Cases collected, Note (1935) 97 A. L. R. 1188. Cf. Edmunds v. Edmunds, [1926] Prob.
202.
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circumstances similar to those involved in the Eaton case. In deciding
that the retroactive portion of the New York statute was an unconstitutional interference with the wife's property in the unaccrued alimony,
the court adopted the theory that the final divorce decree changed the
husband's obligation to support. The new obligation created by the
judgment was in the nature of a vested right which the legislature was
powerless to invade. A later New York court has explained that the
Livingston case did not decide that alimony was a mere debt. It recognized that the foundation of the award rested on the husband's marital
duty to support, but held that this previously indefinite obligation was
liquidated by the divorce decree.30
Thus the New York decisions would seem to imply that, in a divorce a mensa, the award of alimony is co-extensive with and dependent upon the husband-wife relation and the appertaining duty to support. When that relation is terminated by an absolute divorce the duty
to support ceases. Any alimony which may be awarded in the decree is
based on the obligation created by law or the court at the time of the
marriage dissolution. It becomes a right fixed by judgment.3 l
The courts which have taken this majority position, that the legislature cannot give retroactive operation to statutes allowing changes in
permanent alimony, point to the severance of the matrimonial bonds
as the reason for differentiating between alimony decreed in a divorce
a vinculo and alimony in a divorce a mensa.3 2 To the minority, which
regards the right to alimony as inchoate until the time for payment has
arrived even in the absence of a reservation and statutory authority,
such a distinction is unimportant.3 3 That the parties by a divorce
a vinculo have become strangers at law does not alter the fundamental
premise. The purpose of the alimony provision is to afford a continuing maintenance for the wife in the form of a judicial substitute for her
lost right of support.3 4 It should be revised as the circumstances of the
'Wilson

v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 408, 75 N. E. 236 (195o).
"See Munson, Some Aspects of the Nature of Permanent Alimony (1916) 16 Col.
L. Rev. 217.
'Brin v. Brin, 147 Va. 277, 137 S. E. 503 (1927); Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165
Pac. io63, L. R. A. 1917F, 721 (1917); and see Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377,
66 N. E. 123, 6s L. R. A. 8oo, 93 Am. St. Rep. 6oo (sgo3).

'Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898), 45 L. R. A. 8o6 (1899).
'Cf. the dissent of O'Brien, J., in Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 389,
66 N. E. 123, 127, 6s L. R. A. 8oo, 805, 93 Am. St. Rep. 6oo, 606 (1903) in which
it was contended that an alimony award was a mere creation of equity and had "...
no more of the attributes of property than the common law right to marital support for which it is an imperfect substitute."

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

parties and the other conditions affecting its award change. 35 By this
holding no violence is done the principle of res judicata; the divorce
decree is "final" in that it operates res judicata as to the facts existing at
the time of its award.36 There would appear to be nothing unusual for
an equity decree to be absolute in some respects yet variable in others. 37
From the standpoint of judicial history the position of the majority
is understandable, but its doctrine is not compelling. Lacking Ecclesiastical Courts, the American states executed the English concepts of divorce by the regular processes of equity and the common law.3 8 Although the divorce a vinculo was, with modifications, a statutory declaration of ecclesiastical principles,3 9 a final decree of divorce was
given the same binding effect as any other final decree. 40 It would seem,
however, that by every dictate of reason the right to unaccrued alimony
should be subject to the changed circumstances of the parties. 41 To
deny inflexibility is to recognize that the duty to support extends further than the scope of the marital bonds. The primary function of a
court decreeing permanent alimony should be to provide an adequate
maintenance for the divorced spouse and the family, independent of
financial aid from the state.42 Any theory by which the administration
of this function is rendered inflexible is contrary to the purpose of the
alimony award. The Virginia court is to be commended for refusing
to follow the Livingston case, and for impliedly abandoning the majority doctrine to which it had heretofore subscribed.
Emv Cox, JR
Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334-(1898), 45 L. R. A. 8o6 (1899);
Emerson v. Emerson, io Md. 584, 87 Ad. 1O33 (1913); Simpson v. Simpson, 154 Ore.
396, 6o P. (2d) 936 (1936). Cases collected, Notes (1917) L. R. A. 191 7 F, 729; (1931)
7V A. L. R. 723, 726, 738; (194o) 127 A. L. R. 741, "742, 745'See Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 38 S. Ct. 182, 62 L. ed. 444, L R. A. 19i 8C,
355 (918).
'Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898), 45 L. R. A. 8o6 (1899); Francis v. Francis, 192 Mo. App. 710, 179 S. W. 975 (1915).
1
Bradway, Why Pay Alimony? (1937) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 295.
"2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 104.
4Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123, 61 L. R. A. 8oo, 93 Am. St.
Rep. 6oo (1903); Sampson v. Sampson, 16 R. 1.456, 16 Atd. 711, 3 L. R. A. 349 (1889).
"Cf. dissenting opinion of Chadwick, J., in Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165
Pac. io63, 107o, L. R. A. 1917F, 721, 729 (1917) "..every reason, the dictates of common sense, the interest of society, and the logic of our statutes defining the status
of married persons, save the law, call for a different rule."
"Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Alimony Law (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 186, 196. Cf. West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 699, io S. E. 876, 877 (1920)
Alimony "...is an order compelling a husband to support his wife, and this is a
public as well as a marital duty-a moral as well as a legal obligation."
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LABOR LAW-MAJORITY VOTE OF EMPLOYEES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT AS PRE-REQUISITE TO PEACEFUL PICKETING. [Wisconsin]

The case of The Hotel & Restaurant Employees' InternationalAlliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board1 for the first time
brings into purview an important provision of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. 2 The statute provides that "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employee individually or in concert with others: To
co-operate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing, boycotting
or any other overt concomitant of a strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against whom
such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a
strike....,,
The action giving rise to the instant case was a strike by employees
of two hotels, no vote having been taken, and an attempt by the
strikers to picket the employer's business. The Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board found: first, that the contractual relationship between the unions and the employer was terminated by the calling of the
strike; second, that the unions were guilty of an unfair labor practice
by engaging in picketing and boycotting without first obtaining the
approval of the majority of the employees by secret ballot; third, that
all of the former employees who went out on strike and who remained
out on strike were guilty of an unfair labor practice by co-operating
and engaging in a strike without first obtaining the approval of a
majority of such employees; fourth, that certain named persons by
reasons of threats and assaults or by misdemeanors committed by them
during the strike were guilty of unfair labor practices. The board on
the basis of these findings ordered the unions immediately to cease
and desist from: one, engaging in promoting or inducing picketing at
or near the hotels; two, attempting to hinder or prevent by threats,
intimidation, force or coercion of any kind the pursuit of lawful work
by the employees of the hotel company; three, boycotting in any way
2294 N. W. 632 (Wis. 1940), rehearing denied, 236 Wis. 329, 295 N. W. 634 (1941).
2Wis. Laws (1939) c. 57.

3Wis. Laws (1939) c. 57, § ui.o6 (2) (e).
"The term 'collective bargaining unit' shall mean all of the employes of one
employer (employed within the state), except that where a majority of such employes engaged in a single craft, division, department or plant shall have voted by
secret ballot as provided in section ii .o5 (2) to constitute such group a separate
bargaining unit they shall be so considered. Two or more collective bargaining units
may bargain collectively through the same representative where a majority of. the
employes in each separate unit shall have voted by secret ballot as provided in section 111.05 (2d) so to do." Wis. Laws. (1939) c. 57, § 111.02 (6).
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the hotel company. The unions in appealing from the order of the
board relied upon two recent cases, Thornhill v. Alabama4 and Carlson
v. California,5 to uphold the contention that the Wisconsin statute in
requiring the approval of a majority of the employees before there
could be an authorized strike was in violation of that freedom of speech
which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and by the Wisconsin Constitution. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the order of the board by holding that the
legislature can provide that only a majority of a collective bargaining
unit has the power to authorize a strike, and that picketing is an unfair
labor practice unless a strike has been called with proper authorization.
The court took the position that a fundamental prindple of Congress in regulating labor relations was to allow a majority of a collective
bargaining unit to coerce the minority in the matter of bargaining;
therefore, the state legislature could follow the same policy by putting
it within the power of a collective bargaining unit to determine
whether conditions in the employment did or did not merit the calling
of a strike.8 The congressional action referred to is found in the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Peace Act, which
appear to have received varying interpretations by different authorities.
Dicta in two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States would
seem to indicate that the only coercion provided for in those statutes
is that which requires the employer to enter into negotiations with the
representatives of the majority of a collective bargaining unit.7 He is
not compelled to reach an agreement with them, but only to make a
reasonable effort to do so.8 And whether he makes such agreement or
not, he is still free to make contracts with individual employees as he
wishes.9 Thus, it is said that no coercion applies to either the majority
or minority of any collective bargaining unit or to any employees.
'31o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093

(1940).

531o U. S. 1o6, 60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. ed. 1104 (1940).
6294 N. W. 632, 640 (Wis. 194o).
Stat. 453 ('935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (a) (Supp. 1940), N. L. R. B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. i, 44, 57 S. Ct. 615, 627, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937); 48 Stat.
1186 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (9) (Supp. 194o), Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 548, 57 S. Ct. 592, 6oo, 81 L. ed. 789 (1937).
8N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 44, 57 S. Ct. 615, 628,
81 L. ed. 893 (1937); Virginian Ry Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515,
548. 57 S. Ct. 592, 599, 81 L. ed. 789 (1937).
ON. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45, 57 S. Ct. 615, 628,
81 L. ed. 893 (1937); Virginian Ry Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515,
548, 57 S. Ct. 592, 600 (n. 6), 81 L. ed. 789 (1937).
749
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However, the language of the statutes does not seem to sustain this
view,' 0 and the debates on the Labor Relations Act in both houses of
Congress show a contrary legislative intent." Further, the Labor Relations Board has taken a position opposing the Court's dicta, in ruling that the employer violates the act by negotiating with any group
12
other than that representing the majority of the employees, or by
13
entering into agreements with the employees individually. It has been
very pertinently observed that the view denying the majority the right
to negotiate for the whole body conflicts with the fundamental precepts of democratic institutions and undermines the essential purposes
of the act.' 4 Therefore, while no ultimately compelling authority is
available, the position of the Wisconsin court seems justified on this
point.
In passing on the effect of the provision prohibiting picketing unless the strike has been authorized by a majority vote, the court had to
deal with a serious charge that the statute threatens fundamental civil
liberties. In the Thornhill case, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that an Alabama statute which prohibited loitering or picketing
of even a peaceful nature was unconstitutional because it contravened
the guarantees of free speech afforded by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The same court in the Carlson case held a
county ordinance similarly unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Murphy
speaking for the Court in the Thornhill case stated:
"In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed
by the Constitution.... Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substan"49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (a) (Supp. 1940): "(a) Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer." See also 48 Stat. i86
(1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (9) (Supp. 1940).
"See Sen. Rep. 573, 7 4 th Cong., 1st. sess., and House Rep. 1147,
sess. See Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy (1940) 224-32.

"Elbe File & Binder Co.,

2

7 4 th

Cong., ist

N. L. R. B. 9o6. And see National Motor Bearing

Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 409.

"Sands Mfg. Co., i N. L. R. B. 546, 558; Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,
i N. L. R. B. 181; Atlas Bag and Burlap Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 292.
"See Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy (1940) 224 if.
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tive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the
market of public opinion." 15
The Court went even further in declaring that:
the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither
so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion.... But no clear and present
danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right
of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent
in activities of every person who approaches the premises of an
employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving
the latter."'16
Thus, peaceful picketing is per se a means of lawful exercise of
one's freedom of speech. It may therefore seem difficult to understand
how a state can make a majority vote of all the employees a pre-requisite to the enjoyment of that right which is given to the individual
by the Federal Constitution. In American Federation of Labor v.
Bain17 an Oregon statute prohibited all picketing or patrolling unless
there was a bona fide "labor dispute," and a "labor dispute" was defined as an "actual bona fide controversy in which the disputants stand
in proximate relation of employer and the majority of his or its employees ....,118 The Oregon court held the statute unconstitutional,
saying:
"The fundamental constitutional right...was declared to be
secured to 'every person.' We see no escape from the conclusion
that the denial of such a right to the members of a minority is
no less an unconstitutional abiidgement of the right simply
because it is saved to the majority." 9
The Wisconsin court in the principal case considered the decision
of the Oregon court, but distinguished it on the ground that the word
"picketing" in the Oregon statute meant that kind of peaceful picketing which the Thornhill and Carlson cases held to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 20 The Wisconsin statute, on the other hand,
"3to U. S. 88, 102, 104-5, 60 S. Ct. 736, 744-5, 84 L. ed. io93 (1940).

"'310 U. S. 88, io5, 6o S. Ct. 736, 745-6, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
P. (2d) 544 (Ore. 1940).
Isoregon Laws (1939) C. 2, § i. See 1o6 P. (2d) 544, 547 (Ore. 1940).
"1o6 P. (2d) 544, 555 (Ore. 1940).
2'The Oregon Court expressly recognized this aspect of the statute with which
it was concerned. The broad coverage of the term picketing was said "to indicate
17106

conduct of a noxious character with which the state has power to deal. But it also
embraces activities which the Supreme Court holds the state may not lawfully suppress." American Federation of Labor v. Bain, 1o6 P. (2d) 544, 554 (Ore. 1940).
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was viewed as referring only to the kind of picketing which the Supreme Court had expressly recognized as subject to state regulation
21
aimed at preservation of peace and protection of life and property.
This interpretation of the statute was based on the clause by which the
legislature declared that the act should not "be so construed as to invade
unlawfully the right to freedom of speech." 22 Thus, while the prohibitory provision itself is unrestricted as regards the kind of picketing
covered, the courts are saddled with the duty of applying it only within
the limits allowed by constitutional guarantees of free speech.
That there is a permissible area of state regulation is recognized in
the Thornhill case in these words:
"It is true that the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a
share in the products of industry are subject to modification or
qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist.
This is but an instance of the power of the State to set the limits
of permissible contest open to industrial combatants....
And in the principal case the Wisconsin court found it possible to
bring the majority vote pre-requisite within the pale of valid regulation by the state. First it was pointed out that the Employment Peace
Act does not attempt to prohibit picketing but merely seeks to regulate
the exercise of this right. The "regulation" takes the form of a prohibition, however, in any strike which is "unauthorized" under the provisions of the statute. In terms, this prohibition includes all kinds of
picketing-peaceful or violent-and the cease and desist order of the
Employment Relations Board was as all-inclusive as the statute in this
regard. The Wisconsin court affirmed this order on the intrepretation
of the order as being "coextensive with the statute as construed.1 24 It
is difficult to determine exactly what the court meant by this phrase,
in spite of the fact that two opinions were written presenting the
court's conclusions. In view of the rehearing opinion's emphasis on
"Thornhill v. Alabama, 3io U. S. 88 at o5 , 6o S. Ct. 736 at 745, 84 L. ed. 1o93
(1940).

"Wis. Laws (1939) c. 57, § i i.i5. See 294 N. W. 632, 638, 639 (Wis. i94o). Further
distinction was found between the Oregon and Wisconsin statutes in the fact that
the prohibited picketing was in the former termed to be unlawful and a misdemeanor, whereas in the latter statute only an unfair labor practice is declared. As a consequence of the commission of unfair practices, the miscreants lose their status as
employees, and by virtue of that fact forfeit the rights which the act gives employees
conducting an authorized strike.
3io U. S. 88, 103-4, 6o S. Ct. 736, 745, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
2294 N. W. 632, 642 (Vis. 1940).
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the significant fact that violence occurred during the picketing, and
in view of the court's repeated mention of the clause in the statute to
the effect that the act shall not be applied to infringe on freedom of
speech, it seems probable that the order of the board was sustained as
a prohibition of further picketing in this unauthorized strike, such
prohibition being justified by the fact that there had been violence and
disorder in the previous activities of the pickets. The recent Supreme
Court decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies25 sanctions the enjoining of all future picketing where in past
picketing there has been violence of such nature as to have a coercive
influence in future activities. Thus, the statute as applied to the situation before the board and court does not appear to invade any constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties.
It may then be argued that, under the clear language of the Thornhill case, a court must consider the general provisions of the statute itself rather than merely the evidence under it, where regulation of the
exercise of freedom of speech is concerned. 28 Pursuing this policy, the
Wisconsin court would have to examine the validity of the statute as
it might operate in a case in which there was no violence or disorder in
the picketing done. What the result of such an inquiry would be is conjectural, but it is believed that the statute would still be upheld but
its scope of operation limited. In case of an authorized strike without
violence in picketing, of course, by its specific terms the prohibitions
of the act do not apply. Where an unauthorized strike is accompanied
by only peaceful and orderly picketing, the specific terms seem to
apply, but here the saving clause forbidding any construction violating
freedom of speech would be invoked. If, as seems probable, the doctrine
of the Thornhill and Carlson cases precludes the prohibiting of peaceful picketing even in unauthorized strikes, then the court must find
that the statute does not apply-for to apply it would be to invade the
right of freedom of speech, whereas the legislature has declared that
2351 S. Ct. 552 (1941), noted 41 Col. L. Rev. 727, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1064.

""Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has never been deemed a
requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the
dissemination of ideas.... It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the
censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the
danger to freedom of discussion.... Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the
statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits
of permissible conduct and warns against transgression." 31o U. S. 88, 97, 98, 60
S. Ct. 736, 741, 742, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940); but cf. opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 56 S. Ct. 466, 480, 80
L. ed. 688 (1936).
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no such application shall be made. If, on the other hand, the Supreme
Court rulings are regarded as not covering the issue presented in this
situation, the regulation of the Wisconsin statute would probably be
extended to all types of picketing in the promotion of an "unauthorized" strike. Such is the legislative mandate.
It may well be thought that the statute here in question shows a
lamentable regression from that leadership in state labor policy which
has heretofore been typical of Wisconsin. 27 If a state is to be allowed to
require a majority vote of a collective bargaining unit before even
peaceful picketing is permitted, the holdings of the Thornhill and
Carlson cases will be reduced in many situations to a useless doctrine,
and the bargaining power of labor will have received a serious blow. 28
However, the Wisconsin court in carrying out its function of applying
and interpreting the statute seems to have followed the only reasonable
course open to it. As the court itself observed, it is not the judge of
legislative wisdom, but only of constitutional validity.2
LYNELL G. SKARDA.

SURETYSHIP-RIGHT OF SURETY PAYING CREDITOR'S CLAIM AGAINST

IN-

SOLVENT BANK TO BE SUBROGATED TO POSITION OF CREDITOR. [Fed-

eral]

The recent case of American Surety Co. v. -Bethlehem National'
Bank' poses the question of the extent to which a surety on a bond of
an insolvent bank may prove and receive dividends by subrogation to.
the depositor's claim. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had deposited $135,000 in the Bank, and this deposit was secured by collateral
in the form of stocks and bonds worth $12,0oo and the Bank's bond of'
$125,000, the plaintiff being surety on the bond. On the insolvency of
the Bank, the Commonwealth sold the collateral which had been
pledged, and later received the first dividend in the course of the Bank's.
liquidation. The plaintiff then paid the remainder of the amount of
the Commonwealth's deposit-approximately $68,5oo. Conceiving itself
MSee, Rice, The Wisconsin Relations Act in 1937, [1938] Wis. L. Rev. 229.
1It is not unusual for the members of a union to constitute a minority of the
employees of a collective bargaining unit. See American Federation of Labor v.
Bain, io6 P. (2d) 544, 554 (Ore. 194o).
"Hotel 9- Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 294 N. W. 632 at 642, and 236 Wis. 329, 295 N. W. 634 at 635,
(1941).
21

6 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 3rd, 194o).
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to be subrogated to the exact position of the creditor-Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, the Surety Company claimed the right to receive the
same percentage dividends of the assets in future liquidation payments
as the Commonwealth would have received. The Federal District
Court upheld this contention. 2 However, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the share of
the Surety Company in the distribution of the Bank's assets should be
based on the amount which the Surety Company actually had paid in
satisfying the Commonwealth's claim. This is to say that as the Bank
pays further liquidation dividends, the Surety Company will receive
its payments on the basis of a total claim of $68,5oo, instead of on the
basis of a $135,000 total claim which would have applied had the

Commonwealth been receiving the dividend as a depositor.
Since the case of Merrill v.National Bank of Jacksonville, the federal courts have permitted creditors of an insolvent national bank to
prove their claims on the basis of the full amount owing to them, without deductions for collateral they hold or for collections made from its
sale.3 This so-called "chancery rule," which was in a large measure the
basis for the decision of the lower court,4 was adopted by the federal
courts in preference to the "bankruptcy rule." By the latter rule a
creditor may prove only the amount of his original claim against the
bank less the collections he has made and the value of the security
which he holds. The statute concerning insolvent national banks merely provides that the distribution be "ratable, '5 and the Supreme Court
has decided this to mean the "chancery" rather than the "bankruptcy"
rule.6
233 F. Supp. 722 (E. D. Pa. 194o). The comments in (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 349

and in (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 1448 approve the holding of the District Court. It is
to be understood, of course, that the total recovery of the surety would not be allowed to exceed the sum it had actually paid.
Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 S. Ct. 360, 43 L. ed.
140 (1899). Many state courts favor the rule.

The "chancery rule" has been much criticized as bringing about inequality to
the unsecured creditors. The courts upholding the rule state that the secured creditor has the absolute right to recover his debt from the general assets of his debtor,
without recourse to any collateral he may have taken; and that this contract right
of recourse is vested so that the accident of insolvency cannot take it away from the
secured creditor. For full discussion and case classification see, Notes, L. R. A. i9i8B,
1024, and (1935) 94 A. L. R. 468.
433 F. Supp. 722 (E. D. Pa. 194o).

5Rev. Stat. § 5236 (1864),
6A third class of cases
ruptcy rule. They hold that
,dividends are to be paid is

12 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1936).
has followed a rule varying slightly from the bankwhen the collateral has been sold, the claim on which
reduced by the amount of the realization on the col-
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In the principal case the court recognized that if this had been a,
case of a creditor trying to prove his claim, it would have been bound
to follow the Supreme Court rule announced in the Merrill case. But
here the surety of the debtor was seeking subrogation to the rights of'
the creditor. Therefore, it was declared that the precedent was not di-rectly in point. The court held itself free to apply a different rule to,
a surety, unless it should be true, as the plaintiff contended, that asurety by subrogation steps into the exact position of the creditor.
Thus, the ultimate issue for the court's decision was whether the surety
in this case was entitled to be so subrogated.
In order to protect the creditor in his rights against the debtor, it
is the agreed principle of subrogation that the surety cannot be subrogated to the creditor's rights until the latter's claim has been fully
satisfied.7 However, this does not mean that the surety must pay theentire claim. If the surety pays a part of the obligation and the remainder is paid from another source or sources, as through the sale of
collateral or through part payment by the debtor, the creditor's need7.
for protection is obviated, and the surety's demand for subrogatiom
may be heard.
It is stated as a general principle that "when a surety pays his principal's debt he has a right to be substituted to the position of thecreditorwhen he pays.... It [right of subrogation] entitles the surety
to use any remedy against the principal which the creditor could have
used, and in general to enjoy the benefit of any advantage that the
creditor had..... 8 However, subrogation is a doctrine of an equitable
nature.9 When its operation will be contrary to the established principles of equity, it will not be enforced. 10 In instances where the
surety may not be subrogated, it can resort to a direct remedy against
the principal debtor based on the right of indemnity or reimbursement,
in which case the position of the surety is that of a general creditor.1 '
The remedy of subrogation is patently to be preferred, for through
lateral. This has been called the preferable rule. Jamison v. Adler-Goldman Co., 59
Ark. 548, 28 S. V. 35 (1894); Erle v. Lane, 22 Colo. 273, 44 Pac. 591 (1896); Wheat
v. Dingle, 32 S. C. 473, i S. E. 394 (189o); Note (1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 232, 239.
'See 6o C. J. 721 and the cases cited therein. Also see Arant, Suretyship (1931) 59.
sArant, Suretyship (1931) 357. (Italics supplied)
9
Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty (1927) § 131. Also 6o C. J. 696 and cases cited.
2"The surety's right may be lost by laches. See Note (1899) 13 Harv. L. Rev. 509.
Also the surety must present his claim with clean hands. If the consideration between
surety and principal is illegal, the surety will not be subrogated, even if forced to
pay for the default of the principal.
"Arant, Suretyship (1931) § 73.
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its use the surety can have the advantage of any sort of preference
2
which the creditor might have enjoyed.'
The surety is entitled to be subrogated to the creditor's rights as
:they existed before the payment of the creditor's claim, which in the
.principal case was at the moment of the Bank's insolvency.13 At that
-time, under the "chancery rule" which bound the federal court, the
creditor was entitled to prove for the full amount of his deposit. But
the Circuit Court of Appeals was of the opinion that to allow this regular operation of the doctrine of subrogation in this case would give
rise to inequitable consequences, and that therefore the court should
invoke its discretionary power to refuse to the plaintiff his remedy of
subrogation. It was pointed out that the Surety Company had deliberately undertaken the risk of the Bank's becoming insolvent and had
been paid for doing so. Also that to give the surety dividends on the
basis of the Commonwealth's total deposit would necessarily result in
the other general creditors of the Bank receiving less money in a distribution of assets. Thus, "the surety and the depositors shared the
same risk. It seems fair that they should share, in partial compensation
for their loss, on the same basis"14-that is, in proportion to the
amounts of their actual losses.
A similar decision in another circuit1 5 is apparently the only authority in support of the principal case. While no decisions to the contrary have been discovered,' 6 the conclusion does not seem proper. It is
true that the other creditors will be able to recover more of their claim
'2American Bonding Co. v. Reynolds, 203 Fed. 356 (D. Mont. 1913); U. S.
Fidelity Co. v. McFerson, 78 Colo. 338, 241 Pac. 728 (1925); Maryland Casualty Co.
v. McConnell, 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W. 410 (1924); Central Trust Co. v. Bank of
Mullens, 1o7 W. Va. 679, 15o S. E. 221 (1929). See other cases cited in Arant, Suretyship (1931) 363. But see the Pennsylvania rule to the effect that the surety is not allowed subrogation to the Commonwealth's preference, Note (1929) 78 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 12o discussing the case of In Re S. Philadelphia State Bank's Insolvency, 295 Pa.
433, 145 At. 520 (1929). The overwhelming weight of authority on this point seems
against the Pennsylvania case. The Federal rule favors subrogation to the government's preference, and this has been made statutory. 1 Stat. 676 (1799), 31 U. S. C. A.
§ 193 (1926); Hunter v. U. S., 5 Pet. 173 (U. S. 1831); American Surety Co. v. Carbon
Timber Co., 263 Fed. 295, 298 (C. C. A. 8th, '919); U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Union Bank
and Trust Co., 228 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).
13Lumpkin v. Mills, 4 Ga. 343, 349 (1848). This early opinion states: "The substitution of the surety is not for the creditor as he stands related to the principal
-after the payment, but as he stood related to him before the payment. He is subrogated to such rights as the creditor then had against the principal."
Il16 F. (2d) 75, 77 (C. C. A. 3 rd, 1940).
15Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cox, 1o4 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
"The case of In Re Thompson, 300 Fed. 215, 217 (W. D. Pa. 1924) supports the
opposing rule, but it concerns the problem of rights of a surety against co-sureties.
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from the insolvent Bank if the plaintiff can only claim for the amount
he has paid. But this additional recovery is purely a windfall which
the creditors would not have enjoyed had the Commonwealth sought
its full share of the liquidated assets, in the absence of a surety. The
issue is clear enough: Whether to grant the general creditors a windfall, or to let the subrogation be complete and enable the Surety Company to approach nearer to a full recovery.1 7 The other creditors had
no part in obtaining the surety, and it would seem that as to their
claims all the dictates of equity and fairness would be met by treating
those claims exactly as they would have been handled if there had been
no surety.
Policy favors the protection of sureties in order to insure the desirable freedom of credit. While it is true that the surety undertook the
risk of the Bank's failure and was paid therefor, yet it is only reasonable to assume that in contracting this obligation, the Surety Company
proceeded on the premise that in case it had to pay the Commonwealth's claim, it would enjoy the advantage of being subrogated to the
Commonwealth's position. This premise seemed justified in the light of
the general application of the subrogation doctrine, and the surety's undertaking should be measured in view of it. The compensation of which
the court spoke was presumably calculated to reimburse the company
for assuming the risk of having to pay a creditor to whose favorable
position the surety could be subrogated. If that right is not accorded,
the compensation has failed to give the reimbursement intended.
The holding in the lower court, favoring a larger recovery for the
surety, would seem better than that rendered in the Circuit Court of
Appeals. That this must be true is forcibly demonstrated by the fact
that under the principal case holding, the extent of the loss which will
result to the surety depends on the caprice of the creditor as to whether
it shall go first against the debtor and accept dividends, or apply at
once to the surety for payment' s . Or at least the extent of loss depends
'In Lumpkin v. Mills, 4 Ga. 343, 355 (1848), the court observed: "If anybody is
entitled to complain, it is the creditor, who holding a lower grade of claim, is excluded by the substitution of the surety. But, really, no injustice is done to him.
The surety by paying the debt to the cretitor, abstracts from the assets of the principal debtor, just that amount which the creditor himself would have abstracted, if
he had not paid it." To the same effect, see Arant, Suretyship (1931) 359.
"'The case of Pice v. Pace's Adm'r., 95"Va. 792, 3o S. E. 361 (1898), favors the
rule which allows proof of the full amount in the interest of greater certainty and
uniformity to the surety's position. See also, In Re Thompson, 300 Fed. 215, 217 (W.
D. Pa. 1924) which supports the opposite rule to that of the principal case as applied
to the analogous problem of the right of a surety against the co-sureties.
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on whether the surety pays the creditor before any dividends are paid
to the creditor or after some liquidation payments have been made. For
the court concedes that the windfall which it proposes to give the other
creditors would not be available if the surety paid its creditor's claim
immediately and entered its own claim for the full amount of deposit.
In the case of In Re Thompson, where a closely similar problem was
decided, it was pointed out that "Equity would seem to require that the
rights of the parties should be definitely fixed by law rather than made
dependent on the uncertain procedure of the creditor." 19 Surely if this
benefit can validly be swept away from the general creditors by so
simple an action as paying earlier in the proceedings, the loss of benefit does not give such unfair and inequitable results as to necessitate the
abrogation of the general suretyship doctrine of subrogation. In other
instances the surety's right of subrogation has been guarded jealously
by the courts, as where the surety is declared to be released because it
has been deprived of its right of subrogation by the creditor's extension
20
of time to the principal debtor.
It seems probable that the unexpressed reason for the holding in
the principal case is that the court desired to avoid the operation of
the "chancery rule," which was thought to be too favorable even to
secured creditors themselves. However, in shying away from one inequitable result, the court has apparently produced another inequity.
In trying to prevent over-compensation it has decreed under-compensation. Perhaps as a preferable compromise position, the surety should
have been given the right to prove on the basis of a claim of $123,000,
which was the amount of the creditor's deposit minus the sum received
from the sale of collateral security. Inasmt1ch as subrogation is a creature of equity, surely the courts can apply it with such flexibility as to
give the proper settlement in each individual case.
JOHN E. PERY

TAXATION-POWER OF STATE TO IMPOSE TAX MEASURED BY INTRASTATE
EARNINGS ON DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS BY FOREIGN CORPORATION.

[United States Supreme Court]
With the recent case of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.,1 the Supreme
Court of the United States has taken the third step in a development
begun in 1873. During this seventy year period, the Court's concepts
'3oo Fed.

215, 218 (W. D. Pa. 1924).
"Arant, Suretyship (1931) § 68.

161 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. ed.

222

(1940), rehearing denied, 61 S. Ct. 444 (1941).
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regarding the significance of the "subject" and "measure" of state
taxes 2 have undergone a process of revision which has now seemingly
reached the furthest extreme in removing judicial restraints on state
taxing power.
The beginning of this development appears in The Delaware RailRoad Tax Case s in which the Court upheld a Delaware tax requiring
railroads to. pay the state one-fourth of one per-cent on the cash value
of their shares. If a railroad did business in more than one state, the
proportion of business taxable in Delaware was based on the ratio
that the number of miles of track in that state bore to the entire line.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, said:
"It is not for us to suggest in any case that a more equitable
mode of assessment or rate of taxation might be adopted than
the one prescribed by the legislature of the State; our only concern is with the validity of4 the tax; all else lies beyond the
domain of our jurisdiction."
This statement lays down the principle of the first group of decisionsi.e., that the Court judges a tax only by whether it involves a valid subject of taxation; it has no concern with the nature of the measure of the
tax.
This view was reiterated almost twenty years later in two cases with
opinions again written by Mr. Justice Field. The Court upheld in
Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.5 a tax on the privilege of exercising
franchises within the state, measured by the gross receipts per mile,
and in Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York6 a tax on franchises measured either by a per cent of capital stock according to dividends paid,
or by the actual cash value of the stock. A short time later the Court,
with Mr. Chief Justice Fuller writing the opinion, sustained a tax on
the right of commission merchants to do business, measured by the
amount of business, regardless of whether it was local or interstate. 7
3Isaacs, The Subject and Measure of Taxation (1926) 26 Col.. L. Rev. 939, 940.
"Subject" is defined as "... that on which the statute says the tax is imposed." The
"measure" of a tax is explained as "... that element whose magnitude in each particular case, given the rate of the tax, determines the amount which the taxpayer
must pay."
st8 Wall. 206, 21 L. ed. 888 (U. S. 1873).
'18 Wall ao6, 231, 21 L. ed. 888 (U. S. 1873).
5142 U. S. 217, 12 S. Ct. 121 (dissent, 12 *S.Ct. 163), 35 L. ed. 994 (891).
0143 U. S.305, 12 S. Ct. 403, 36 L. ed. 164 (1892).
7Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1, 12 S. Ct. 810, 36 L. ed.
6oi (1892). See Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S.688, 15 S.Ct. 268, 39 L.

ed. 311 (1895).
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In all these cases the Court concerned itself only with the subject of
the tax and did not give attention to the measure. It must also be noticed that the Court at this time attached no significance to the fact that
the tax might fall on interstate as well as local commerce.
In i9o8, with Mr. Justice Holmes speaking, the Court in Galveston,
Harrisburg,and San Antonio Ry. v. Texas s started the second line of
decisions. There it was held that even though the subject matter of the
tax was good, the tax still failed because its measure was bad. The tax
was levied on the gross receipts of railroads from all sources of income.
The plaintiff railway was located entirely within the state of Texas,
but a large portion of its gross receipts came from interstate business
with connecting lines. In holding the tax invalid, the Court distinguished Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.9 on the ground that the
levy in that case was an excise tax imposed on the privilege of exercising a franchise, and was in lieu of other property taxes; on the other
hand, the Texas tax was on the gross receipts themselves, not being in
the nature of a privilege tax. It was further held that since the measure
took in business done outside the state, this tax amounted to an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. It seems dear that the Court
here made a definite break from its former opinions in which no attention was given to the measure and the sole inquiry concerned the
subject of the tax.
Under the impetus provided by the Texas case, the Court during
the next few years invalidated several statutes on similar reasoning. A
Kansas statute 10 which imposed a tax on the right of foreign corporations to do business, the levy being measured by the amount of the
corporation's capital stock, was held unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce."' An Oklahoma statute12 which levied a gross income tax on public service corporations in addition to the taxes already
imposed, the tax being apportioned according to the ratio that the gross
receipts of business in the state bore to total receipts, was declared
void 18 as being of the same nature as the tax-in the Texas case,14 in that
S. Ct. 638,

L. ed. io3i (19o8).
163), 35 L. ed. 994 (891).
"'Kansas Gen. Stat. (19o) p. 28o; Gen. Stat. (igo5) p. 284.
8210 U. S. 217, 28

'142 U.

52

S. 217, 12 S. Ct. 121 (dissent, 12 S. Ct.

'Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 3o S. Ct. 190, 54 L. ed.
355 (1910).
2
2 0kla. Sess. Laws (191o) c. 44, p. 65, § 2.
2Oklahoma v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298, 32 S. Ct. 218, 56 L. ed. 445
(1912). In 192o, however, a Connecticut statute (Conn. Laws of 1915, c. 292, Part IV,
§§ 19-29) taxing income attributed to business done in the state was upheld, inasmuch as it was not shown that income earned outside that state was included.

1941]
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the measure of the tax by gross receipts was invalid. A few years later
a Texas franchise taxi 5 was declared void, because though its subject
was one over which the state had control, it imposed too great a burden on interstate commerce.1 6 In 1925, the Court considered a Massachusetts statute1 7 which imposed an excise for the privilege of carrying on or doing business within the Commonwealth, the tax being
levied on shares of stock attributed to such business and on the proportion of the income attributed to such business. The tax was held
invalid because its subject (interstate commerce) was not a taxable
subject, though on this occasion the Court seemed to think that the
measure was a valid one.' 8
As late as 1938, in the case of Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co. v. Johnson,9 the reasoning of the foregoing group of decisions was
employed to strike down a California tax.20 The subject was good inasmuch as the tax was on the doing of a local business; but the measure
was bad because there was an attempt to touch business done entirely
outside the control of California. The next year a Texas statute2 was
upheld which imposed a franchise tax on the outstanding capital stock,
surplus, and undivided profits of the corporation, plus its long term
obligations. This tax was measured by the ratio of the gross receipts of
its Texas business to the total gross receipts.2 2 Both of these taxes were
franchise taxes, but the former was rejected because of its extra-territoriality, while the latter was upheld because it was measured by local
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 45, 65 L. ed.
165 (1920).

2'Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 21o U. S. 217, 28 S. Ct. 638, 52 L. ed. io3i
(19o8). But during this same period a Minnesota statute [Rev. Laws of Minn. (19o5)
c. 11.], which imposed a tax on gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes, was upheld.
The Court said this was allowed because it was done in the exercise in good faith
of a legitimate taxing power, and though the measure covered some elements not

taxable, the tax was not an attempt to burden the conduct of interstate business as
it was in lieu of all other taxes. U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 355, 32 S.
Ct. 211, 56 L. ed. 459 (1912).

"Texas Acts of 1893, p. 158; Acts of 1897, p. i68; Acts of

19o7,

p. 5o3; Rev. Stat.

(1911) Art. 7394-

'"Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 38 S. Ct. 85, 62 L. ed. 23o (1917).
27Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 63 § 3o.
"8Alpha-Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct. 477, 69 L.
ed. 916 (1925).

29o3 U. S. 77, 58 S. Ct. 436, 82 L. ed. 673 (1938).
"*Cal Const., Art XIII, § 14; Cal. Stat. (1921) C. 22, pp. 20, 21; Political Code,
§ 3664b.
"Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 7o84.
"Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 3o8 U. S. 331, 6o S. Ct. 273, 84 L. ed. 3o4 (1939).
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capital in Texas, the amount of which was determined by an approved
23
formula.
From a review of the above cases it appears that during the period
19o8-1939 the Court not only looked to the subject of the tax but also
to the measure of it. If either of these was improper, the tax was invalidated.
At the present term, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. . C. Penney
Co. 24 took the final step in the progression when it held valid a Wisconsin statute 25 which levied a tax on the privilege of declaring dividends
from profits earned in Wisconsin, which dividends were paid out by the
company in New York. 26 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
majority in sustaining the statute, observed that in reality it involved
merely an additional income tax on a corporation doing business in
the state, in spite of the fact that the legislature had specifically said
that the tax was on the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends
out of income derived from property located and business transacted in
Wisconsin. The Court held that if Wisconsin had provided such a tax
as the price of the privileges offered corporations within its borders, it
would dearly be upheld.27 The proper test was stated to be whether
the property was taken without due process of law, and it was concluded
that the privilege of doing business in Wisconsin was ample basis for
this levy.
Looking at the tax from the viewpoint of the Wisconsin legislature,
it is plain that the subject was bad, because the tax attempted to cover
activities that were done entirely outside of Wisconsin. All money received by the defendant in Wisconsin was sent to New York, and all
dividends of the company were declared and paid in New York. On
the other hand, the measure of the tax was a proper one. It was based
on a formula that had already been accorded the approval of the
Supreme Court 28-i. e., the income to be attributed to Wisconsin bears
the same relation to the total income of the company as the gross busi2For a general discussion, see Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 838.
246, 85 L. ed. 222 (194o), rehearing denied, 61 S. Ct. 444 (1941).
2Wis.
Stat. (1937) § 71.60 "The Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously held the tax invalid U. C.
Penney Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 233 Wis. 286, 289 N. W. 677, 126 A. L. R.
1333 (1940)], on the authority of Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U. S. 77, 58 S. Ct. 436, 82 L. ed. 673 (1938), see note 19, supra.
=Compare Continental Assurance Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U. S. 5, 61 S. Ct. I,
85 L. ed. 42 (1940).
28
United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. ed. 1135,
Ann. Cas. 19 18E, 748 (1918).
261 S. Ct.
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ness and property in Wisconsin bears to the total gross business and
property of the company. In substance, it appears that the Court has
said that even though the subject is bad, the measure used to ascertain
the tax is a good one and is fair; therefore, the tax will be sustained.
Of course, Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not say directly that the subject is bad, but he seems tacitly to admit as much by abandoning the
legislative declaration of the nature of the levy and saying that the tax
is nothing more than an additional income tax. By applying this title
to the levy, the majority then had no trouble distinguishing this case
from Connecticut GeneralLife Insurance Co. v. Johnson, for there the
tax had been called an excise tax; and, further, there it was the
29
measure, and not the subject, that was invalid.
Thus, after once having considered that only the subject of a state
tax was of significance, then having regarded a valid subject and measure both essential, the Court now seems to require only an acceptable
measure. This is apparently a radical departure from previous concepts
of taxing power, but the change in legal rules may be necessitated, as
the Court observed, by practical considerations in the form of the great
need of the states for additional revenue. It is not believed that Mr.
Justice Robert's fears that Wisconsin could now levy an ad valorem
tax on property outside of Wisconsin because it returned income in
Wisconsin 0 will come true. But this case has every indication of allowing states to tax as personal income, dividends to out-of-state stockholders of foreign corporations doing business in the state. It is to be
supposed, however, that the Supreme Court will not approve any tax
that is not essentially fair. The tax in the principal case seems to meet
the test of fairness in that it is a tax on profits that were earned in Wisconsin, even though the subject of the tax was said by the legislature to
be something entirely out of the jurisdiction of the state.
G. MuRRAy SMITH, JR.

"'The four dissenting Justices contended that the tax must be declared invalid
on the authority of Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, therein
concurring with the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See note 26, supra.
"Dissenting opinion, Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 61 S. Ct. 246, 251, 85 L. ed.
222 (1940).
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[Texas]

By its recent decision in Ener v. Gandy,' the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals has reaffirmed and perhaps extended its earlier repudiation of
the "family purpose doctrine." In this case it appeared that the defendants' seventeen year old son had obtained permission to drive his parents' car to a football game in which he was to participate. During the
trip the car collided with plaintiff's car, and in the accident plaintift
received personal injuries, her husband and child were killed, and her
car damaged. In a suit to recover for her losses, plaintiff contended that
the defendant father 2 should be liable for damages caused by his son's
negligence, because the father was the owner of the car and had given
the son permission to drive it. The trial court's judgment for the
defendants, based upon an instructed verdict, was affirmed on appeal.
Since the decision of Trice v. Bridgewater3 in 193 5 , the Texas
courts have consistently maintained the rule that the family purpose
doctrine has no application in that jurisdiction. 4 When urged to adopt
the doctrine in the Trice case, the Court of Civil Appeals, in a well
considered opinion, asserted that neither law nor reason supported the
operation of such a principle. 5 In the instant case a situation more
favorable to the family purpose rule was presented. As the son was on
his way to play in a game for which he would receive credit in school,
the father had a more direct interest in his activity than in the usual
cases in which the child is merely bent on personal pleasure through
use of the family car. Nevertheless, the court refused to place liability
'141 S. W. (2d) 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 194o).

-The alleged liability of the mother was based upon her presence in the car
and her failure to exercise proper control over the son's driving. This phase of the
case is not relevant to the discussion of the family purpose doctrine, and will not
be considered here.
sTrice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S. W. (2d) 63 (1935).
'Bluth v. Nelson, 127 Tex. Rep. 462, 94 S. W. (2d) 407 (1936); Sturtevant v.
Pogel, 109 S. W. (2d) 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Witt v. Universal Automobile Ins.
Co. t6 S. W. (2d) 1o95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Seinsheires v. Burkhart, 132 Tex. 336,
122 S.W. (2d) io63 (1939); See also Fernandez v. Lewis, 92 S.W. (2d) 305 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
5Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S. W. (2d) 63. 64 (1935): "A consideration of these cases [previously cited] leads to the inescapable conclusion that there
is no sound or logical basis in law or reason on which liability of the father for the
negligent acts of his son, while in the pursuance of his own personal ends and
pleasure, can be grounded."
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on the father, and so seemingly made its former rejection of the family
purpose doctrine complete and all-inclusive. 6
A fair statement of what the doctrine entails was announced in the
case of Norton v. Hall 7 in the following laiguage:
"The substance of the doctrine is that when the father or
other head of a family supplies an automobile for the use and
pleasure of the family, permitting the members thereof to use it
at will, those members thus using the automobile become the
agents of the head of the family, and that each one using it, even
for his own sole personal pleasure, is carrying out the purpose
for which the automobile is furnished, and is the agent or servant of the head of the family, so that the latter is liable for injuries resulting from negligence, under the doctrine of respondeat superior."
This doctrine is a comparatively new legal rule which did not make
its appearance until the advent of the automobile.8 The fact that it
was developed to cope with the problems arising from ever-increasing
automobile accidents has led some writers to title it the "family car
doctrine." There has been a sharp variance of opinion in the different
jurisdictions as to the propriety of the doctrine, with many courts refusing its acceptance. And except in situations in which an orthodox
agency relation can be shown, it is only in the states which have incorporated the family purpose doctrine into their law that recovery may
be had from the parent for injuries caused by a member of the family
driving the family automobile. 10
OIn Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S. W. (2d) 63, 67 (1935), the court
limited its decision in these words: "The question of liability of a father, if any, for
negligent acts of his child while driving the family car in furtherance of some particular mission of the father or some business mission which may involve the moral,
intellectual, and material welfare of the child or other members of the family, and
in which matter the father has a direct interest, is in no manner to be affected by
this decision." In the principal case the court decided that the son in playing football was in pursuit of his own personal pleasure, and that it was wholly immaterial
that he was driving the car with permission of his father or that the son received
credit in school for playing football.
"149 Ark. 428, 232 S. W. 934, 935 (1921), 19 A. L. R. 384, 385 (1922).
85 Am. Jur., Automobiles § 365.
'Harper, Torts (1933) § 283, p. 60.
1
Benton v. Regeser, 2o Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1919); Stickney v. Epstein, oo
Conn. 170, 123 Atl. 1 (1923); Smith v. Callahan, 34 Del. 129, 144 Atl. 46 (1928); Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P. (2d) 351, 93 A. L. R. 984 (1934); White v. Seitz, 342
Ill. 266, 174 N. E. 371 (1930); Landry v. Oversen, 187 Iowa 284, 174 N. W. 255 (1919);
Grier v. Woodside, 2oo N. C. 759, 158 S. E. 491 (1931); Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S. C.
171, 81 S. E. 487 (1914). See also (1936) 1oo A. L. R. 1021; 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles
§ 365; Harper, Torts (1933) § 283.
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The whole gist of the argument advanced by the courts to justify
the doctrine is based on the agency principle of respondeat superior.
When the father, as head of the family, places an automobile at the
disposal of his family, the courts assume an agency to exist. This reasoning proceeds on the premise that furnishing the use of a car is a
means of providing pleasure for the family," and is a part of the ordinary duties of the father. Thus, a member of the family driving the car
is an agent engaged in a mission for the parent. The true reason for
the doctrine, however, is that the courts feel that by holding the father
liable, they are carrying out the dictates of justice. 12 Such a view, intimated in many decisions, is frankly adopted by at least one court,
which observed that ". . . the practical administration of justice between
the parties is more the duty of the court than the preservation of some
esoteric theory concerning the law of principal and agent."' 3 In the
usual case the actual driver of the automobile is judgment-proof, and
the only person financially able to respond in damages is the family
head who has placed the car in the hands of the negligent driver. The
courts are therefore faced with the alternative of finding a legal basis
for imposing liability on the parent or leaving the injured party
without means of recovering for his losses and injuries.
These arguments supporting the rule have been well rebutted in
14
cases rejecting it.
A thorough statement is found in Smith v. Calla5
han,' where the Delaware court refused to apply the family purpose
doctrine. The court very pertinently pointed out that agency is based
UStowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224 (1412); McNeal
v. McKain, 33 Okla. 449, 126 Pac. 742 (1912), 41 L. R. A. (N. s.) 775 (1913); Birch v.
Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913), 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 59 (1914). Of
course, once the doctrine has been adopted in a jurisdiction, later cases follow the
precedent without inquiring into its legal merit. Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150, 257
Pac. 1079 (1927); Grier v. Woodside, too N. C. 759, 158 S. E. 491 (1931).
2Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 1024 (1913), 50 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 59, 67 (1914) ".. Any other view would set a premium upon the failure of the
owner to employ a competent chauffeur to drive an automobile kept for the use of
the members of the family, even if he knew that they were grossly incompetent to
operate it themselves. The adoption of a doctrine so callously technical would be
little short of calamitous." Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P. (2d) 351 at 353, 93
A. L. R. 984 at 988 (1934).
"King v. Smythe, 14o Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296, 298, L. R. A. 19i8F, 293, 296
(1918).
1
Smith v. Callahan, 34 Del. 129, 144 Ad. 46 (1928), 64 A. L. R. 83o (1929);
Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 5o2, 33 P. (2d) 351, 93 A. L. R. 984 (1934); White v. Seitz,
342 111. 266, 174 N. E. 371 (1931); Harrington v. Gough, 164 Miss. 802, 145 So. 621
(1933); Lafond v. Richardson, 84 N. H. 288, 149 Ad. 6oo (1930); Piquet v. Wazelle, 288
Pa. 463, 136 At. 787 (1927); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5, 156 At. 399 (193).
534 Del. 129, 144 At. 46 (1928), 64 A. L. R. 830 (1929).
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upon the agent's doing something for the principal's benefit or in the
principal's stead. Factual agency is hard to find when a member of the
family is using the family automobile for his own personal pleasure
which is in no way connected with the family relationship.j 6 To the
argument that the doctrine satisfies the dictates of justice, this court
answered that the head of the family is guilty of no negligence in allowing members of his family certain pleasures, and should not be
held an insurer against any injury resulting from the negligence of
the permitee.
In the light of the mounting toll of automobile accidents, the social expediency of the family purpose doctrine seems generally admitted today, even among those who fail to see a legal basis for its
application. 17 Further proof of the desirability of the doctrine can be
found in the fact that courts have strained to give recovery on other
bases. One court allowed recovery on the ground that an automobile
is a dangerous instrumentality,' 8 while in other jurisdictions the
legislatures have passed statutes incorporating the family purpose
doctrine into their law or adopting rules of liability even broader
than that of the doctrine.19
"Smith v. Callahan, 34 Del. 129, 144 Adl. 46 (1928), 64 A. L. R. 83o (1929). The

court pointed out that since an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality, its
use by a son can be compared with his use of a baseball bat or any other instrument furnished by his father. There should be no more liability for one than for the
other.
."It is to be observed that the agency explanation of the 'family car' principle
is not very convincing. This, however, in no sense militates against the desirability of
the doctrine as a matter of social engineering." Harper, Torts (1933) § 283, p. 621.
See also Notes (1914) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 91; (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 543; (1932) 81 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 6o; (1926) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 187, where the writers agree to the desirability of the doctrine from a social standpoint but find no legal basis for it in our
common law. They suggest that the family purpose doctrine is a good subject for
legislative action.
IsSouthern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 8o Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (192o). The court's
position was that any vehicle requiring as much legislative regulation as an automobile should be classed as a dangerous instrumentality. But that an automobile is
not a dangerous instrumentality, see Smith v. Callahan, 34 Del. 129, 144 At. 46
(1928), 64 A. L. R. 83o (1929); Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 6o So. 150 (1912); Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 13o N. W. 336 (1911); Note (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
6o. The Florida court later reversed its stand and now appears to be in line with
the almost unanimous holding that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality. Herr v. Butler, ioi Fla. 1125, 132 So. 81i (1931); Engleman v. Traeger 102 Fla.
756, 136 So. 527 (1931); Green v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931).
"Public Acts of Michigan (1927) N. 56, § 29, p. 69; Laws of New York (193o) c.
64-a, § 59. For a good discussion of the legislative approach see, Lattin, Vicarious
Liability and The Family Automobile (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 846, 869.
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If it be admitted that the doctrine is socially desirable, the problem remains to find a more logical basis for its application. Since past
experience indicates that few legislatures are inclined to come to the
aid of the courts in this regard, judical action is the only means of
supporting the imposition of liability. Professor Harper advocates
the recognition of a new rule of vicarious liability, thereby avoiding
the controversy over factual agency.2 0 Such a solution carries the
merit of being a direct and undisguised move to the attainment of
the desired policy, and should be favorably received by those courts
which commend the aims of the family purpose doctrine but refuse
to adopt it because of the faulty agency concepts which support it.21
A further suggestion grows out of an examination of the evolution of respondeat superior. The historical origin of this principle
has been the subject of much controversy which has resulted in two
conflicting views. On the one hand some authorities have contended
that the doctrine is the result of judicial legislation by Holt in the
seventeenth century when he made the master liable for acts of the
agent when the agent acted with implied consent.22 Justice Holmes, an
exponent of the other view, traced the principle from the ancient
Roman law in which the father was held responsible for the acts of the
23
members of his family.

'"It seems better, in the absence of legislation, to frankly recognize a new rule
of vicarious liability, and to predicate the departure from 'established principles'
upon the real reason therefor, the demands of the welfare and safe organization
of modern society. By recognizing such a basis for the doctrine, the difficulties of
the agency theory are avoided." Harper, Torts (9s3) § 283, p. 621.
2An attempt at such a compromise may be found in the inauguration in Illinois
of a doctrine called the "Family Errand Doctrine." This state had formerly repudiated the family purpose doctrine in White v. Seitz, 342 IIl. 266, 174 N. E. 371
(193-). In O'Haran v. Leiner, 306 Ill. App. 230, 28 N. E. (2d) 315 (i94o), a husband
was held liable for his wife's negligence when she was driving the car to purchase
a dress for the daughter. The court seems to adopt a modified form of the family purpose doctrine, holding the head of the family liable when the car is being used for
family business. See Note (1940) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 3o9.
22In about 1688, Judge Holt used the implied consent theory as a basis of the
master's liability for acts of the servant. See Jones v. Hart, Holt 642, go Eng. Rep.
1255; Boulton v. Arlsden, Holt 641, go Eng. Rep. 1255. Also see: Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Act: Its History-II (1894) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 394, for a full
collection of these cases. It is admitted that many centuries before, the master had
been responsible for acts of his servant, but it is contended that these earlier holdings bear no relation to any present doctrine of respondeat superior. See Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (1894) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315 and 383; 2
Polloch and Maitland, History of English Law (1895) 526.
MAccording to Justice Holmes' view, the whole law of agency is based on the
theory that the father as head of the family should be liable for acts of the members
of the family, since the acts of the family were considered acts of the father. See
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Either theory which may be accepted may be thought to give a
foundation for the present application of the family purpose doctrine.
If the very origin of respondeat superior lies in judicial legislation,
then the extension of the concept by further judicial legislation to
embrace the policy of the family purpose doctrine does not seem a
surprising development. 24 Changes in the conditions of man's existence continually result in modifications of legal rules to fit the new
circumstances. On the other hand, under the Holmes view, the family
purpose doctrine seems not to be a new principle at all. Rather, it
appears as a return to a simple and fundamental precept which was
thought necessary under the family system of ancient times, and may
at present have become again as necessary under different conditions.
Foaasr WaIL

TORTs-LIABILITY IN CONVERSION OF LANDLORD DISPOSING OF CHATTELS,

LEFT ON PREMISES BY FORMER TENANT. [Massachusetts]

It is a common occurrence for a landlord or new tenant taking possession of a building to find there belongings which were left by a former occupant. Very often these effects left behind are apparently worthless articles, such as old books, papers, pictures and all kinds of odds and
ends, and in many cases they have been abandoned by their owner.
When such goods are in fact not abandoned, a troublesome problem
arises as to the nature of the new occupant's duty in respect to thesechattels.
This question is exemplified by the recent case of Row v. HomeSavings Bank.1 The defendant held a mortgage on a building which
was occupied by a Campfire Girls Council. Plaintiff had hired a room
from the Council until June, 1932, after which she removed most of
Holmes, Agency (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345: "I then shall give some general reasons
for believing that the series of anomalies or departures from the general rule which
are seen whenever agency makes its appearance must be explained by some causenot manifest to common sense alone; that this cause is, in fact, the survival fromancient times of doctrines which in their earlier form embodied certain rights and
liabilities of heads of families based on substantive grounds which have disappeared
long since ...
"
2"... ethical standards have changed in the past; no doubt they will continue to
change in the future. It is not inconceivable that respondeat superior is but theforerunner of a different way, perhaps a more intelligent way of dealing with a social problem." Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 444, 454.
129

N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass. 1940).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

her belongings, but continued, with the consent of the Council, to use
the room during that summer. When she terminated her tenancy and
left the community at the end of the summer, she intended to return
and get the rest of her property. In May, 1933, plaintiff was notified by
the Council that it was vacating the building and that everything was
to be moved out. By June, 1933, the Council had removed all its prop,erty, but in the room formerly occupied by her, the plaintiff had left
a suitcase and two old trunks, one of which was unlocked. These were
.filled with manuscripts, letters and documents, family photographs,
and other personalty of varying intrinsic and sentimental value. 2 Plain-tiff returned to the room in July, 1933, and at that time left the property unchanged. She came back to the premises on August i, but could
not enter the building because a new lock had been put on it. And
later she learned that in the meantime, on July 13, 1933, defendant by
his agent had entered, foreclosed the mortgage, and caused the "debris," including plaintiff's property, to be removed.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in holding that the
defendant had not committed a conversion, declared that the plaintiff
had no right to keep her property on the premises of the defendant,
whose duty to such property did not extend beyond reasonable conduct. The apparent worthlessness of the property excused the defendant from looking for the real owner, and made the disposal of the property fall within the term "reasonable conduct." In the words of Justice
Lummus, speaking for the court: "His [defendant's] duty depends upon
its [the property's] value to the eyes of a reasonable man in his position,
not upon the value that it may later be shown to have. He is entitled to
act upon appearances." And the fact that the property was removed or
thrown away "... was no wrong to the plaintiff. Her own conduct led
the defendant naturally to the course taken."s
Thus it appears that the two factors of the property's apparent
worthlessness and the plaintiff's apparent abandonment of it gave defendant full right to dispose of the goods left on his premises. In view
of the frequency of the occasions in which buildings owners find themselves confronted with situations like that in the principal case and of
the difficulties which beset such owners in trying to determine how
such property should be handled, the result reached in this decision
-The trunks also contained photographic plates and films, a 17 th century Japanese lacquered escritoire, two antique sewing boxes, some linen and embroidery,
a carved ivory tusk, some books and china, some silver spoons and silver plated ware,
a crayon portrait, and some curiosities from New Zealand.
329 N. E. (2d) 552, 554 (Mass. 1940).
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seems the best practical solution to the problem. However, legal principles to support the result are not easily discovered.
According to the usual standards, the Home Savings Bank converted
4
the plaintiff's property by assuming the right to throw it away. The
property, though apparently abandoned by plaintiff, was not actually
or legally abandoned,5 but still belonged to plaintiff;6 and generally,.
any unlawful exercise of dominion over another's property is a conversion. It is ordinarily no defense to an action for conversion that thedefendant acted in good faith, did not know who owned the property, 7
8
or thought the property was abandoned, or that he himself owned it.9Y
In addition, it has been held in at least one case that mistaken belief
as to value is not defense, 10 and other cases have established the law
that it is not necessary that the property be of commercial value in
11
order that its taking be the basis for an action in trover. Neither can

the contributory negligence of the owner of the property be a defenseto an action for conversion. 12 The foregoing cases seem to demonstratethat the reasonableness of defendant's action is not even a material.
factor in deciding whether he is a converter.
'Beasley v. Central of Georgia Ry., 29 Ga. App. 584, 116 S. E. 227 (1923); Hall v..
Merchants' State Bank, 199 Iowa 483, 202 N. W. 256 (1925); Eisenberg v. Nelson, 247S. W. 244 (Mo. App. 1923); McClintock v. Parish, 72 Okla. 26o, 18o Pac. 689 (igig);:
Pittman-Harrison Co. v. Fox Bros. 228 S. W. 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). See also 26.
R. C. L. io98, §§ 2, 3; Restatement, Torts (1934) § 226.
5"The question whether there is an abandonment or not, thus turns on the
fact of intent to be determined by the jury in the light of all circumstances. Without
the intent there can be no abandonment." Brown, Personal Property (1936) 9.
OThere must be actual intent to abandon. International Finance Corp. v. Jawish,
63 App. D. C. 262, 71 F. (2d) 985 (1934); Hediger v. Zastrow, 174 Minn. 1,28 N. W.
172 (1928); Pearson v. Black, 12o S. W. (2d) 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Delay in
removing property is not abandonment. Bickham v. Bussa Oil & Gas Co., 152 So.
393 (La. App. 1934). Non-user is not abandonment. Riedman v. Barkwill, 139 Cal.
App. 564, 34" P- (2d) 744 (1934)'Naitional Atlas Elevator Co. v. U. S., 97 F. (2d) 94o (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Poggi v.
Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 139 Pac. 815 (1914); Prudential Insurance Co. of America vThatcher, 1o4 Ind. App. 14, 4 N. E. (2d) 574 (936); Nesvold v. Gerding, 49 N. D.207, 19o N. W. 815 (1922).
6Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 387, 139 Pac. 815 (1914).
OCarver v. Ketchum, 53 Idaho 595, 26 P. (2d) 139 (1933); Moore v. Andrews, 203
Mich. 219, 168 N. W. 1037 (1918); Pine & Cypress Mfg. Co. v. American Engineering
& Construction Co., 97 W. Va. 471, 125 S. E. 375 (1924).
"OPoggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 139 Pac. 815 (1914). See Teal v. Felton, 12 How. 284,
13 L. ed. 98o (U. S. 1851) (unlawful detention of a mere newspaper by a postmaster
held to be a conversion).
'-Vaughn v. Wright, 139 Ga. 736, 78 S. E. 123, 45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 785 (1913); Wartman v. Swindell, 54 N. J. L. 589, 25 At. 356 (1892).
"-Varney v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 309, ioo N. E. 65o, L. R. A. 1915A, 629 (1913).
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However, when the enforcement of even such a well-established
principle of law13 conflicts with the rights of another property owner
-to use his own premises as he reasonably desires, it is natural for the
-courts to qualify the concepts of conversion in deserving cases. It was
ithis conflict in rights between two property owners which led the Mas•sachusetts court in the principal decision to declare that the ordinary
rules of conversion did not govern here. Other courts have taken similar
positions in recognizing the validity of acts done by building owners
in handling chattels of another left on the premises. For example, in
Geisler v. Stevenson Brewing Co. 14 the defendant, on taking possession
of a building as assignee of a lease, removed plaintiff's furniture, which
had been left on the premises, to a warehouse. Though this action was
taken without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, the court held that no
conversion had resulted from the removal of the property, because
there had been no demand and refusal to deliver, but rather defendant
had stored the goods subject to plaintiff's order and requested that she
retake them. 1 5 It is now established that the owner of premises on
which another's personal property has been left may, after reasonable
notice to such person to remove, himself remove the goods in order to
make a normal use of the premises. 16 Some cases have gone so far as
to hold that the landlord may destroy the tenant's effects when such an
act is necessary to enable him to obtain the use of his property, provided proper notice to remove was given to the tenant at the expiration
of the lease.17
In all the cases mentioned above there has been wrongful intermeddling, asportation, or detention of another's property. Nevertheless, the courts relax the rule of conversion in accordance with the cir,cumstances, and justify the defendants in such conduct as can be said
to be reasonable in each case. But even the cases discussed do not go
"Velzian v. Lewis, 15 Ore 539, 16 Pac. 631 (1888). See Carver v. Ketchum, 53
Idaho 595, 26 P. (2d) 139 (1933); Lee Tung v. Burkhart, 59 Ore. 194, 116 Pac. io6
(1911); 26 R. C. L. 1098, §§ 2, 3; Restatement, Torts (1934) § 226.
14126 App. Div. 715, 111 N. Y. Supp. 56 (19o8).
25The principal case referred to this right of the building owners to remove
goods to a warehouse. 29 N. E. (2d) 552, 554 (Mass. 194o).
"Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Maine 568, 8 Am. Rep. 442 (1871); Smith v. Detroit
Loan & Building Ass'n., 115 Mich. 340, 73 N. W. 395 (1897); Whitney v. Sweet, 22
N. H. 10, 53 Am. Dec. 228 (185o); Herrman v. Huntington, iii App. Div. 875, 98
N. Y. Supp. 48 (19o6), aff'd, 188 N. Y. 622, 81 N. E. 1166 (19o7); Rush v. Aiken Mfg.
'Co., 58 S. C. 145, 36 S. E. 497 (igoo); Alsbury v. Linville, 214 S. W. 492 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919).
"Opperman v. Littlejohn, 98 Miss. 636, 54 So. 77 (1911); Lyons v. Philadelphia
& R. Ry., 209 Pa. 550 , 58 At. 924 (1904).
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quite as far as the principal case, in that here no notice was given by the
defendant to plaintiff to remove her property.
The plaintiff in Row v. Home Savings Bank,'8 by her negligent delay in removing her goods and failure to notify defendant of her ownership, set up appearances that to a reasonable person occupying the
premises would indicate that the property had been abandoned. It is
true that Row did not actually abandon the property and the ownership did remain in her, because to constitute abandonment there must
be a clear and unequivocal intent to abandon on the part of the
owner.19 However, the plaintiff left goods which were to the ordinary
eye worthless junk. Seemingly the things had not been taken by their
owner because she no longer wanted them. In this connection, it must
be remembered that the premises had not been used actively for several
months prior to the defendant's taking possession. The fact that the
defendant had no dealings with the plaintiff and no knowledge that
she ever occupied the premises makes defendant's conduct all the more
reasonable. The case appears to fit exactly into the sensible rule, announced by the Massachusetts court in an early decision:
"The unauthorized appropriation of personal chattels will
generally be sufficient of itself to enable the true owner to maintain an action for their conversion.... But this severe rule of law
will not be applied when the action of appropriation can be
justified as having been authorized in any manner by the owner
HowARD WESLEY DoBBINS
of the property." 20

TORTS-R IGHT OF CHILD TO RECOVER FRoM DOCTOR FOR INJURIES
RECEIVED BEFORE BIRTH AS RESULT OF NEGLIGENT TREATMENT OF

MoTHmR. [New Jersey]
By its recent decision in Stemmer v. Kline,' the Circuit Court of
New Jersey has extended the scope of common law liability for negliN. E. (2d) 552 (Mass. 194o).
2'See Notes 5 and 6, supra.
10Hills v. Snell, 104 Mass. 173, 177, 6 Am. Rep. 216, 218-9 0870). In this case
the defendant, a baker, ordered flour from a merchant, C, who had to buy flour
from B to fill the order. B gave C an order on a warehouse for the flour. The flour
delivered to the defendant was not the flour which had been bought from C, but
was of a higher quality than ordered, mistakenly sent, and belonging to A. Defendant
consumed it, not knowing the difference. Other cases have acknowledged the existence of the doctrine set out in Hills v. Snell: Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass. 357, 33
N. E. 391 (1893); Somerville National Bank v. Homblower, 293 Mass. 363, 199 N. E.
918, 104 A. L. R. 1107 (1936).
1829

117 A. (2d) 58 (C. C. N. J. 1946).
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gence by upholding the right of an infant child to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained while the child was en ventre sa mere2 and
caused by the negligence of a doctor. The complaint in the case alleged
that the defendant had negligently diagnosed the condition of the
mother of the child and applied X-ray treatments to her; that she was
in fact pregnant; and that the result of the treatments was the birth of
the infant child as a microcephalic idiot without skeletal structure or
powers of sight, hearing, or locomotion. Defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaiht was denied.
Some rights of a child en ventre sa mere have been so often recognized and so well protected that there is no doubt concerning their existence. At common law, under what is termed the "civil rule," a child
when conceived is considered as born if such a fiction will operate for
the benefit of the child.3 This rule will not operate to the child's disadvantage, 4 and the right is conditioned upon the live birth of the
child. 5 Thus, a child en ventre sa mere has been held to be born for
the purpose of being vouched in a recovery, taking under the Statute
of Distribution, having a guardian appointed for it, taking by devise,
being entitled under a charge for raising portions, having an injunction issued, suing for the death of its father under Lord Campbell's
7
Act,6 and receiving other benefits.
2A child is said to be en ventre sa mere before it is born; while it is a fetus.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1934); 2o C. J. 1297.
sGroce v. Rittenburg, 14 Ga. 232 (1853); Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick. 255, 26 Am.
Dec. 598 (Mass. 1834); McLain v. Howald, 12o Mich. 274, 79 N. W. 182, 77 Am. St.
Rep. 597 (1899); Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35, 21 Am. Dec. 66 (N. Y. 183o);
Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 691, 119 Am. St. Rep. 943 (19o7); Wallis v.
Hodson, 2 Atk. 115, 26 Eng. Rep. 472 (1740).
'Re Haines' Will, 98 N. J. Eq. 628, 129 At. 867 (1925); Villar v. Gilbey, [1907]
A. C. 139, 145.
'Gillespie v. Nabors, 59 Ala. 441, 31 Am. Rep. 2o (1877); Marsellis v. Thalhimer,
2 Paige Ch. 35, 21 Am. Dec. 66 (N. Y. 1830).
OJudical declarations, in holdings or in dicta, covering these points may be
found in : Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jun. 227, 322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163, 27
Am. & Eng. Enc. 421 note 1, i Eng. Rul Cas. 498 (1799); Millar v. Turner, i Ves.
Sen. 85, 86, 27 Eng. Rep. 9o 7 , 9o8, Ves. Sen. Supp. 63, 64, 28 Eng. Rep. 457 (1747);
Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021, 1022, 11 L. R. A.
391, 392 (189o); Hill v. Moore, 5 N. C. 233 (18o9); Pearson v. Carlton, 18 S. C. 47, 56-9
(1882); Detrick v. Migatt, 19 Ill. 146, 149, 68 Am. Dec. 584, 585 (1857); Marsellis v.
Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35, 21 Am. Dec. 66 (N. Y. 1830); Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk.
229, 230, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 ( 1424); Quinlen v. Welch, 69 Hun 584, 23 N. Y. Supp.
963 (1893); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Contreras, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 72 S. W.
1051 (1903); The George and Richard, L. R. 3 Adm. & Eccl. 466, 24 L. T. N. S. 717,
27 Am. & Eng. Enc. 421 note 1 (1871).
7
Crisfield v. Storr, 36 Md. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 480 (1872) (Child en ventre sa mere
can take remainder in fee); Cooper v. Heatherton, 65 App. Div. 561, 73 N. Y. Supp.
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In the so-called "criminal rule," the common law recognizes a distinction between a deliberate injury to an unborn child which prevents its birth alive, and a deliberate injury to an unborn child which
results in its death subsequent to birth. The former is not punishable
as murder,8 but the latter isg-this, because according to legal concepts
there can be no murder of a being which has never been "alive." And
though there be no direct injury to the child, yet if a child is quick
within the mother' ° at the time of an attempted abortion, and as a result is born prematurely and dies because it is too young to survive
the changed environment, that, too, is murder."
These two rules covering both civil and criminal rights and liabilities have been proffered as reasons for allowing a child to sue for
prenatal injuries to itself,' 2 but most courts have not recognized the
validity of this argument. The court in Stemmer v. Kline' 3 admitted
that the majority of the cases on the question would seem, in the absence of close analysis, to deny the action; but it felt that many of these
cases could be distinguished and that the weight of the better reasoning
4
would allow the recovery.'
14 (19o0) ("youngest child" held to be child en ventre sa mere); Mason v. Jones, 2
Barb. 229 (N. Y. 1848) (child en ventre sa mere will take in trust in accumulation
for children); Jenkins v. Freyer, 4 Paige Ch. 47 (N. Y. 1833) (child en ventre sa mere
is considered as in esse, conditioned on his live birth, and will take as if born during
life time of testator); Stedfast v. Nicoll, 3 John. Cas. x8 (N. Y. 1802) (child en ventre
sa mere took a vested estate subject to ulterior contingent remainderman); Laird's
Appeal, 85 Pa. 339 (1877) (child en ventre sa mere held to be "issue living'); Smart
v. King, i Meigs 149, 33 Am. Dec. 137 (Tenn. 1838) (child en ventre sa mere included
in "all my grandchildren'); Trower v. Butts, i Sim. & St. i8s, 57 Eng. Rep. 72 (1823)
(child en ventre sa mere held to be a child "born within testatrix's lifetime" so as
to include it within terms of trust); Snow v. Tucker, i Sid. 153, 82 Eng. Rep. 1027
(1714) (devise to child en ventre sa mere is good); see io Am. & Eng Enc. 624 and note.
'Coin. v. Parker, 9 Met. 263 43 Am. Dec. 396 (Mass. 1845); State v. Cooper, 22
N. J. L. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 248 (1849); 1 BI. Comm. 129.
'Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671, 67 Am. St. Rep. 157 (1898); Regina v.
West, 2 Car. & K. 784, 175 Eng. Rep. 329 (1848); Rex v. Senior, i Moody, C. C. 346,
168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832); See i Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932) § 783; Notes
(19o4) 63 L. R. A. 902, 9o8; (1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 580, 582.

:°Usually about the tenth to twenty-fifth week of pregnancy. Dates from time
the embryo moves into abdomen; in eyes of law, life starts at this time, although the
fetus is alive from moment of conception. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1934) roio.
"Regina v. West, 2 Car. & K. 784, 175 Eng. Rep. 329 (1848).
1It is argued that since for all beneficial civil rights the child en ventre sa mere
is considered as alive, then it ought to be so considered in the analagous situation
where the benefit is the right of a tort action; that since the child en ventre sa mere
is a person such as to make its destroyer guilty of murder, then a mere damager
ought to be liable in tort on the same reasoning.
17 A. (2d) 58 (C. C. N. J. 194o).
"See Boggs, J. in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 111. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48
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The thirteen cases 15 which militate against the child's right to
maintain the action give six reasons for the denial. It is said that such
an action has never been previously allowed and that there is no common law action for such injuries; 16 that a child en ventre sa mere has
no existence apart from that of its mother until its birth, and thus no
duty of care is owed it until that time;' 7 that no right of action in the
child is needed because the mother may recover damages for all the
injuries to the unborn child, if they are not too remote; I8 that the
death statutes sued upon do not include such a person within their
meaning;' 9 that to allow a recovery under these facts would result in
great inconvenience and danger of fraudulent actions and uncertainty
2
of proof;2 0 and that the court has no power to legislate judicially. '
The first case which deals with the problem is Dietrich v. City of
L. R. A. 225. 228, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176, 179 (19oo); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R.
Co.- 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1913); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry.
& Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916, 917, L. R. A. 19 17G, 334 (1916); Drobner
v. Peters, 194 App. Div. 696, 186 N. Y. Supp. 278 (1921); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa.
Dist. & Co. R. 227 (1924); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 Doam. L. R. 37, (1933)
Can. L. R. 456; 1 Bevin on Negligence (4 th ed.) 75; Frey, Injuries to Infants en
Ventre sa Mere (1927) 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 85; Kerr, Action by Unborn Child (19o5)
61 Cent. L. J. 364; Morris, Injuries to Infants en Ventre sa Mere (19o4) 58 Cent. L. J.
143; Straub, Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries (193o) 33 Law Notes 205.
2See cases discussed in body following, and cited in notes 16 to 21, 30, 31, 33,
34, 37"Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 111. App. ioo, i9 N. E. (2d) 446 (1939); Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 184 111. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176 (igoo);
Dietrich v. City of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884); Buel v. United Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71, 45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 625, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 613
(1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169,49 Atl. 704, 55 L. R. A. 118, 91 Am. St. Rep.
629 (1go1); Magnolia Coca-Cola Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944, 97 A.
L. R. 1513 (1935).
"*Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75
Am. St. Rep. 176 (19oo); Magnolia Coca-Cola Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W.
(2d) 944, 97 A. L. R. 1513 (1935).
"Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928);
Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, io8 So. 566 (1926); Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176
(1900); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
"Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75 Am.
St. Rep. 176 (19oo); Dietrich v. City of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242
(1884); Buel v. United Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71, 45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 625, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 613 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atl. 704, 55 L. R. A. 118,
91 Am. St. Rep. 629 (1901).
2'Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. CO., 214 Ala. 611, io8 So. 566 (1926);
Magnolia Coca Cola Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944, 97 A. L. R.
1513 (1935).
21
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 1oo, 19 N. E. (2d) 446 (1939); Berlin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. (2d) 28 (194o).
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Northampton,22 decided in Massachusetts in 1884. Recovery under a
death statute was denied for the child's death resulting from its premature birth, which was allegedly due to the mother's having slipped
on a defective highway. The child had lived only a few moments after
its birth, and the action was brought by its administrator. In holding
that the statute did not include such a person within its meaning, the
court discussed the issue of whether a being like the plaintiff's intestate
could sue at common law and decided that no such action would lie.
Justice Holmes, in writing the opinion, denied that there was any
analogy between the civil and criminal rules, and tort law applicable
to a conceived but unborn child.23 The court further observed that no
precedent existed for such an action, and that there was no reason to
allow the child a cause of action, since the mother could recover for
24
all injuries to it which were not too remote.
If the statute sued under in the Dietrich case was a wrongful death
statute,25 the case may not be in point with Stemmer v. Kline, as the
action would by necessity have to be given by the statute itself, there
being no action at common law for wrongful death. 26 If the statute
sued under was a survival statute27 the two cases may still be distinguished in that in the Dietrichcase there was no direct injury to the
child.28 Further, the degree of care that a community owes to its citizens
=i38 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
2Justice Holmes thought that any arguments for recovery based on analogies
to the criminal law were destroyed by the fact that, though the Massachusetts statute made attempted abortion a crime and increased the punishment if the mother
died, yet no distinction was made to turn on whether the child lived or died.
"Accord: Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, io8 So. 566
(1ga6), approved by Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So.
741 (1928).
"A wrongful death action is an action given by statute to the surviving dependent relatives of the deceased person or to the administrator of the estate. It is an
entirely new action, unknown at common law, and modeled after Lord Campbell's
Act, 9 & 1o Vic. C. 93. It is independent of any action which deceased could have
brought in his own right had he survived. Harper, Law of Torts (1933) § 279; McCormick, Damages (1935) § 9328Baker v. Bolton, Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1o33 (i8o8); Higgins v. Butcher,
Yelv. 89, 8o Eng. Rep. 61 (16o6).
"A survival statute permits the administrator of the deceased to sue upon a
claim which deceased could have maintained during his life time, or to revive and
follow to judgment any suit actually instituted by the deceased. At common law,
the cause of action was wiped out by death; a survival statute prevents this, but
gives no new ground of action, merely preserving the old. Harper, Law of Torts
(1933) § 279; McCormick, Damages (1935) § 9328In Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atl. 704, 55 L. R. A. 118, 91 Am. St.
Rep. 629 (19o), the court held that where the mother, quick with child, was injured
due to the negligent maintenance of a building and as a result the child died from
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may not be the same as that owed by a doctor to one of his patients. 2 9
The next case chronologically was Walker v. Great Northern R.
Co.,30 decided in Ireland in 18go. Here the mother was a paying passenger upon a train and was injured as a result of the negligence of
the operator. The child was born subsequently, in a deformed condition; and when suit to recover for the injuries was brought in behalf
of the child, the court sustained a demurrer to the complaint saying
that it was insufficient in that it did not aver a contractual relationship
between the defendant and the child en ventre sa mere. The issue of
whether a child could recover for prenatal injuries was expressly left
open by the Chief Justice, but three of the Justices expressed the
opinion that there was no such action. Inasmuch as this case was decided on the seemingly irrelevant basis of an absence of a contractual
relation, 1 it is not precisely in point with the issue in Stemmer v Kline.
Ten years later the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled on the question
in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.3 2 The mother of the plaintiff alleged
that she contracted with the defendant hospital for care during the
approaching birth of her child and for the care of the child, and that
both m6ther and child were injured directly through the negligent
operation of an elevator in the hospital. A demurrer to the complaint
was sustained, with one Justice strenuously dissenting. The court cited
Dietrich v. Northampton and Walker v. Great Northern R. Co. as
authority. However, the dissent pointed out that neither of these two
cases was in point. In the Dietrich case the child was not capable of
independent life at the time of its birth while here the child was still
living. This factor affords grounds for a differentiation between the
rights of a viable child and one incapable of life at the time its rights
were injured.3 3 In the Walker case there was no averment of knowledge
a premature birth, living but three days, there was no action for the death of the
child under the wrongful death statute. The fact that here the child suffered no
direct injury distinguishes this case also from Stemmer v. Kline.
'See Cooley, Law of Torts (188o) 649; Luka v. Lowrie, 117 Mich. 122, 136 N. W.
I o6, 1110 (1912), 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 290, 295 (1913).
10L. R. 28 Ir. 69 (189o).

'The court in this as in other "contractual" cases fails to show why the absence
of a contract prevents a tort recovery. Justice Clarke in his dissenting opinion in
Drobner v. Peters, 194 App. Div. 696, 186 N. Y. Supp. 278 (1921), pointed out that
the court was really denying a tort action for negligence and not a contract action.
-184
Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176 (10oo).
"In Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916, L.
R. A. 191 7 B, 334 (1916), the court limited its decision by holding that a child injured while en ventre sa mere could not recover if it was not viable at the time of
the injury. It was admitted that there was cogent reasoning for allowing recovery
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in the railroad of the existence of the child nor any contractual relationship between the defendant and the mother with respect to the
unborn child, while here the mother contracted directly with the hospital with respect to the child as well as with respect to herself, and the
hospital owed them a duty of care. Mention was also made by the
dissent of the civil and criminal rules concerning a child en ventre sa
mere, these rules being cited as supporting the view that the action
should lie.
34
This decision was followed by Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.,
which held that a child injured while yet unborn could not recover
for injuries received through the negligent operation of a public carrier. Again, as in the Walker case, the court relied upon the incomprehensible argument that there was no contract to carry as between the
defendant carrier and the child. But the language of the court was
strongly in favor of allowing a recovery under more limited facts. Thus:
"The indisputable fact is that one is answerable to the
criminal law for killing an unborn child who to that end is
regarded as in esse, and the further fact is that the unborn child,
so far as the property interests are concerned, is regarded as an
entity, a human being with the remedies usually accorded to an
owner. But the argument then proceeds that one must respect
the rights of ownership, and, so far as a civil remedy is concerned, disregard the safety of the owner. In such argument there
is not true sense of proportion in the protection of rights. The
greater is denied; the one lesser and dependent on the very existence of a person in esse and entitled to protection is respected.
...In my view, justice should not be turned aside and wrongs
go without remedies because of apprehension of what may hapdecided that an unborn child has
pen in jurisprudence if it 8be
5
some rights of the person."
In Drobnerv. Peters 6 a lower New York court, in a divided opinion, followed the above language of Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.
Co. to hold that a child could recover for prenatal injuries. The court
recognized the analogies of the civil and criminal rules in respect to the
rights of a child en ventre sa mere and pointed out that the statements
in the Nugent case were not dicta but essential to the holding. Upon
appeal the decision of this inferior tribunal was reversed,37 Judge
if the child was injured while viable, but the court expressly refused to decide the'
question.
3'154
m154
'194
'7232

App. Div.
App. Div.
App. Div.
N. Y. 220,

667, 139 N. Y. Supp 367 (1913).
667, 672, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1913).
696, 186 N. Y. Supp. 278 (1921).
133 N. E. 567 (1921).
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Cardozo dissenting. In delivering the prevailing opinion, Judge Pound
said:
"Strong reasons of public policy may be urged both for and
against following the new right of action. The conditions of negligence law at the present time do not suggest that the reasons in
favor of recovery so far outweigh those which may be advanced
against it as to call for judicial legislation on the question."' 8
Intermediate in time between the Nugent case and the Drobner
case, Buel v. United Rys. Co.3 9 was decided. There, the pregnant
mother was negligently injured while boarding a street train of the
defendants; the child was injured directly and died nine months after
birth. The court denied recovery under a wrongful death statute for
the death of the child. In a carefully worded opinion, the court stated
that at the time of the passage of the state's statute, admittedly a copy
of Lord Campbell's Act, 40 the common law as of that time gave no such
cause of action. The court thus admitted that the common law at the
time of the decision might be different from the common law as of
the time of the passage of the statute; which means that the court refused to decided whether the growth of the common law had since included such an action.
Although no recovery was allowed in these cases, yet the dissenting
opinions, the dicta, and the grounds of decision show that the courts
were strongly swayed by the arguments in favor of recovery, but
hesitated to take the final step, leaving that to Stemmer v. Kline.
To support its holding in the principal case, the court relied upon
the dicta and dissenting opinions in the cases discussed, and upon the
reasoning in an inferior court in Pennsylvania 4' and a Canadian
case,42 in which such a recovery was allowed. The Canadian court in
answer to the proposition that there was no analogy between the criminal and the tort law, remarked that most crimes were torts as well,
and that they were both really different aspects of the same facts. The
court in the principal case held that the civil rule in respect to a child
en ventre-sa mere extended to a tort action by the child since it was
for his benefit; that the law of negligence had so changed that it was
now time to determine judicially that such was the law. However, it
limited the holding to a situation in which the defendant was a doctor
'

232

'248

N. Y. 220, 224, 133 N. E. 567, 568 (1921).
Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 613 (1913).

409& 1o Vict. c. 93.

'"Kine v. Zukerman, 4 Pa. Dist. & Co.

R. 227 (1924).
"Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 Dom. L. R. 337, (1933) Can. L. R. 456.
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who knew or should have known of the existence of the child, and his
negligence resulted in injury to it.
The absence of a precedent does not mean that such an action is
not to be allowed, 43 for there must be novel decisions or the law would
soon become stagnant. Medical science has expanded and grown, and
many facts known today were unknown a few years ago.4 4 If the increase of medical skill and knowledge can now assure a more accurate
determination of the actual cause-result sequence, there is no real
reason to deny the action. The fear expressed by the courts that to
allow such action would make damages too speculative could be allayed by procedural safeguards. That this fear is the main basis for the
refusal seems to be clear when the various given reasons are considered.
The confusion resulting from deciding almost similiar fact situations
upon different grounds, and the failure to differentiate between
wrongful death actions and ordinary tort actions seem to spring from
this, rather than from purely legalistic reasons.
The issue would be almost entirely academic were it not for the
fact that, in spite of judicial declarations to the contrary, a parent can
not recover for all the damages done to the child before its birth. He
may recover for all the pecuniary damage he has suffered, 45 such as the
loss of services; 46 but he can not recover for injuries done to the child,
such as its disfigurement, 47 impaired earning power past the child's
majority, 48 or mental injury.49 He can not recover for any injury for
"Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225, 75
Am. St. Rep. 176 (igoo); Kujek v. Goldman, 15o N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773, 34 L. R. A.
156 (1896).
"See 17 A. (2d) 58, 62 (C. C. N. J. 1940).
"Birmingham R. Co. v. Baker, 161 Ala. 135, 49 So. 755, 135 Am. St. Rep. 118
(19o9); Union Pacific Ry. Co., v. Jones, 21 Colo. 340, 40 Pac. 891 (1895); Travers v.
Hartman, 28 Del. 3o2, 92 AtI. 885 (t914); McGreevey v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 232
Mass. 374, 122 N. E. (1919); Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N. Y. 422, 122 N. E. 249 (1919).
"Finnerty v. Cummings, 132 Cal. App. 48, 22 P. (2d) 37 (1933); Jackiewicz v.
United Illuminating Co., io6 Conn. 310, 138 Atl. 151 (1927); Thompson v. Town
of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N. E. 440 (1931); Scanlon v. Kansas City, 325 Mo.
125, 28 S. W. (2d) 84 (193o).

"1Durkee v. Central Pacific R. Co., 56 Cal. 388, 38 Am. Rep. 59 (x88o); Wilkie
v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 1o9 So. 225 (1926); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa.
372 (1858).
"Braswell v. Garfield Cotton Oil Mill Co. 7 Ga. App. 167, 66 S. E. 539 (1909);
Bong v. Webster, 217 Ky. 781, 290 S. W. 662 (1927); Dollard v. Roberts, 13o N. Y.
269, 29 N. E. 104 (1891); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 285 Pa. 116, 131 Adt.

665 (1926).
"Michigan Sanatarium &-Benevolent Ass'n. v. Neal, 194 N. C. 401, 139 S. E. 841
(1927); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Gregory, 73 S. W. 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o3).
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which the child, had it been a person in the eyes of the law, could have
sued in his own right.50
It has been speculated that this holding might allow a child to sue
his own mother for negligence, 51 but this is not true. The court expressly limited the decision, and did not lay down a broad rule. And
the fact that a valid rule of law may possibly be distorted to apply to
an inappropriate case should not dictate a refusal to recognize the rule
in a proper case.

GEoRGE F. MCINERNEY

WOPrescott v. Robinson, 74 N. H. 46o, 69 At. 522, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 594, 124 Am.
St. Rep. 987 (19o8).
51XXXVIH Time 68 (Feb. 24, 1941).
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